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Executive Summary 
The main aim of this report is to provide detailed evidence on the long-term resilience of 
Italian manufacturing, focusing, in particular, on the regions in the North-West (primary 
locus of Italy’s historical industrialization) and North-East (primary locus of industrialization 
in the 1980s and 1990s) of Italy. We study the case of Piemonte and also analyse the main 
trends in Lombardia, Emilia Romagna and Triveneto. Overall, this geographical macro area 
accounts for about 27 million people, equivalent to the population in BENELUX. The 
journey from Milano by train takes 45 minutes to reach Torino, 60 minutes to reach Bologna 
and 200 minutes to reach Venezia. Milano and Torino can be considered an urban 
agglomeration (e.g., the Metropolitan Statistical Area of greater Boston is about 110 km in 
diameter involves a mean work commute travel time of 45 minutes).  
We introduce and discuss a set of indicators aimed at capturing industrial resilience in the 
most recent years. We examine the evolution of our main indicators from the mid-1990s, the 
period when Italian productivity began to lag behind that of Germany, the other main 
European exporter.   
This report focuses, in particular, on how digital technologies (big data, computational 
power, algorithms and the related fast developments in artificial intelligence) are shaping the 
development of a new generation of cyber physical systems based on the convergence among 
robots, sensors and 3D printing. Digital technologies are reshaping the division of labour 
within and between firms, with a reallocation of capital and labour towards new activities. 
Moreover, digital technologies are increasing the importance of information-intensive 
monitoring and coordination activities while containing the relative importance of cost 
differences for lower skilled labour. Against this background of opportunities and challenges, 
regions and countries must facilitate the processes of re-shoring of those industrial activities 
with higher potential for generating value for the territories. The development of distinctive 
and smart capabilities related to the quality of institutions, scientific capabilities, 
technological skills and supporting infrastructures is crucial.  
Italy and its most advanced Northern area are emerging from the longest economic 
recession since the Second World War, having been particularly badly hit by high levels of 
unemployment and significant loss of GDP per capita compared to the most advanced regions 
in Europe. However, the report identifies clear possibilities for economic resilience based on 
advanced manufacturing capacity. The data tell a story of crisis that started well before the 
most recent economic recession, related to the slow down since the mid-1990s of Italian 
growth and productivity rates. The crisis merely exacerbated and accelerated what was 
already in motion. Ultimately, the crisis probably triggered a very painful process of selection 
among those companies that were unable to keep abreast with foreign competitors, due to 
lower levels of investment in innovation and over-reliance on internal demand. A prolonged 
period of reduced internal demand spared only those companies able to innovate and to 
growth in their export shares. In Chapters 1 and 2 we discuss how greater fragmentation of 
the global organization of production across national borders, has been reshaping the 
competitive advantages of firms and nations. Firms have become organized in supply chains 
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that can stretch across many countries and industries. However, following this wave of 
enthusiastic offshoring and outsourcing, some companies are beginning to reconsider this 
choice, as the initial cost advantages in alternative locations diminish and overstretched 
supply chains are starting to threaten the quality of and innovation in products and processes. 
We estimate that, given the current industry structure and to avoid endangering supply chains 
or production quality, only 13% of Italian jobs should still be offshore. This share is much 
lower than the comparable figures for other countries, for example, the US. At the same time, 
we estimate that, in the most recent years, Italy has caught up against its initial disadvantages 
with respect to other advanced economies, and has become more attractive for new 
manufacturing. 
However, we highlight that today’s manufacturing production differs from past 
manufacturing production. A process of intensive servitization is underway, involving an 
increasing share of (business) services being used as manufacturing inputs. Manufacturing 
goods are increasingly bundled with service. While it is clear that services are responsible for 
the largest share of GDP, a large portion of their value exists because they are crucial for the 
delivery of manufactured products and they are sold together with physical goods. In this 
context, Italian manufacturing has a relatively high services component. ‘Made in Italy’ relies 
increasingly on service activities to generate value for consumers.  
Focusing on a set of regions in the North of Italy and, in particular, Piemonte, this report 
identifies a set of indicators that capture firms’ economic and technological capabilities and 
regional educational background.  
We argue that the combination of firm capabilities and public infrastructure is allowing 
the North of Italy to respond to the challenges of new digital manufacturing. In a comparison 
to a sample of European regions involved in advanced manufacturing production, such as the 
German regions of Baden-Wurttemberg and Bayern, we show that Italy’s Northern regions 
(especially Piemonte, Emilia Romagna and Lombardia) have a competitive advantage in 
high-medium technology areas.  
Taken together, the regions belonging to the greater region of North-West of Italy employ 
1.6 million workers in manufacturing, a share of around 23% of total local employment. To 
trace technological capabilities, we investigate the number of patents owned by companies 
and public institutions in Robotics & Automation, and Computing Technologies, an area in 
which Europe has a position of competitive advantage, while Italy is ranked among the top 
countries in absolute and relative terms with growth in its relative specialization, second only 
to Germany’s. At the regional level, Piemonte and Emilia Romagna perform well for number 
of patents per inhabitant and exhibit strong (growing for Emilia Romagna and decreasing for 
Piemonte) relative specialization, even higher than that in Bayern. In the area of Computing 
Technology, the situation is rather bleak; it is well-known that the US dominates this 
technological area, while Italy is ranked last among the eight countries examined, in both 
absolute and relative terms. At the regional level, the situation is slightly better, with all 
Northern Italian regions and, especially, Piemonte showing a growing share of patents in 
relative terms. With the exception of Île-de- France, all the regions considered have a 
negative specialization in Computing Technologies.  
The literature shows that Italy’s share of R&D expenditure in GDP is low (1.37% in 
2014) due not only to the small size of its companies and its sectoral industrial focus but also 
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to the low propensity of large high technology companies to invest in R&D. The situation 
improves when we consider Italy’s Northern regions. All the Italian regions considered have 
achieved significant growth since 1995 then after the 2008 economic crisis. The growth rate 
has been particularly significant in Emilia Romagna and Triveneto. Piemonte with 2.2% of 
R&D to regional GDP outstrips countries such as Canada, The Netherlands, and the UK, and 
the share of business funding in Piemonte is about 80%, higher than all the countries 
considered and at the same level as Baden-Wurttemberg and Bayern. Even following the 
restructuring of research activities at FIAT after its acquisition of Chrysler and the transfer of 
some activities to North America, business R&D intensity in Piemonte has increased 
significantly.  
Finally, we show that the Northern Italian regions considered, according to the PISA Test, 
perform in secondary education similarly to the highest ranked countries in Europe (e.g. 
Veneto is similar to Finland, the top ranked country in Europe). The percentage of the 
population with tertiary education is much lower, with a catching up in recent years, in the 
age bracket 30-34. Italy seems to suffer from lack of development of a dedicated technical 
higher education system. In other European countries, this system developed during the 
1980s and 1990s and serves a significant share of students; however, in Italy, following 
several failed attempts, the Istituti Tecnici Superiori (ITS – Higher Technical Institutes) were 
finally launched in 2011.  
In the Third Chapter of the report we map the characteristics and future prospects for the 
key product technology of robotics and 3D printing in Italy and most advanced 
manufacturing regions. In both areas, we survey the existing product differentiation, which, 
especially in the case of robotics, is broad and covers a large number of different 
applications. The CO-BOTs or collaborative robots segment appears to show the greatest 
potential. Italy is a key robotics market and in 2016 has increased its share by 1.7% for a 
value of EUR 676 million. There are also many producers and research institutions in Italy 
that are leveraging on these wide internal markets; these are surveyed in detail. Piemonte and 
Lombardia account for more than half the Italian market. In Lombardia, large incumbents are 
mainly driving this positive result, while in Piemonte there is a relative high density of 
innovative firms. Similarly, Italian additive manufacturing is a fast-growing sector, 
accounting in 2014 for EUR 130 million total revenues. Additive manufacturing in Piemonte 
represents a technological excellence, due mostly to Avio Aero (GE Aviation Group) and 
Cameri. Avio Aero includes an important chain of companies specialized in the realization of 
high technology components for the aerospace and energy sectors. In Torino alone, we 
surveyed about 20 innovative companies in these fields. 
In the second part of Chapter 3 we briefly examine the evolution of the automotive 
industry and the pivotal role of Piemonte. The automotive sector is experiencing major 
innovations in the area of connected, intelligent and driverless cars. The industry exhibits two 
main trends: increasing concentration and power among large established companies, and a 
long value chain both upstream and downstream. In 2016, a record 94 million cars were 
produced (estimates predict 2 million sales in Italy by the end of 2017 with extremely high 
growth rate in the last 15 months, taking the Italian market back to almost the pre-crisis levels 
similar to France and the UK); however, global automotive manufacturing is concentrated in 
large own equipment manufacturers and involves high entry barriers. In Piemonte, there are 
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712 automotive components companies, which represents more than 36% of the total Italian 
car suppliers and accounts for more than 77,000 employees (55,500 in the automotive 
industry). In the distribution of Piemonte's turnover, generated by supplying Fiat Chrysler 
Automobiles, the impact of the group has grown further. Key regional drivers are innovation 
capabilities and export orientation; 74% of component companies in 2015 were involved in 
innovation activities (8% more than 2014), especially in the subcontracting and engineering 
and development segments. Piemonte’s export propensity has allowed the supply chain to 
ride the recent crisis and to reach nearly € 4.5bn (about 37% of exports Italian cars in 2015). 
Overall, the report identifies a shortage of competences in Computing Technology and 
Artificial Intelligence, key competitive areas for Northern Italy and Piemonte in particular. 
Although the machinery and robotics industrial base is quite robust, the input gaps identified 
could create a bottle-neck in the evolution of this industry towards advanced digital 
manufacturing. The short-term risk is decline in competitiveness in a region where the 
automotive industry is pivotal. This geographical area can certainly move to the next phase of 
industrialization. In particular, if it builds on its competitiveness in mechatronics and additive 
manufacturing it could become a global leader. To realize this goal, it is necessary to further 
develop Computing Technology and Artificial Intelligence competences, and favour the 
interaction of these with the developing competences in robotics and automation. This 
process will require investment and coordination among the actors and should be 
underpinned by specific interventions. We focus on a bundle of policies aimed at promoting 
the development of lacking competencies and integrating these with local competitive 
advantage. Policy actions must take into account present situation of binding budget 
constraints, and the objective of delivering quickly since, in the fast-paced world of 
technological and industrial transformation, windows of opportunity are narrow. 
We focus on two sets of polices. The first is aimed at developing human capital at 
different levels: the goal is to improve existing successful secondary, tertiary and post-
graduate education. This type of formal education complements on-the-job training and the 
strengthening of apprentice contracts. At the same time, we suggest ways to attract foreign 
professionals, based on career opportunities, financial incentives and local quality of life. The 
second set of policies focuses on coordination and diffusion mechanisms in the area, also 
strengthening the relations with universities and research institutions, which are already 
focusing on computing and robotic technology. We suggest the set-up of a lean entity, whose 
role would be to coordinate the resilience efforts of the area. The report describes such 
policies and discusses examples of successful cases abroad along with an estimate of their 
costs.   
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1 Digital technologies and industrial 
transformations 
1.1 Introduction  
Over the past decades, ‘digital technology’ has shaped the so-called Third Industrial 
Revolution – the first in the XIX century being characterized by steam and water, and the 
second at the beginning of the XX century being based on electricity and the emergence of 
mass production. In his book, ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution’, Klaus Schwab, Founder 
and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum suggests, will be a further step in 
human production based on a complete integration between the cyber and physical 
dimensions. The fourth revolution has the potential to transform not only the way we produce 
and distribute things but also the dynamics of customer engagement, value creation, 
management and regulation (Kagermann, et al., 2013; Schwab, 2017). An historical account 
of the origins, history and impact of cybernetics is beyond the scope and goals of this report 
(Ampère, 1843; Wiener, 1948; Simon, 1968). However, the idea of the new cyber physical 
revolution or ‘Industry 4.0’ has been introduced, inspired by the transformations made in 
German manufacturing (Kagermann, et al., 2013). Industry 4.0 has been described also as: 
Digital Manufacturing, Industrial Internet, Smart Industry and Smart Manufacturing 
(Hermann et al., 2016).  
Since buzzwords emerge faster than the innovation waves they describe, the 
conceptualization of Industry 4.0 remains vague, although it can be thought of as the result of 
a convergence among the advances made in several related Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and in Computer Science (CS) (Monostori, 2014), such as Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), cloud computing, the Internet of Things (IoT) and the accompanying 
robotics, sensor technologies, additive manufacturing and traditional manufacturing. This 
new revolution is being influenced by the economic globalization that has been taking place 
over the last 30 years and will shape future globalization.   
Against this background, the present report proposes an analytical framework to 
investigate this epochal transformation in manufacturing, on two levels. First, at the industry 
level, we focus on the impact of the new generations of cyber-physical systems, on 
transportation and on the automotive industry, which is rooted historically in the Torino area, 
and the impact of mobility on previous industrial revolutions. Second, at the firm level, we 
shed light on the potential impact of the new cyber-physical transformation on employment 
and productivity, with a particular emphasis on the geographic division of labour, for both 
advanced and emerging economies1. We find some evidence of the re-shoring of 
manufacturing activities to their origin countries based on the fact that overstretched supply 
chains are endangering firms’ competitive advantages. 
                                                 
1 The research combines proprietary firm level databases with publicly available information from company 
press releases, news articles, peer-reviewed journals and trade and industry reports. 
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Although our analyses are partial and preliminary, they address the big questions at the 
core of international debates. Will robots replace human labour? Will robots distribute more 
wealth while freeing up human time for higher-skilled occupations, or will they generate 
more unemployment and concentrate wealth among a limited number of people? How is Italy 
positioned to manage this new technological and industrial environment? Will Italy’s 
traditional manufacturing regions, Piemonte, Lombardia and Emilia Romagna, be able to 
reposition and take advantage of the emerging opportunities? 
 
Figure 1.1 The framework for Industry 4.0 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration  
Digital Technology 
Automation Technology in 
Focus: robotics and additive 
Manufacturing 
Focus: automotive 
Service 
• Productivity 
• Employment  
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A straightforward way to understand the mechanisms behind the recent acceleration in the 
automation of production processes is to consider them as the advent of a General-Purpose 
Technology (GPT).2 Our analysis relies on two key forces (see Figure 1.1). First, the effect 
of the digital technology on automation, driven by the capabilities of AI. Second, the effect of 
a new, more flexible family of robots on manufacturing. The combination of these effects is 
shaping a new paradigm of industrial production (the new Cyber-Physical Systems, CPS). It 
is in this context, also, that we can interpret the ongoing convergence between the 
manufacturing and service industries, often referred to as servitization since the services 
industries, increasingly, are providing content to enhance the quality of manufactured 
products.  
However, as usual with GPTs, to see the ‘big picture’ requires investigation of the 
creation of new products or services that eventually might spark the emergence of new 
industries. For instance, in the cases of self-driving vehicles and drones, the digitization of 
signals from the external environment enables the self-driving capability of vehicles and the 
remote control of planes. Self-driving cars are a new product within an existing sector; drones 
represent the emergence of a new, steadily-growing sector.  
New opportunities can be unleashed, also, by connecting products across otherwise 
independent sectors and exploiting digital capabilities. For instance, the case of smart 
clothing and smart driving wheels, which are aimed at the implementation of a system of 
real-time health control, while in the case of smart mobility and car sharing, it would not be 
futuristic to envisage a car-on-demand service, which would contribute to reducing 
congestion in modern cities. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the economic consequences of a digital 
disruption. Chapter 2 presents a discussion on the impact that rapid technological progress is 
having on firms’ internationalization strategies while Chapter 3 analyses the robotic industry 
as a fundamental technological and industrial cornerstone of the new CPS model and looks at 
its impact on automobile industry. In Chapter 4 we put forward a set of policy actions that 
could be implemented at the regional level to support the transition to digital manufacturing. 
  
 
1.2 The resilience of manufacturing in the aftermath of the financial crises 
It has become common in public economic debate to consider the present time as 
characterized by post-industrial economies, and there should have been a shift from a pattern 
of specialization based on manufacturing activities to one based on service activities. The 
statistics would indicate that this has happened to a degree since the share of activities 
classified as services has increased disproportionately, especially in developed countries. 
However, we argue that, first, a net separation between manufacturing and services tasks is 
overly simplistic, since, often, both activities are integrated into the production of final 
(manufactured) goods destined for consumers. Moreover, the financial crises that occurred in 
2008 and 2011 (in Italy till 2015) refocused attention on the benefits of a stable 
                                                 
2 GPTs are technologies characterized by the potential of pervasive use in a wide range of sectors and are 
the ultimate trigger of technical-driven long-run growth (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). 
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manufacturing base; many Italian companies started to increase their export revenues which 
compensated for losses in revenues and profits from reduced domestic demand. Many 
companies were able to react by innovating in products and processes to respond to the 
changing needs of both domestic and foreign consumers. This is evident in the revival of 
manufacturing in national statistics, although a consequence of a difficult selection process. 
In Italy, according to ISTAT (2016), the manufacturing industries have emerged from the 
most recent crisis with fewer firms and fewer employees.3 However, there is evidence of a 
polarization with some healthy and more viable firms gaining market share at the expense of 
more fragile firms. As a consequence, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) increased overall in 
2014 and 2015, with a rising trend for manufacturing and a declining trend for business 
services. 
The post-industrial narrative tells us that advanced economies can no longer afford the 
costs of manufacturing, an activity that, progressively, has moved to China, India and other 
emerging economies. This narrative tells us also that we should focus on advanced services 
activities and the production of knowledge. Statistics on occupations tell a slightly more 
complex story. Even if we restrict our analysis to Germany, Italy, France and UK as main 
producing countries in Europe, we observe that they have not dismissed their productive 
capacity, in either absolute (Fig.1.2, panel a) or relative terms (Fig. 1.3 panel a). The share of 
Italian manufacturing remains at around 20%, second only after Germany. Although the 
manufacturing employment share shows an overall decreasing trend over the last decade, this 
is due mainly to a contemporary rise in services industries employment since, in absolute 
terms, the numbers of employees involved in manufacturing activities have been stable and 
slightly increasing in both Germany and in Italy since 2010. 
At the regional level, traditional industrial strongholds, such as Baden-Wurttemberg and 
Bayern in Germany, have kept their leadership and managed to recover to pre-crisis levels, 
while Italy has managed to maintain stable or slightly decreasing numbers for manufacturing 
occupations certainly in Lombardia and less so, in Piemonte and the North-East of Italy 
(panels b in Fig. 1.2 and Fig. 1.3). Although Piemonte is among the smallest of top European 
manufacturing regions in absolute terms, its historical focus on manufacturing activities 
makes it a champion in terms of percentage of manufacturing employment in total 
employment. Taken together, the regions belonging to the greater region of North-West of 
Italy employ 1.6 million workers in manufacturing, a share of around 23% of total local 
employment. Among Italian regions, the North-West also accounts for a large share of the 
services industries, which explains the apparent lower representation of manufacturing. 
                                                 
3 Respectively, about 194,000 fewer firms and 800,000 fewer workers than before the onset of the last crisis 
(ISTAT, 2017). 
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Figure 1.2 Employment in manufacturing by main European countries, in absolute (a) and 
relative (b) terms. 
 a) number of employees (in thousands) 
 
 b) manufacturing employees as % of total in the country 
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Figure 1.3 Employment in manufacturing by main European regions, in absolute (a) and 
relative (b) terms. 
 a) number of employees (in thousands) 
 
b) manufacturing employees as % of total in the country 
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However, a net separation between manufacturing and services tasks is misleading 
because it misses the nature of modern production, which is fragmented across different 
tasks. A supply chain for the production of a final manufactured product includes both pre- 
and post-production services, which are ever more important to improve the quality of the 
product, innovation in production processes and the after-sales support of customers. Rather, 
the content of services activities embedded in the manufacturing of final products is 
becoming increasingly more important - and in some countries more than in others. Figure 
1.4 reports the most recent statistics available for the G7 countries plus China, comparing 
years 2000 and 2011. Total manufacturing value in each country is decomposed into the 
value generated by manufacturing inputs, domestic services inputs and foreign services 
inputs. For example, for each euro of value added generated in the Italian manufacturing 
industries, about 46 cents come from tasks performed by services firms, which include 
research, design, engineering, marketing, advertising and other sales activities pre- and post- 
delivery of the manufacturing product to the final consumer. 
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Figure 1.4: Service content in manufacturing value added of G7 countries and China, a 
comparison, year 2000 and 2011.  
 Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD TiVA database. 
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the contribution of foreign services inputs, that is, at the input of foreign suppliers of business 
services to Italian manufacturing, we observe that their share is about 15% of the total value. 
The values are similar for leading European partners and Canada. Japan appears less open to 
inputs of foreign services while the USA and China are two peculiar cases that require some 
further qualification. China is notorious for entering global production and trade from a base 
of manufacturing activities where Chinese firms could have achieved cost advantages given 
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the low level of salaries after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001. At that time, it had almost no base of production services, which explains why, in 
2000, we observe less than 10% of value sourced from domestic services inputs, while R&D 
activities, engineering, marketing, etc., essentially were sourced from trade partners that had 
started to integrate China in their global value chains. China has upgraded its manufacturing 
production progressively while, simultaneously, starting to develop its national provision of 
business services. On the other side of the world, the USA has been progressively losing its 
manufacturing base and specializing in the provision of business services (including finance). 
US business services are also exported to emerging countries, such as China, where part of 
the US original manufacturing moved after companies started outsourcing and offshoring. In 
2000, also, debate emerged over the costs and benefits of delocalization. Blinder and Krueger 
(2007) discuss how easy it was to offshore US manufacturing activities, either physically or 
electronically. They conclude that about 25% of all US manufacturing or service activities, 
potentially will be offshorable within a decade or two. In the following analyses, we try to 
provide an estimate, albeit imperfect, of the offshorability of Italian jobs. Currently, given 
Italy’s productive structure, a share of some 13% of Italian jobs could be offshored.  
  
1.3 More robots, fewer jobs? 
What is happening in Italy in the aftermath of the great recession seems to be a long run 
tendency that is not limited to the most recent few years. As discussed above, the overall 
increase in the productivity of Italian firms in 2014-2015 has been matched with a process of 
polarization, where some already healthy firms gained market share at the expense of more 
fragile firms, resulting in fewer firms and fewer jobs involved in manufacturing activities. 
However, the financial crisis of 2008 and 2011 and the following sovereign debt crisis might 
have just accelerated a process that began in many countries in the 1970s. Figure 1.5 reports 
the decrease in the share of labour in gross value added in Italy, from values around 75% to a 
65% in 2010. In this respect, the most studied country, the USA, broke the 60% threshold in 
2010. Author et al. (2017) explain this as due to the so-called superstar firms in the high-tech 
industries adopting a ‘winner takes most’ strategy. In a nutshell, ongoing technological 
progress coupled with decreasing barriers to international trade allowed bigger firms to 
become bigger, fostering competitive pressures that hit especially smaller firms. 
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Figure 1.5 Labor compensation on value added in 1970-2010.  
 Source: Author et al. (2017) based on KLEMS data. 
 
Ultimately, what allows bigger firms to become superstars and concentrate market shares 
is their dynamism related to new technologies. Author et al. also correlate the rise in market 
concentration to growth in patenting intensity. That is, the companies that produce more 
knowledge are also the ones that are more likely become superstars. However, the decrease 
in the share of labour corresponds to an increase in remuneration of capital as a factor of 
production: bigger firms can rely more on economies of scale and can afford to buy better 
and technologically advanced machines that can substitute the work previously performed by 
human beings.  
The change seems to be structural in all sectors, regardless of the nature of the output. 
Whether an industry produces high-tech or low-tech goods, some superstar companies 
emerge that rely heavily on technology intensity and relatively more investment in capital 
than in labour. 
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This process occurs in countries following different specialization patterns. For example, 
traditional Italian manufacturing - with a stable share 7%-8% of total manufacturing exports - 
is less high-tech than in other G7 countries (see Figure 1.6). Nonetheless, ISTAT data show 
that a relevant fraction of companies in the traditional Made in Italy sectors are growing more 
than other smaller and fragile competitors in the same industry. The overall effect is a rise in 
the country’s productivity and a loss of manufacturing jobs. This very rough picture suggests 
that Italy has still a relevant industrial base which can play a role in the rapidly changing 
manufacturing landscape. 
  
Figure 1.6 High-tech exports for G7 + China in the period 1992-2014, as % of total 
manufacturing.  
 Source: Eurostat/Comext. 
 
Underlying all of this is the inescapable productivity conundrum related to Italy 
(Calligaris et al., 2016) (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8). Figure 1.7 shows that, over the past 20 
years, Italy did not have any productivity growth. If we zoom in on the European context, 
comparison with Germany is self-explanatory (Fig.1.8). Until the end of the 1980s, both 
Germany and Italy showed steadily increasing GDP per hour worked; however, from the 
1990s, Italian productivity lost momentum and has stagnated. 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
19 
Figure 1.7 GDP per hour worked in US Dollars (constant prices, 2010 PPPs)  
 Source: OECD 
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Figure 1.8. GDP per hour worked  in US Dollars (constant prices, 2010 PPPs)- Germany vs. 
Italy  
 Source: Elaboration on Eurostat 
 
Table 1.1 What economic studies tell us of the impact of automation on employment 
Paper Time 
period 
Country Method % Jobs at 
risk 
Results 
Frey-
Osborne 
(2013) 
Next 
10-20 
years 
US occupation-
based 
approach – 9 
skill categories 
47% 47% of all jobs in the US are in the 
high risk category, “meaning 
that associated occupations are 
potentially automatable over some 
unspecified number of years, 
maybe a decade or two” (p. 38). 
McKinsey 
Global 
Institute 
(2017) 
  2,000 job 
activities, 18 
human 
capabilities 
49% of 
work 
activities, less 
than 5% of 
occupations 
 
Brzeski and 
Burk (2015) 
 Germany Based on Frey-
Osborne 
(2013) 
59%  
Dengler and 
Matthes 
(2015) 
 Germany  15% with high 
substitution 
potentials 
“fears of a massive loss of jobs 
through ongoing digitalisation are 
currently unfounded” 
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Paper Time 
period 
Country Method % Jobs at 
risk 
Results 
Pajarinen 
and 
Rouvinen 
(2014) 
 Finland  35%  
Acemoglu 
and 
Restrepo 
(2017) 
1990-
2007 
US effect of robots 
on employment 
in a commuting 
zone relative to 
other 
commuting 
zones that have  
become less 
exposed to 
robots. 
1 robot/1000 -
0,37% 
employment 
to pop ratio 
Two opposite forces should be 
considered: displacement effect and 
productivity effect 
Arntz, et 
al., OECD 
(2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
US task-based 
approach 
9% “the estimated share of “jobs at 
risk” must not be equated with 
actual or expected employment 
losses from technological 
advances” 
Germany 12% 
France 8% 
UK 10% 
Canada 9% 
Japan 7% 
Italy 10% 
Korea 6% 
Ambrosetti 
(2017) 
Next 
15 
years 
Italy Based on Frey-
Osborne 
(2013) 
14,9%  
Germany 14,4% 
France 13,9% 
Bakhasi et 
al., Nesta 
(2017) 
Next 
15 
years 
(2030) 
US and 
UK 
120 O*NET 
Occupation-
related features 
20% in 
occupation 
that are likely 
to shrink  
…but 10% in occupations that are 
likely to grow: “far from being 
doomed by technology and other 
trends, we find that many 
occupations have bright or open-
ended employment prospects. More 
importantly […] the skills mix of 
the workforce can be upgraded to 
target such new opportunities” 
 
In recent years, much effort has been devoted to estimating the impact of automation on 
employment. A non-exhaustive collection of studies, from consultancy reports to academic 
papers, is reported in Table 1.1 with some coordinates on findings and methodologies. 
Interestingly, the estimates vary significantly according to geographic coverage, methods and 
perspectives. In some cases, the failure of predictions can be attributed to approaches that do 
not consider industrial activities as composed of diverse tasks with implicitly different 
propensity for standardization and, hence, automation (among others, see Arntz et al., 2016). 
The percentage of jobs at risk for Italy has been estimated in the bracket 10% to 15 %.  
Since scholars disagree so fundamentally about the consequences for employment, it 
might be useful to reverse the question and ask whether and how technological change might 
have a positive impact on employment.  
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In fact, technological change can generate mechanisms that are able to more than 
compensate for job losses in the longer term (see also Calvino and Virgillito, 2016). For 
example, it is possible that there is a ‘sectoral shift’ from machine-using industries to 
machine-producing industries and a reallocation of workers to the latter. Also, the 
introduction of new products may stimulate consumption and, possibly, employment in 
different industries.  
The net effect on labour markets will be dependent on: i) how much the labour force 
complements or substitutes for automation in production in the market for production factors; 
ii) how much new products are complements/substitutes for older products in the final goods 
market. In the first case, labour markets will expand if workers are able to move up the ladder 
to higher-skill occupations that are needed to enable automation. In the second case, labour 
markets will expand if newer products do not just cannibalize older products, merely 
reducing the market shares of low-tech companies, but respond to new demand from modern 
consumers.  
 
1.4 Digital disruption and the ‘great convergence’ with emerging economies 
When trade barriers started to fall in the early stages of economic globalization, some 
countries were more able than others to take off on and catch the advantages of shortening 
geographical distances.4 Faster circulation of goods allowed the unbundling of production 
from consumption on a global scale. The primary drivers of globalization were a decrease in 
import tariffs as well as a drop in transportation costs. In fact, firms that originated in the 
countries that, nowadays, we consider as among the most industrialized nations, started to 
serve the needs of consumers on a global scale. At the dawn of globalization, Western 
Europe, the US, Canada and Japan were at the forefront to benefit from the technological 
advantages derived from the Industrial Revolution. They started a process of agglomeration 
of economic forces, expanding their economic activity and reinforcing their competitive 
advantages on a global scale.  
In these countries, firms engaged in the same industries could choose to cluster next 
to shared transport infrastructures and R&D laboratories. Also, firms in adjacent industries 
were attracted by the possibility to establish buyer-supplier linkages, hence, shaping local 
supply chains. They were able to benefit from direct or indirect technological spillovers 
arising out of geographical proximity. Eventually, a geographic concentration of 
manufacturing production paved the way for a divergence with those other countries that 
were unable to keep pace with technological progress.  
The adoption of modern digital technologies is having a different impact on the 
distribution of world income and rebalancing the differences between industrialized nations 
and emerging economies. Companies are using digital technologies to bridge geographic 
distances and combine factors of production located in different countries. In this perspective, 
digital technologies allow for the faster circulation of knowledge within and across 
companies, and are reshaping the organization of production across countries. More than 
                                                 
4 For a timeline of the economic globalization and detail on the two unbundling waves, see Baldwin (2006, 
2016).  
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ever, it is possible now that the tangible and intangible assets of a company originated in an 
industrialized country can combine with labour provided by residents in other countries. As a 
result, production has become fragmented in relation to tasks, and supply chains have become 
global, because companies are able to profit from the competitive advantages of alternative 
locations, in different countries, to which they can decide to offshore or outsource segments 
of production that previously were performed at home and/or inside the company.  
Initially, offshoring and outsourcing strategies were directed towards exploiting local 
cost advantages whether in China, Eastern Europe or other emerging countries. However, 
limits emerged to the possibility of basing firms’ choices of productive locations exclusively 
on labour cost arbitrage. On the one hand, economic growth in emerging countries allows for 
actual and prospective rises in local salaries, which, in turn, makes it less convenient for 
further offshoring operations. On the other hand, excessive stretching of company supply 
chains can endanger the ability to innovate in products and processes.  
Alongside labour cost advantages, uncertainty in supply networks, exchange rate 
volatility, complex coordination of inventories and ever-changing consumer preferences are 
difficulties that may enter the location decision. Indeed, there is some evidence (see Section 
2.4 for a discussion of Italy and two interesting cases) that companies have started reshoring 
some productive activities back to their home country as either the benefits of offshoring 
have ended, (e.g. labour costs have increased) or an overstretched supply chain is 
endangering their competitive advantages.  
The development of the new CPS may offer the possibility for a broader rethinking by 
European companies of their offshoring strategy as labour cost advantages become less 
relevant and the skills requirements for new production systems become stricter. 
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1.5 Digital technology and automation in manufacturing 
Digital technologies have been developing continuously since the end of WWII, but it is 
only since the diffusion of computers in the 1980s, followed by the networking of computers 
(Internet) in the 1090s that the potential of the digital industries for many aspects of humans’ 
daily lives has been unleashed.  
But what is their effect on productivity? Apparently, the diffusion of new technologies 
can lead to a temporary decrease in productivity. In the US, despite rapid progress in 
computers, productivity was slower in the 1970s and 1980 because, following the 
introduction of a major innovation, the development of other smaller complementary 
innovations is needed for it to spread throughout the economic system. The development of 
such complementary innovations can take time. Then, a technological dynamism induced by 
a GPT leads not only to the introduction of complementary innovations but also to the origin 
of new products, services and, eventually, sectors (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1994; 
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995) 
Among others, Dedrick et al. (2003) provides robust evidence that the productivity 
paradox vanishes when complementary innovations are taken into account. Antonelli et al. 
(2010) show the relevant impact on multifactor productivity of patents in ICT when they are 
based on multi-technological classes, that is, the ICT require complementary innovative 
efforts in various different realms, to fully release their potential.  
Only in the recent years the following key complementary innovations enabled the full 
potential of ICT to be unleash: 
1. Digitization and Big Data 
2. Algorithms 
3. Computational power. 
Digitization, defined as the capability to create data as inputs to ICT from multiple 
sources, including image, video, text and speech, which are the main innovations 
complementing ICT as a GPT, and are combined with algorithmic refinements and improved 
computational power. Digitization is at the basis of the process responsible for Big Data. It is 
widely acknowledged (e.g. see Table 1.2) that the term ‘big data’ identifies datasets that are 
not simply very large in term of bytes, but highlight the variety of multimedia sources that 
generate these data (images, text, video, etc.), and the rapid and continuous flow of incoming 
data (Gartner, 2012). 
 
Table 1.2 How big are Big Data   
29 million observations 1937 the first US government Big Data Project tracking social security 
1 Zettabyte 2016 global Internet data traffic, 5 times more than 2011 
90% of world data have been generated since 2014 
102 billion dollars is the size of Big Data Market 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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The availability of big data challenges traditional techniques of analysis and allow the 
application of existing algorithms and the creation of new ones which leverage on the large 
scale of the observations in the dataset. The science of data is aimed at extracting patterns 
from complex information. In the age of big data, algorithms are required to solve different 
classes of problems, including pattern recognition, classification, clustering, dimensionality 
reduction, similarity matching, etc.  
 
Table 1.3 Example of big data algorithms for business 
Business Activity Machine Learning Value 
Predict churn / default Supervised Increase business insights 
Profile customer and market 
segmentation Unsupervised Increase business insights 
Image classification Supervised Improve process 
Recommendation engines Unsupervised/ Supervised Improve service 
  
The collection, storage and analysis of large amounts of data via the deployment of 
advanced algorithms require computational power, which has only recently become 
available. The computational power of a system does not depend only on the speed of the 
processor but also and increasingly on the architecture or network in which the processor is 
embedded. While up to the 1990s the increased computational power was driven by the 
geometric scaling of its components and, thus, by the investment in hardware in the 
semiconductor industry, more recently, the rise in network or distributed computing has 
extended computational capabilities far beyond the boundaries set by the hardware structure. 
In network computing, computers work together like the nodes in a network, or over the 
internet (so-called cloud computing). The applications that profit most from network 
computing are those related to parallel computing, which consists of a series of computer 
protocols to distribute a problem over various computational cores and reassemble the results. 
The de facto standard in parallel computing is ‘Mapreduce’, developed by Google for its own 
business purposes, but subsequently released and updated for free. The diffusion of 
‘Mapreduce’ and the cheap availability of cloud computers has made it possible for any data 
science to access the required computational power to exploit the potential of big data.  
Within the theoretical framework of GPT, it is possible to understand why only recently 
and not before: 
 data analytics have become a tool for sound evidence-based decision making; 
 firms can increase the complexity of the supply chain thanks to detailed quality 
control; 
 sensor technologies have diffused rapidly in factories; 
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 robots are able to interact with humans and enhance their skills, instead of 
substituting for labour in relatively simple tasks. 
When algorithms and artificial intelligence interact together with physical machines 
within a system of reciprocal control, feedbacks and loops, this is described as a CPS, which 
is the key feature of the firm in Industry 4.0 In Industry 4.0, manufacturing is envisaged as 
featuring machine systems that have self-prediction capabilities and self-awareness, thereby 
allowing intelligent production capabilities on the shop floor (‘smart factories’). Autonomous 
systems in Industry 4.0 understand their tasks based on explicitly represented knowledge 
about the machine, the task and the environment without detailed programming and human 
control, and enabling greater flexibility in the production process (Rosen, et al., 2015) and 
capabilities for customizable, small-lot production (Brettel, et al., 2014).  
In smart factories, human workers and machines interact, with the former becoming the 
purveyors (the ‘creative problem solvers’) of the production process, providing flexibility for 
on-site decision and monitoring processes (Gorecky, 2014). For instance, in Wang, et al.’s 
(2015) system architecture, human workers are in the supervision and control terminal layer. 
As such, smart factories can best be understood as the integration of industrial networks, 
cloud computing, supervisory control terminals and smart shop-floor resources (e.g. robots). 
(Wang, et al., 2016). 
In contrast, traditional production lines are only able to perform single functions; the 
shop-floor is not part of a closed loop and machines that perform pre-determined tasks are 
deployed along the conveyor belt (Wang, et al., 2015). These traditional production schemes 
emphasize achievement of cost efficiencies and gather data during operations, used mainly 
for understanding current factory conditions and detecting system failures (Lee, et al., 2014). 
Robotics have advanced significantly since the first mechanical systems were conceived. 
Various technological breakthroughs in engineering, computer science, information 
technology and related sciences have extended what is technically feasible, which is allowing 
various stakeholders to expand the potential of robots. 
However, an exact conception of robots is nebulous – Joe Engelberger, regarded as ‘the 
father of the industrial robot’, once said, ‘I can’t define a robot, but I know one when I see 
one’ (Carlisle, 2000). An all-encompassing definition of a robot remains problematic since its 
various forms, intelligence and purposes vary significantly (HBR Wilson, 2015). Different 
informants provide different definitions, varying from a mechanical system positioned behind 
a work fence (i.e. an autonomous vehicle is not a robot), to a contraption that displays 
autonomy and the ability to respond physically, to an entire system of machines working 
together on the shop floor (Pearson, 2015).    
The above described advancements seem only to exacerbate the problem: artificially-
intelligent agents (AIAs) (e.g. software robots) are a point of contention for roboticists and 
industry stakeholders since some maintain that robots require a physical embodiment 
(Wilson, 2015; Pearson, 2015; Perlongo, 2016). Thus, the term ‘robot’ tends to be overused 
with non-specialist industry observers being quick to attach it to any new technological 
development (Perlongo, 2016). As a result, potential users approach robot-centred adoption 
conservatively – productivity gains are unproven and older systems seem more reliable 
(Leitão 2009; Brettel, et al., 2014). 
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Key to the realization of Industry 4.0 is the continued advancements in CPS, which are 
likely to become the foundations of smart factories. CPS are automated systems that connect 
the operations of the physical reality to computing and communication infrastructures (Jazdi, 
2014). They constitute partial breaks with traditional automation pyramids because they are 
designed to be collaborating computational entities with intensive connections to the 
surrounding physical world and its on-going processes (Monostori, 2014). In addition, 
generally they are characterized as software-intensive systems, in which the software is a 
critical part of the integration (Wang, Törngren & Onori, 2015).  
Increased intelligence and autonomy in CPS are related positively to the realization of 
smart factories. On today’s smart shop floors, CPS are realized in part through 
Reconfigurable Manufacturing Systems (RMS), such that machine components can be added, 
removed or re-arranged. RMS feature modularization by enabling manufacturing companies 
to adapt to changing production requirements in a cost-efficient way (Brettel, 2014). 
The behaviour of CPS physical components derives from advances in Distributed AI 
(DAI) (Leitão, 2009). Two of the most prominent systems being tested in industrial 
applications are Multi-Agent System (MAS) and a related variant called the Holonic 
Manufacturing System (HMS). MAS are comprised of intelligent agents that negotiate with 
one another to implement dynamic reconfigurations to achieve flexibility (Wang, et al., 2016) 
and are characterized by decentralization and parallel execution of activities (Leitão, 2009). 
In practice, MAS agents often are combinations of software (through the provision of 
interaction capabilities among distributed multiple agents and/or agent autonomy) and 
hardware agents (robot variants) in production systems (Pĕchouček & Mařík, 2008; Wang, et 
al., 2016).  
A HMS is a holarchy that integrates the entire range of manufacturing activities from 
order booking, to design, production and marketing, to achieve agile manufacturing 
(Babiceanu & Chen, 2006; Shen, et al., 2006; Leitão, 2009). HMS builds on the concept of 
agents’ reactivity and is able to perform system reconfiguration in order to achieve pre-
programmed situations (Pĕchouček & Mařík, 2008). The HMS agents or holons, can include 
both hardware and software components and are autonomous entities. Considered a whole, 
HMS include sub-holons, comprising inherited original characteristics while, at the same 
time, being part of a broader holon to which it passes on some of these characteristics 
(Babiceanu & Chen, 2006). The potential of these DAI agent technologies (and other 
comparable agent technology variants) combined with developments in machine learning, 
have a significant influence on the realization of intelligent manufacturing, in which systems 
can be expected, within certain limits, to solve unprecedented, unforeseen problems based on 
even incomplete and imprecise information (Monostori, 2014).  
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Figure 1.9 Manufacturing schemes, agent technologies, and salient attributes.  
 Source: author elaboration of Lee, et al. (2014) 
 
1.6 Mapping techno-economic performance in Digital Manufacturing of Italy and 
Piemonte 
Industry 4.0 is an emerging approach to the adoption of next-generation robotics in 
industrial applications. Significant productivity gains are expected from the full realization of 
Industry 4.0 (Deutsche Bank Research, 2014; Bauer, et al., in Hermann et al., 2016; Boston 
Consulting Group, 2015) (see Table 1.4). 
 
Table 1.4 Industry 4.0 productivity gains in Germany by 2025. 
Source Year Estimate (in billions EUR) Productivity gains (%) 
Lower-bound Upper-bound Lower-bound Upper-bound 
Deutsche Bank Research 2014 267 267 30.0 30.0 
Bauer, et al. 2015 78 78 NA NA 
Boston Consulting Group 2015 90 150 15.0 25.0 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research (2014); Boston Consulting Group (2015); Bauer, et al. in Hermann et al. 
(2016).   
 
Digital manufacturing has huge potential, but is still evolving and has no secure standards. 
Practitioners and academics compete to identify its key drivers. A review of the main 
contributions highlights three salient features (see Table 1.5): 1) horizontal integration 
through value networks to facilitate inter-corporation collaboration; 2) vertical integration of 
hierarchical subsystems inside the factory to create flexible and reconfigurable manufacturing 
  
Traditional Manufacturing 
Schemes 
 Enabling technologies: Networked manufacturing systems 
 Key attribute: productivity and efficiency 
 
Reconfigurable 
Manufacturing Schemes 
 Enabling technologies: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) 
 Key attribute: production flexibility and re-configurability 
 
Intelligent Manufacturing 
Schemes 
 
Enabling technologies: 
CPS + agent 
technologies (e.g. 
MAS, HMS) 
 Key attribute: autonomous and self-awareness 
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systems; and 3) end-to-end engineering integration across the entire value chain to support 
product customization (Kagermann, et al., 2013; Brettel, et al., 2014; Wang, Wan, et al., 
2015; Wang, Wan, et al., 2016) 
Hermann et al. (2016), which is the most recent survey of the literature on digital 
manufacturing, provides the most concise description to date: Industry 4.0 can be regarded as 
a collective term for technologies and concepts in the organization of the value chain. Within 
the modular structured Industry 4.0 smart factories, CPS monitor physical processes, create 
virtual copies of the physical world and make decentralized decisions. CPS communicate and 
cooperate with each other and humans in real time, over the IoT, while the Internet of 
Services (IoS), offers both internal and cross-organizational services that can be utilized by 
all the participants in the value chain. 
 
Table 1.5 Scanning of Industry 4.0 technologies and proposed system design and architectures.  
Three Features of Industry 4.0 Relevant technologies System design and architecture 
Horizontal integration through 
value networks; 
 
Vertical integration and 
networked manufacturing 
systems; 
 
End-to-end digital integration of 
engineering across value chains 
 
 
Kagermann, et al. (2013); 
Brettel, et al. (2014); Wang, et 
al. (2015); Wang, et al. (2016) 
 
Nine technologies in (BCG, 
2015):  
1) Autonomous robots,  
2) simulation,  
3) horizontal and vertical 
integration,  
4) Industrial IoT,  
5) cybersecurity,  
6) the cloud,  
7) additive manufacturing,  
8) augmented reality,  
9) big data 
6 requirements of NGMs (Shen, 
et al., 2006):  
1) Integration of heterogeneous 
software and hardware systems; 
2) open system architecture;  
3) efficient and effective 
communication among 
departments;  
4) embodiment of human 
factors; 5) adaptability to 
external changes;  
6) fault tolerance 
 
 
6 design principles (Hermann, et 
al., 2016):  
1) Interoperability;  
2) Virtualization;  
3) Decentralization;  
4) Real time capabilities;  
5) Service Orientation;  
6) Modularity 
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Three Features of Industry 4.0 Relevant technologies System design and architecture 
Horizontal integration through 
value networks; 
 
Vertical integration and 
networked manufacturing 
systems; 
 
End-to-end digital integration of 
engineering across value chains 
 
 
Kagermann, et al. (2013); 
Brettel, et al. (2014); Wang, et 
al. (2015); Wang, et al. (2016) 
 
 
 
6C system configuration (Lee, et 
al., 2014):  
1) Connection (sensor and 
networks);  
2) Cloud (data on demand);  
3) Cyber (model & memory);  
4) Content (meaning and 
correlation);  
5) Community (sharing & 
collaboration);  
6) customization 
(personalization and value) 
 
 
5C functional architecture (Lee, 
et al., 2015):  
1) smart connection level;  
2) data-to-information;  
3) cyber level;  
4) cognition level; and  
5) configuration level 
 
 
Four layers (Wang, et al., 2016): 
1) Physical resource layer (with 
3C capabilities with autonomy 
and social capabilities);  
2) industrial network layer;  
3) cloud layer;  
4) supervision and control 
terminal layer 
 
In this section, we map the potential techno-economic performance of Italy and the 
regions in North of Italy with particular attention to Piemonte in digital manufacturing using 
a combination of employment, patenting statistics and other R&D and educational statistics. 
When we look at employment in high technology sectors (Fig.1.10) Italy as a whole, and 
Piemonte to a slightly less so are generally weak. With the remarkable exception of 
Lombardia, this applies also to knowledge-intensive high-technology services. On the other 
hand, if we consider employment in high and medium high-technology manufacturing 
(Fig.1.11), Piemonte’s average is over 10% of total employment. It is ranked after Baden-
Wurttemberg and Bayern, and just before Emilia Romagna and Lombardia and it shows a 
positive increase since 2007, in line with one of the two top German regions. 
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Figure 1.10 High-technology sectors (high-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive 
high-technology services) Percentage of total employment 
 
 Source: Elaboration on Eurostat 
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Figure 1.11 High and medium high-technology manufacturing. Percentage of total employment 
  
 Source: Elaboration on Eurostat 
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included in the IPC 3-digit code G06; to assign patents to robotics/automation technologies, 
we use the list of IPC codes provided by Aschhoff et al. (2010).5    
Figure 1.12 shows the absolute number of regional and national patents for 
robotics/automation technologies, computing technologies, and a combination of both 
technologies. This last category is identified by the co-occurrence of IPC code G06 (i.e. 
computing technologies) and any of the IPC codes associated to robotics/automation 
technologies (Aschhoff et al., 2010). We consider yearly patents developed in two different 
periods, i.e. early 1990s and early 2010s.6 
At the national level, country ranking of patent production in robotics and automation 
highlights not only Germany’s leadership but also that this country is forging ahead. We 
observe a similar pattern in the patents of computing technology where the US is the leader. 
In this second technology, Germany and Japan are ranked equal second. This suggests that in 
absolute value we are observing a process of concentration of knowledge production in 
different areas.  
Figure 1.13 replicates Figure 1.12 but using the number of patents per capita (millions of 
inhabitants) in order to increase comparability among countries and regions. At the country 
level, it is clear that the European countries considered show better performance than the US, 
and that German leadership is even stronger. At the regional level, Italian regions show non-
negligible production in robotic/automation technology and, over time, show some signs of 
improvements in computing technologies, in which, historically, they have been weak.  
Figure 1.14 depicts the normalized Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA) index, 
which compares a region’s performance in a specific technological area with its average 
technological performance. An RTA index larger than 1 indicates specialization. At the 
country level, Germany and Italy traditionally have been highly specialized in machinery and, 
thus, their specialization in robotics and automation technologies is not surprising. The US is 
more specialized in computing technologies. Both Germany and Italy show a tendency 
towards increased specialization in computing technology. Note the case of Korea, which has 
shifted from being non-specialized in computing technologies into a pattern of specialization 
of computing technologies. 
At the regional level, specialization patterns are more pronounced; at the country level, 
various regional specializations become levelled out. While with the exception of Lombardia, 
Italian regions retain specialization in automation and robotics, none of the Italian regions 
shows a pattern of specialization in computing technologies. 
Note that, in general, the pattern for computing technology is both less pronounced and 
less stable than is the case for automation and robotics. This suggests that competitive 
                                                 
5 Based on an analysis of the characteristics of technologies as described by the IPC system, the authors provide 
a conversion table mapping a set of key enabling technologies to the IPC codes. Robotics/automation 
technologies are identified by IPC codes: B03C, B06B 1/6, B06B 3/00, B07C, B23H, B23K, B23P, B23Q, 
B25J, G01D, G01F, G01H, G01L, G01M, G01P, G01Q, G05B, G05D, G05F, G05G, G06M, G07C, G08C; 
except for co-occurrence with sub-classes directly related to the manufacture of automobiles or electronics. 
Additional information, i.e. the list of IPC codes related to the manufacture of automobiles or electronics, are 
from Van Looy and Vereyen (2015). 
6 For both periods, we consider the first year for which data are available. Moreover, we calculate a three-year 
moving average to smooth annual fluctuations. 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
34 
advantages in computing technologies are less cumulative and more contestable compared to 
robotics. 
This evidence provides some contrasting results related to the Italian competitive system 
and, specifically, that in Piemonte and Emilia Romagna, one the one hand, specialization in 
robotic/automation persists and is increasing although not comparable with Bayern in 
absolute terms. In contrast, the Italian regions exhibit extreme weakness in the production of 
computing technology, which creates bottlenecks to the integration of these technologies into 
robotics and automation. However, the evidence suggests that the main advantage for future 
competition is could become the specialization in automation and technology and also that it 
might be possible to close the gap in computing technologies. 
 
Figure 1.12 Number of regional and national patents for robotics/automation technologies, and 
computing technologies  
  a) Robotics/automation technologies 
   
  b) Computing technologies 
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Figure 1.13 Number of regional and national patents per million inhabitants for 
robotics/automation technologies and computing technologies  
  a) Robotics/automation technologies 
 
  b) Computing technologies 
 
 
Figure 1.14 Regional and national RTA index values for robotics/automation technologies and 
computing technologies  
  a) Robotics/automation technologies 
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  b) Computing technologies 
 
Finally, we briefly analyse R&D and human capital. It has frequently been noted that the 
modest Italian expenditure on R&D is not only the smallest among the G7 countries as a 
percentage of GDP (Table 1.6) but also it has a small business share funding. In 2013/14 
Italian companies contributed slightly more than half of R&D expenditure, compared to 78% 
in Japan, 71% in the US and 67% in Germany. Unsurprisingly, Baden-Württemberg and 
Bayern are ranked at the top among European regions. Piemonte performs well measured as a 
percentage of GDP (2.2%) and, especially, as business expenditure (80%), outdoing any other 
Italian region. 
The second area where Italy traditionally lags compared to the G7 countries, is average 
education. Table 1.7 confirms that even the most industrialized Italian regions have a much 
lower percentage of the population with tertiary education compared to European 
competitors. Although Italy has made attempts to narrow this gap, especially among the 
youngest cohorts, if the working population is considered, Lombardia is lagging than 10 
points behind Baden-Wüttemberg and Piemonte is lagging by almost 15%. However, these 
huge differences are associated also to the fact that, in Italy, technical tertiary education, such 
as two-year postsecondary diplomas, has only recently started to develop with the creation in 
2011 of the Istituti Tecnici Superiori (ITS – Higher Technical Institutes). In Germany, a 
significant share of higher education students are educated in the Fachhochschulen (there are 
also similar institutes in France); these institutions have played an important role in supplying 
a qualified workforce. The education perspective improves significantly if we consider 
student performance according to PISA indicators (Table 1.8). The mathematics and 
scientific capabilities of students in the regions Northern Italy are commensurate with 
European and G7 countries, with Lombardia and Triveneto on a par with the top performing 
country Finland, and Piemonte and Emilia Romagna ranked closely behind.  
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Table 1.6 Gross R&D expenditures (GERD) as % in GDP and Business enterprise R&D 
expenditures (BERD) as % in GERD  
Country/Region GERD as % in GDP BERD as % in GERD 
  1995 2007 2013/2014 2013/2014 
Belgium 1,64 1,84 2,46 71,22 
Canada 1,66 1,91 1,74 53,70 
France 2,23 2,02 2,23 64,97 
Germany 2,13 2,45 2,88 67,65 
Italy 0,94 1,13 1,37 55,38 
Japan 2,61 3,34 3,40 77,76 
Korea 2,20 3,00 4,29 78,22 
Netherlands 1,85 1,69 1,95 56,03 
United Kingdom 1,68 1,63 1,68 65,15 
United States 2,40 2,63 2,76 71,08 
Baden-Württemberg 3,4 4,15 4.80* 80.58* 
Bavaria 2,71 2,81 3.16* 76.26* 
Catalonia 0,86 1,43 1.50* 56.60* 
Ile de France 3,36 2,85 2.96* 68.41* 
Piemonte 1,64 1,76 2,22 79,95 
Emilia-Romagna 0,78 1,42 1,72 66,70 
Lombardia 1,07 1,16 1,31 70,16 
Triveneto 0,59 0,92 1,20 60,34 
Source: OECD data for non-Italian regions;  ISTAT data for Italian regions; * refers to 2013 
 
Table 1.7 Percentage of population with a tertiary education  
Region 2005 2016 growth rate 2005 2016 growth rate 
Age 25-64 30-34 
Baden-Württemberg 26 31,7 22% 29,1 38 31% 
Bayern 24,3 30,1 24% 27,8 38,3 38% 
Cataluña 30 38,6 29% 41,2 43,1 5% 
Île-de-France 38,7 47,3 22% 51,2 57,2 12% 
Piemonte 11,2 17 52% 16,6 24,5 48% 
Lombardia 12,6 19,3 53% 18,7 30,8 65% 
Provincia Bolzano/Bozen 10,3 16,5 60% 13,8 23,9 73% 
Provincia Trento 12,1 18,7 55% 16,3 35 115% 
Veneto 11,2 16,2 45% 16,1 29,6 84% 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 12 17,4 45% 19,3 22,2 15% 
Emilia-Romagna 13,4 20,7 54% 19,9 29,6 49% 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
  
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
38 
Table 1.8 Mean PISA2012 scores 
  Reading Math Science 
Country/region Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Belgium 509 (2.3) 515 (2.1) 505 (2.2) 
Canada 523 (1.9) 518 (1.8) 525 (1.9) 
Finland 524 (2.4) 519 (1.9) 545 (2.2) 
France 505 (2.8) 495 (2.5) 499 (2.6) 
Italy 490 (2.0) 485 (2.0) 494 (1.9) 
Germany 508 (2.8) 514 (2.9) 524 (3.0) 
Japan 538 (3.7) 536 (3.6) 547 (3.6) 
Korea 536 (3.9) 554 (4.6) 538 (3.7) 
Netherlands 511 (3.5) 523 (3.5) 522 (3.5) 
Spain 488 (1.9) 484 (1.9) 496 (1.8) 
United Kingdom 499 (3.5) 494 (3.3) 514 (3.4) 
United States 498 (3.7) 481 (3.6) 497 (3.8) 
OECD average 496 (0.5) 494 (0.5) 501 (0.5) 
Bolzano 497 (2,4) 506 (2,1) 519 (2,2) 
Emilia Romagna 498 (6,5) 500 (6,4) 512 (6,2) 
Friuli Venezia 
Giulia 518 (4,1) 523 (4,4) 531 (4,7) 
Lombardia 521 (5,9) 517 (7,6) 529 (6,8) 
Piemonte 506 (4,8) 499 (5,8) 509 (4,4) 
Trento 521 (5,2) 524 (4,1) 533 (3,9) 
Veneto 521 (6,0) 523 (7,6) 531 (6,1) 
Catalonia 501 (4,7) 493 (5,2) 492 (4,2) 
Source: OECD 
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2 Participation in global supply chains and the 
offshorability of Italian jobs 
Rapid technological progress fosters transformations in the organization of production, 
both within and across countries. In recent decades, the main consequence of such progress 
has been the fragmentation of production by tasks. Companies may decide to profit from the 
competitive advantages of alternative locations and to offshore segments of their production 
which, previously, were performed at home and/or within the firm. 
       Whether a company signs a contract with a foreign supplier or establishes a 
subsidiary abroad, there can be an impact on employment and welfare in the country of 
origin. Most often, an offshoring strategy allows the company to specialize in its core 
activities, remain competitive in the market and gain market share, which results in more jobs 
overall. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, some categories of workers might be 
disadvantaged by their tasks becoming standard routines which require very little knowledge 
stock. In this case, robots can substitute for humans, while workers may be in fierce 
competition with workers in other countries if an offshoring strategy is feasible. 
Here, we adopt a company perspective. First, we provide some insights into the 
generation of value by Italian companies in supply chains, using a sample of some 336,814 
manufacturing and services firms in Italy, and information on financial accounts. We then 
investigate whether there is a limit to the degree of offshorability of the Italian economy, 
given its industrial structure. That is, we examine whether there is a threshold of offshorable 
jobs, beyond which competitiveness and innovation are endangered. Finally, we offer some 
insights into the internationalization strategies of Italian firms, including increased 
participation in international supply chains and their impact on economic growth. All our 
findings point to a robust and resilient persistent Italian productive system. However, we 
argue, that major differences in the performance of some companies and industries are 
highlighting the need for policies to offset the possibly unequal benefits from fast 
technological progress and economic interdependence with the rest of the world. 
 
2.1 ‘Who’s smiling now?’  
In an ideal production sequence, involving one or more firms along the supply chain, we 
can envisage starting a business line from design, to research and development of a blueprint. 
These are pre-production services whose implicit knowledge and skills content is quite high 
on average. It is after these phases that manufacturing for the production of intermediate 
inputs, such as parts, components and semi-finished products, begins, leading eventually to 
the delivery of a final good, which, in turn, requires additional so-called post-production 
services (marketing, advertising, logistics, other business services). The later stages, which 
are designed to bring together demand and supply, require a relatively high knowledge 
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content while the production of intermediate inputs and their assembly involve more 
standardized tasks that, nowadays especially, rely on routines and automation. 
 Figure 2.1 refers to a celebrated framework from the business studies literature 
(Mudambi, 2008), which has been discussed at length in international fora (among others, 
OECD, 2013), and which represents the previous sequence of business functions as a smiley, 
based on the pattern of a hypothetical plot of the economic value of the individual tasks along 
the supply chain.  
 
Figure 2.1 The concept of a ‘smile curve’, source: Mudambi (2008)
 
 
Figure 2.2 The smile curve of Italian firms, source: Rungi and Del Prete (2017) 
  
However, the division of labour in real-world organization of production is often much 
more sophisticated than Figure 2.1 would suggest. For this reason, Figure 2.2 investigates the 
generation of value by Italian firms, adopting a finer metrics for the positioning of companies 
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along the supply chain, while exploiting a simple econometric investigation that takes 
account of the heterogeneous characteristics of Italian firms.7 
Here, we use downstreamness to measure how far an industry (and the firms in it) are far 
from final demand. Based on the input-output linkages among 420 industries (Antràs and 
Chor, 2013), it is possible to define, in greater detail, the position of a company in one 
industry relative to a company in another industry. Firms in upstream industries can be 
considered suppliers of the firms in downstream industries. Downstreamness ranges in the 
interval 0 to 1, where 0 is the beginning of a business line and 1 is the delivery to the final 
consumers.  
We derive firm-level generation of value among a sample of 336,814 manufacturing and 
service companies active in the year 2015. The value added content of each firm is the 
economic value it generates, that is, net of purchases of intermediate inputs, over sales. 
Therefore, it can be considered as representing what each company distributes to production 
factors, as employee wages, dividends and interest on capital, and taxes for public services. In 
aggregate, we can say that all the value generated by companies in a country will sum to the 
gross value added of that country. The higher the value generated by firms, the higher the 
growth of that country. At the level of the company, it is the value it generates for its 
immediate stakeholders, both the owners of the capital and the workers. From a supply chain 
perspective, it is the portion of value generated by a single task before reaching the final 
consumer. 
                                                 
7 For details of the econometric investigation, see Rungi and Del Prete (2017) for all EU firms. Briefly, the 
value-added content of production is regressed on downstreamness by a quadratic term, after controlling for 
firm-level heterogeneity in size, capital intensity, productivity and price-cost margins. The narrow band on the 
graph in Figure 2.2 represents a statistical confidence interval significant at 95%. 
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Figure 2.3 Firm-level value added content in manufacturing vs services, domestic vs foreign 
 Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
We can conclude that Italian ‘supply chains’ show great reliance in the first stages of 
production to generate value, but that the country as a whole lacks competitive advantage in 
the later stages of production when supply meets demand.8  In other words, in Italy, there is a 
possible lack of competitiveness of the production processes, which stems from that part of 
the supply chain where companies meet consumers. To gain a deeper insight into this, Figure 
2.3 reports the separate distribution of manufacturing and services firms, divided, in turn, 
among a set of domestic companies and a set of multinational enterprise subsidiaries active in 
Italy.  
We observe a heterogeneous distribution of both manufacturing and services firms. Also, 
some producers generate more than 80% of economic value, while others generate less than 
20%. The averages reported in the panels in Figure 2.3 may not be representative of the 
underlying reality. Nonetheless, services firms, structurally, are different from manufacturing 
firms. They usually require fewer intermediate inputs, goods and services to perform their 
activities.  On average, they are smaller in size than manufacturing firms because they do not 
benefit from economies of scale or scope. In the Italian case, more than half services firms 
are able to generate above 90%, while the performance of the remaining half differs widely.  
In general, foreign and domestic services show no significant differences in their 
distribution, whereas domestic manufacturing firms produce at a higher value than foreign 
companies, especially if we look at the VI decile in the distribution. The econometric results 
                                                 
8 In fact, a similar exercise for EU firms (Rungi and Del Prete, 2017) shows that companies involved in 
later production stages generate on average about 20% more value than Italian firms represented here. 
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reported in Appendix Table II.2, suggest a phenomenon of value added retention, according 
to which the country retains the higher value manufacturing production stages because they 
are crucial for maintaining present and building future competitive advantage. This does not 
apply to the services sector. 
Geographic location, even more than the foreign vis à vis domestic dimension of 
companies, confirms the presence of a strong divide between the North and the South of 
Italy. This can be seen clearly in Figure 2.4, which plots the representative company in each 
region, after controlling for possibly unequal size, industry affiliation, productivity and 
capital intensity (see Appendix Table II.1). Representative firms located in the South of Italy 
are lagging badly, whereas all the Northern regions, including Piemonte, are in a rather 
narrow range around 68% of value to revenue.9 
 
Figure 2.4 Value added content in the representative firm of each Italian region 
 Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
2.2 Offshorability of Italian jobs 
One of the most common reasons for offshoring intermediate stages is the cost advantage 
that companies can derive from paying less to achieve the same output. After technological 
progress and trade barriers progressively reduced the frictions among countries, a big pool of 
cheaper labour in developing countries has become available to companies from the 
developed countries. However, reduced labour costs are not the only reason that firms are 
keen to offshore. There are shipping costs to consider and intermediate goods can spend 
weeks in transit at customs. However, everything considered, companies still are able to find 
producers in other countries able to provide high quality parts or components. The firm might 
decide to sign a contract with the relevant supplier and either close down an existing 
                                                 
9 Representative value added content is estimated as region fixed effects from the regression model reported 
in Appendix Table II.2, which controls for heterogeneity of firms and industry composition. 
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domestic plant or terminate a contract with a domestic supplier. Alternatively, a firm might 
acquire the supplier company or establish a new plant in the relevant foreign country. All of 
this applies also to services when a foreign provider or a foreign subsidiary can perform the 
same activity more cheaply or at higher quality.   
The surge in offshoring is at the heart of the wave of economic globalization and is also 
the most critical aspect of globalization, due to its impact on domestic labour markets. Most 
economics scholars would acknowledge that there may be short-run effects on employment 
either because some workers will be excluded from the labour market, or, if a skills 
upgrading is possible, because they are reallocated to more efficient activities (Gorg, 2011). 
Unfortunately, the evidence supporting the neutral effect of globalization on unemployment 
in the long run is mixed. The discontents would argue that job creation abroad only 
compensates for job destruction at home, with no overall gains. Also, it is not easy to upgrade 
the skills of unemployed workers, and the efficiency gains from offshoring need to be 
sufficiently large to boost the overall number of jobs (Ottaviano, 2015). More generally, there 
is a lack of conclusive evidence because it is difficult to disentangle the effects of 
technological progress from the effects of globalization. In fact, economic globalization has 
occurred simultaneously with technological progress and, therefore, it could be argued that 
the first is, in part, a consequence of the second. Ultimately, a proper understanding of the 
impact of globalization on unemployment should separate the impact of automation on 
production since machines are also substitutes for human labour.  
Debate and research on the impact of offshoring on employment are far from being 
concluded. More recently, another perspective has been added. Another reason for concern is 
the possibility that competitiveness and innovation are being threatened by the separation of 
strategic tasks which are located at a distance from one another. This is a company 
perspective that can affect the overall growth potential of a country or region.  
For example, take the case of R&D activities which it is preferable to retain in the 
developed country, near to where researchers are being educated. In contrast, manufacturing 
activities tend to be relocated to where they can be produced more cheaply. However, most 
innovation activities are not one-shot tasks. They usually require continuous interaction 
among the workers involved in different stages of production in order to identify where 
improvements can be made to products or production processes. By their very nature, all 
production stage that require face-to-face interaction among workers are more difficult to 
offshore. 
It is possible that decreasing the barriers to trade and investment combined with the 
adoption of ICT may have caused over-optimism and excessive fragmentation of those 
strategic tasks that ensure firm competitiveness. It is difficult to identify ex-ante which tasks 
should be offshored without risking the firm’s competitive advantage. One possibility is to 
ask workers how much their tasks are standardized and how much face-to-face interaction 
with colleagues is required. This is what Blinder (2009) did for the US case, exploting 
surveys of US workers to describe the potential for offshoring for each occupation. In the US 
case, given its industrial structure, they estimated that around 25% of jobs could be offshored 
in the immediate future.  
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Figure 2.5 estimates the offshorable jobs in the case of Italy, drawing on Blinder’s (2009) 
study.10  
  
Figure 2.5 Offshorable jobs in Italy 
 Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
 Based on a representative sample of 336,814 Italian firms in manufacturing and 
service industries (Table II.1 in Appendix), we estimate that it would be possible to offshore 
about 13% of jobs without losing much quality of products and services and without major 
difficulties to the organization of the remaining domestic  activities.  
On the other hand, a core of 64% jobs in the Italian productive system, at the end of 2015, 
could not be offshored without considerable losses in quality and difficulties related to 
completing the remaining tasks. The intermediate situations are less relevant. An additional 
5% of jobs could be offshored, although at the cost of some reasonable difficulty. About 11% 
of jobs could be offshored, but with considerable difficulty. Overall, we can conclude that at 
least twothirds of occupations in Italy are robust to an offshoring strategy and should not be 
                                                 
10 See also Blinder and Krueger (2013). In the absence of ad-hoc surveys in Italy such as the one exploited 
in Blinder (2009), we source from their data the responses provided by US workers about face-to-face 
interaction with colleagues and standardization of their tasks. The original data include information for about 
800 different tasks, nested in 420 6-digit NAICS industries. We matched this information to Italian firm-level 
data, about 336,814 companies, also NAICS 6-digit classes. Therefore, the estimates in Figure 2.5 are based on 
the median offshorability of the tasks in each 6-digit industry. Median values are chosen given the peculiar 
power law distributions of tasks within industries. 
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considered for relocation of activities abroad. The number of jobs that are offshorable is 
considerably less than has been estimated for the US. 
 
2.3 Re-shoring 
After the recent enthusiasm over the offshoring of activities from advanced economies to 
emerging countries, some companies are beginning to reconsider their strategies. Kinkel and 
Maloca (2009) analysed 1,663 responses from German companies and found that offshoring 
had lost momentum since between 16% and 25% of offshoring decisions had been reversed 
within four years of the initial decision. In a survey of US firms, Tate et al. (2014) identified 
a moderate (varying in magnitude with the industry) trend towards reshoring back home.  
More recently, the European Reshoring Monitor11 began to collect global information on 
reshoring companies, including the reasons why firms considered that the decision to 
offshore had been mistaken. Although not exhaustive and lacking statistical relevance, Tables 
2.1 and 2.2 provide a snapshot of a non-negligible phenomenon. The European Reshoring 
Monitor suggests that the main reasons for reshoring include: i) increased costs of logistics 
(24%); ii) impossibility to meet “Made in” regulation (22%); iii) lower quality of production 
abroad (22%); and iv) a general increase in labour costs (18%). Among the cases reported by 
the European Reshoring Monitor for the year 2016, 121 out of the 376 in Europe have Italian 
headquarters. Table 2.2 presents the allocation of headquarters by macro-region and shows 
that the North of Italy particularly involved in the reshoring wave. The Appendix presents 
two peculiar cases of explicit reshoring based on maintaining manufactured product quality 
(FIVE company) and proximity to R&D (Turolla company). Their evidence is illustrative of 
the problems companies encounter when in offshoring. 
 
  
                                                 
11 The European Reshoring Monitor (http//reshoring.eurofound.europa.eu) is a EU funded initiative 
undertaken as part of a multi-annual research project on the future of manufacturing in Europe. The project 
collects information on individual reshoring cases from several sources such as media, specialized press and the 
scientific literature.  
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Table 2.1 Some cases of reshoring  
Headquarters 
Offshoring location 
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Europe 127 39 64 116 9 5 11   5 376 
North 
America 214 46 2 24 23 14 1 2 3 329 
Asia (excl. 
China and Japan) 4 1 1 5 - - - - - 11 
Japan  3 1 1 1 - - - - - 6 
China - - - 2 - - - - - 2 
Africa and 
Middle East - - 2 1 - - - - - 3 
Oceania 1 - - - - - - - - 1 
Total 349 87 70 149 32 19 12 2 8 728 
% of Total 47,9% 12,0% 9,6% 20,5% 4,4,% 2,6% 1,6% 0,3& 1,1% 100,0% 
Source: Uni-CLUB MoRe reshoring 
 
Table 2.2 Reshoring in Italy 
Geographic Area Region Reshoring cases 
North East Italy 
Veneto 36 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 6 
Trentino Aldo Adige 3 
Totale 45 
North West Italy 
Emilia Romagna 32 
Lombardia 28 
Piemonte 7 
Liguria 4 
Totale 50 
Central Italy 
Marche 9 
Toscana 9 
Umbria 2 
Lazio 1 
Abruzzo  1 
Totale 22 
South Italy 
Campania 2 
Puglia 2 
Totale 4 
Total 121 
Source: Uni-CLUB MoRe reshoring 
 
It is difficult to collect exhaustive information on the extent of reshoring by 
companies because most are reluctant to disclose management strategies. However, Figure 
2.6 reports a more general trend in investment in manufacturing in Italy.  
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We first consider all those Italian companies that invested in manufacturing plants in 
Italy from 1995 to 2015. For those same companies and during the same period, we track the 
decision to locate their manufacturing plants elsewhere in the same period. We can broadly 
classify investment operations by these companies as: i) located in Italy; ii) located in another 
advanced economy (OECD countries); iii) located in an emerging economy (non-OECD 
country).  
This allows us to track how Italy is considered an alternative location for 
manufacturing plants, by domestic and international investors. Figure 2.6 presents estimates 
of the propensity12 of an investor to locate a manufacturing plant in Italy and the respective 
averages for an advanced and an emerging economy. 
We found that, at the beginning of the period, Italy did not attract new manufacturing 
production, compared to other advanced economies that were attracting relatively more 
plants, on average. For every 100 new manufacturing plants in the world, around 1 was 
located in Italy and almost 6 in another advanced economy. Since 2011, emerging countries 
have lost some of their attractiveness for manufacturing, whereas Italy is much more 
attractive, with a 5% probability that a new plant in the world will be located in Italy rather 
than elsewhere. 
 
Figure 2.6 Propensity to attract investment in manufacturing, Italy vs other countries 
  
                                                 
12 To estimate location choice, we employ a conditional logit model, which takes account of each country in 
the world as a possible alternative for establishing a manufacturing plant. We extracted from Rungi et al. (2017) 
a sample of 21,013 new manufacturing companies that were incorporated in the period 1995-2015. After 
controlling for some traditional national economic characteristics (GDP per capita, population, working 
population, etc.), we derived predicted probabilities. For details on the procedure, see among others 
Schmidheiny and Brulhart (2011). 
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2.4 Participation in supply chains and contribution to growth 
Understanding the contribution of international trade to economic growth has always been 
problematic because, usually, both export and import flows are gross measures, that is, they 
include the value of imported intermediate inputs used in the production stages performed at 
home.  
Take the example of a car assembled in and exported from Italy, whose components are 
all imported from another country. Its entire export monetary value is attributed to Italy in 
official statistics, although the value of the parts and components should be deducted from 
the gross exports of cars because they were generated (and already recorded) in the country 
from which they were sourced. In this simple case, only the difference between the value of 
the exported output and the value of imported inputs should be recorded in Italy as 
contributing to the generation of income and, hence, growth.13  
Figure 2.7 presents TiVA OECD data to separate the contribution to growth of Italian 
exports from the economic value of imported intermediate inputs. 
 
Figure 2.7 Domestic and foreign value added of Italian exports vis à vis main European 
partners, values in billions euro 
 Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD TiVA database 
  
                                                 
13 The illustrative case is just a simplification of much more complex networks of production, when 
intermediate stages of production cross national borders several times, spanning different countries and 
industries, before reaching the final consumer. In this case, the attribution of value to countries is more 
sophisticated and requires some algebra. Among others, we refer to Timmer et al. (2015), who used the 
automotive example to explain the basics of an accounting for trade flows according to the origin of the value 
added. 
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Starting from the mid 1990s, total exports have increased considerably in Italy and in the 
rest of the world, as documented by several sources (among others, see WTO, 2013). 
However,  a good and increasing proportion of trade flows come from economic participation 
in international supply chains. The foreign value added in exports that we report in Figure 2.7 
represents the economic value coming from abroad since the imported goods and services 
end up in the exported product. This component is generally increasing in all of the bigger 
EU countries represented here, although it is slightly larger in the case of Italy. Briefly, 
Italian exporters benefit considerably from integration in supply chains and their exports also 
have increased, thanks to the sourcing of better and/or cheaper intermediate inputs from 
abroad. 
 Starting from around 83% in the  mid 1990s, the relative share of domestic value 
added in exports has decreased to a value around 75%. More foreign value added implies 
greater participation in international supply chains. However, both domestic and foreign 
value added have increased in absolute terms, showing that a complementarity can exist 
between domestic and foreign inputs in national production. It is possible that better quality 
inputs from abroad could also stimulate more production at home and an overall gain from 
participation in supply chains. Overall, Italy and its main European partners continue to 
generate the majority of economic value in exports, domestically, that is, about three-quarters 
of total export value, indicating that domestic tasks prevail over offshored tasks in Europe.  
Figure 2.8 reports the main countries of origin of the economic value, and the offshored 
tasks, which, ultimately, are embedded in Italian exports, respectively in 1995 and 2011 (last 
available year). We briefly identify the countries of origin of the foreign value added content 
represented in Figure 2.7. Over 20 years ago, the then European Union members represented 
a majority of the value (61%), with the top contributions coming from Germany, France, the 
UK and the Netherlands in Europe, and the US. In 2011, Italian exporters have diversified the 
origin of their intermediate inputs and extra-EU countries now represent 54% of foreign 
value added content in total exports. Germany is still the main provider of Italy’seconomic 
value, but its share has decreased to 13%. The presence of Russia (7%) among the top 
partners is justified by its natural resources and energy contributions, while, nowadays, China 
represents an important source of intermediate inputs, either goods or services, comparable to 
the US.     
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Figure 2.8 Top partner countries for Italy when sourcing value sourcing of intermediate inputs 
 c) year 1995 
 
 d) year 2011 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we traced the generation of economic value by Italian firms using their 
financial accounts. We plotted each firm’s position in the ideal supply chain and identified 
those segments where the most value is generated, at the top and bottom of the chain, 
depicted by a smile curve. We discussed how excessive fragmentation of production can 
endanger the transmission of value along supply chains and estimated that, given the present 
industrial structure, a further 13% of Italian jobs could be offshored without jeopardizing the 
quality of products or services and without raising difficulties related to performing the 
production tasks that remain at home.  
Following a first optimistic wave of offshoring in the 2000s, we documented how some 
companies are reconsidering the reshoring of some activities to their home country, to avoid 
overstretching supply chains and to retain sources of competitive advantage in geographical 
proximity. Firm-level data on the investment decisions made by domestic and foreign 
investors since 1995, in Italy and elsewhere, allowed us to estimate that Italy has become an 
attractive location for manufacturing production.  
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Finally, we examined the last two decades of Italy’s participation in international supply 
chains and its main EU partners, using data on the domestic and foreign economic value 
embedded in the exports of Italian producers. We found that the lion’s share of value is 
generated at home and seems to complement the foreign value of imported intermediates. 
However, the integration with extra-EU partners has increased considerably because of their 
already high representation in the value imported through inputs that are embedded in Italian 
exports.   
Overall, we can conclude that the Italian productive system has been robust to integration 
in international supply chains, thanks to a strategy of diversification of input sourcing from 
abroad, which allowed an increase in the quality and quantity of exports. However, in our 
view, there is little room for further offshoring by companies, because, generally, Italian jobs 
have an inherently high knowledge and skills content, both aspects that are difficult to 
coordinate from remote locations. 
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3 Digital manufacturing (Robotics and 3D printing) 
and the evolution of manufacturing in the 
automotive industry 
This chapter explores the main markets for the production and use of robots and 3D 
printing and presents a comparative analysis of the core robotics and 3D printing 
competences in the major world digital manufacturing sectors. We focus specifically on 
Piemonte and its efforts to develop CPS in the automotive sector, a traditional key driver of 
Italian industrial development. Particular attention is paid to the role of collaborative robots 
compared to the more traditional manufacturing robots already used heavily in automotive 
production. 
The analysis is aimed at classifying robot technologies to understand why collaborative 
robots associated to sensors could revolutionize manufacturing production. The evolution of 
digital manufacturing and its rapid expansion are evident in many applications in the 
automotive value chain. The present review addresses some fundamental questions. For 
example, how has the automobile market changed in the most recent years? How are OEMs 
responding to the challenges posed by Industry 4.0? And what role can Italy (and Piemonte) 
play in this rapidly changing scenario? 
 
3.1 Challenges to the Uptake of Digital Manufacturing 
Despite its far-reaching effects and current advances in the relevant technologies, digital 
manufacturing is in its infancy. One reason for this is the conservative business strategies and 
averseness to unproven production processes displayed by industry (Babiceanu & Chen, 
2006; Leitão, 2009). For example , a survey of 300 manufacturing leaders, conducted by 
McKinsey & Company (2015), indicates that only around half (48%) of firms consider 
themselves prepared for the impact of Industry 4.0. Another reason is related to the persistent 
and significant challenges involved in operationalizing digital manufacturing. First, more 
research is needed into autonomous systems to achieve self-organization among production 
cells, which would allow learning capabilities and dynamic and evolvable reconfigurations 
(Leitão, 2009; Brettel, et al., 2014). These advances would mean that systems could react 
faster, contribute more to the decision process, be more able to undertake small-lot 
production, and be more effective in helping enterprises identify constraints and opportunities 
(Brettel, et al., 2014). 
In the case of Muti-Agent Systems (MAS), in particular, further research is needed on 
their distributive and autonomous capabilities (Shen, et al., 2006; Pĕchouček & Mařík, 2008). 
Current technologies only allow for communication through cloud-assisted industry wireless 
networks (IWN) (Wang, et al., 2016). However, Holonic Manufacturing Systems (HMS) 
require proven design methodologies that can deliver consistency and reliability in a given 
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system, and adaptability to available computing systems (Babiceanu & Chen, 2006). It should 
be noted that beyond the identified agent technologies, there is some emerging research and 
several projects on bio-inspired robot designs, which provide the possibility to build robots 
that mimic natural morphologies and self-organization (e.g. animal-like movements, self-
organization and self-assembly behaviour in nature) (Pfeifer, et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, research on systems autonomy must account for user adoption and firm 
integration. System behaviour should be predictable and stable for human workers; there is a 
need also to develop methodologies that support easy, fast, transparent and re-usable 
integration of physical automation devices (Leitāo, 2009). At the firm level, local enterprise 
integration for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) is impossible due to their 
isolated, heterogeneous and obsolete legacy systems (Shen, et al., 2006; Brettel, et al., 2014). 
In relation to firms, there are issues related to firm capabilities and cyber-security. 
Reconfigurable Manufacturing Systems (RMS) are impeded by lack of powerful IT systems 
and their integration with other systems, and inadequate employee-knowledge of production 
processes (Brettel, et al., 2014). Leitão (2009) raises similar issues with regard to user 
acceptance among enterprise managers and directors of emergent terminologies and 
distributed approaches to problem-solving. Realizing horizontal integration across 
heterogeneous institutions may also be difficult for reasons of trust, data protection and 
security related to firm know-how and customer information (Jazdi, 2014; Wang, et al., 2015; 
Brettel, et al., 2014). Existing system configurations continue to have vulnerabilities: an 
entire PLC network is easily accessible by a single search engine, such as SHODAN (Wang, 
Törngren, & Onori, 2015). In recent years, the US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) 
has issued warnings about hacking at industrial sites; vulnerabilities and actual hostile 
hackings have threatened both private and public-sector facilities systems (Wang, Törngren, 
& Onori, 2015). 
At the shop-floor level, there are challenges related to components and agent 
configurations. For instance, RFID-sensor tags are impaired in the presence of water and 
large amounts of metal (Brettel, et al., 2014). There are problems, also, related to conflict 
resolution, production deadlocks and production disturbances involving intelligent agents 
(Wang, et al., 2016; Monostori, 2014). When human agents are introduced into the 
production dynamics, problems related to the optimal configuration between machine self-
organization and appropriate control methods emerge (Monostori, 2014; Wang, et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, the continued improvements in the pre-conditions for the smart factory seem to 
be addressing the issue of production deadlocks and improvements to agents’ decision 
making are already being explored (Wang, et al., 2016). Regarding the components 
themselves, some important research is being carried out on digital twins which provide 
predictive capabilities through simulations (Rosen, 2015) and prognostics and health 
management techniques (e.g. a ‘time machine’ snapshot stored in the cloud) that can be used 
to increase self-awareness and self-prediction (Lee, et al., 2014; Lee, et al., 2015).  
Finally, there are difficulties related to interoperability, and design and data 
standardization. Ontologies in existing industrial applications are often proprietary, simplistic 
and hierarchical structures of concepts (Leitāo, 2009). Human biases (exacerbated by the 
presence of agents from different backgrounds) significantly influence the development of a 
common ontology (Leitāo, 2009). While much research has been conducted on ontological 
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methods, protocols and semantic interoperability (Pĕchouček & Mařík, 2008; Wang, et al., 
2016), considerable work needs to be done to integrate entire systems with related 
technologies (e.g. RFID technologies, wireless networks, etc. (Leitāo, 2009). Table 3.1 
summarizes the problems and opportunities discussed above, ranked by proximity to robotics 
research advancements. The research described below identifies the current state of robotics 
with a particular focus on robots for industrial applications. It combines publicly-available 
information from company press releases, news articles, peer-reviewed journals and trade and 
industry reports.  
 
Table 3.1 Select Industry 4.0 challenges and research opportunities, ranked by proximity to 
robotics research.  
Challenges Specific issues Research opportunities 
Emergent self-
organization among 
autonomous systems  
 Alternative agent systems, e.g. bio-inspired robot designs (Pfeifer, et al., 2007) 
 
 
Adaptability and prediction mechanisms in agent-based 
systems, particularly regarding production disturbances 
(Leitão, 2009; Monostori, 2014) 
Multi-agent 
systems (MAS) 
Distributive and autonomous capabilities (Shen, et al., 2006; 
Pĕchouček & Mařík, 2008) 
 
 
Continued investigation on ontology methods and contract 
net protocols (CNP) (Wang, et al., 2015) 
Holonic 
manufacturing 
systems (HMS) 
Consistency, reliability, and interoperability with available 
computing systems (Babiceau & Chen, 2006) 
Components and 
agent configurations 
Sensor 
technologies 
Continued development of related technologies, RFID 
technologies (Pĕchouček & Mařík, 2008; Brettel, et al., 2014)  
Production 
deadlocks and 
agent 
Introduction of digital twins that provide predictive 
capabilities through simulation (Rosen, et al., 2015) 
Human-machine 
symbiosis  
Development of prognostics and health management 
techniques, e.g. remote diagnostics, time machine snapshots 
(Jazdi, 2014; Lee, et al., 2014; Lee, et al., 2015) 
 
 Inclusion of human agents in system architecture design  
 
 
Development of user interfaces that allow for human 
interference, e.g. context-sensitive and context-broker 
systems (Gorecky, et al., 2014) 
 
 
Development of user assistance systems (Gorecky, et al., 
2014) 
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Challenges Specific issues Research opportunities 
Interoperability, design, and data 
standardization 
Harmonization of ontology methods, protocols, and semantic 
interoperability (Pĕchouček & Mařík, 2008; Wang, et al., 
2016) 
Identification and understanding of the relevant information 
in manufacturing big data (Wang, et al., 2015)  
Continued integration of autonomous systems with related 
technologies, e.g. RFID technologies, wireless networks, etc. 
(Leitão, 2009) 
Integration and accessibility of virtual systems, e.g. virtual 
reality (VR), simulation (Brettel, et al., 2014; Monostori, 
2014) 
User acceptance 
Unit 
predictability 
Autonomous system behavior must remain predictable and 
stable for human workers (Leitão, 2009) 
Accessible 
integration 
Methodologies development that supporty easy, fast, 
transparent and re-usable integration of physical automation 
devices (Leitão, 2009) 
 
 
Enterprise integration for SMEs that have isolated, 
heterogeneous, and obsolete legacy systems (Shen, et al., 
2006; Brettel, et al., 2014) 
Data protection and cyber-security Continued development of cyber-security related technologies  
Source: author’s analysis 
 
3.2 Robot Technologies 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), through the 2012 ISO-Standard 8373, loosely 
define a robot as a reprogrammable, multifunctional manipulator designed to move material, 
parts, tools or specialized devices through variable programmed motions for the performance 
of a variety of tasks, which also acquire information from the environment and move 
intelligently in response. The International Federation of Robotics (IFR), the sector’s main 
special-interest organization, and other national industry associations, such as the US’ 
Robotics Industries Association (RIA) and the UK’s British Automation & Robot 
Association (BARA), have adopted similar definitions (BARA, 2017b; IFR, 2017; RIA, 2017) 
Various, but related developments in hardware and software technologies, academic 
research and the industry have enabled sustained expansion of nascent sub-sectors such as 
advanced industrial and practical applications. For instance, refinements to software systems 
are allowing robots to interact physically with the environment and also to modify it. In 
another installation, wide functional scope is enabling robots to become viable solutions in 
populated areas and almost any environment (air, land, and sea) and for any purpose (e.g. 
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surgery, laboratory research, defence and mass production of consumer and industrial goods) 
(Boston Consulting Group, 2015; Deloitte, 2015).  
These continued advances can be regarded as positive for the future workplace: as better 
robots are developed, the possibilities increase for them to perform dangerous tasks (i.e. 
nuclear power plant decontamination), repetitive, stressful, labour-intensive (i.e. welding), or 
menial. Furthermore, robots promise cost-efficiencies and greater accuracy and reliability 
relative to human agents (ABB Group, 2016; PwC, 2017). 
Robots vary greatly in their users and suppliers and the technologies and mechanisms 
used. However, it is generally agreed that robots must exhibit the sensing, intelligence and 
motion capabilities. The interaction among these capabilities (the “sense-think-act” formula) 
allows robots to perform tasks without external stimuli, thereby giving them autonomy – the 
technology’s distinguishing feature. 
 
Table 3.2 Robotics capabilities and definitions.  
Ability Definition 
Sensing Robots employ sensing technology to acquire information about their environment. 
Intelligence Robots process information captured through sensor technology and produce outputs for decision making, coordination, and control. 
Motion 
Robots automatically follow instructions that are pre-programmed or generated in real-
time based on sensor input to perform a deliberate, controlled, and often repeated, 
mechatronic action, including point-to-point mobility. 
Source: ABI Research, 2016. 
 
While there are innumerable possible hardware and software combinations that can be 
regarded as robots, all machine systems share a number of core components in their 
construction – these include sensors, end effectors and control systems (Consortium on 
Cognitive Science Instruction, 2017).   
Sensors allow robots to ‘perceive’ their environment, thereby allowing an entire machine 
system to respond appropriately. Sensors enable monitoring of parts locations and machine 
orientations during production, which allow the robot to compensate for any variation in 
processes (Society of Manufacturing Engineers, 2017). Some important sensor types include 
visual, force and torque, speed and acceleration, tactile, and distance sensors (although the 
majority of industrial robots utilize only binary sensing) (USLegal, 2017). More complex 
sensor types include: Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) abilities that use lasers to 
construct three dimensional maps of the robot’s environment, high frequency sounds-based 
supersonic sensors, and accelerometers and magnetometers that allow the robot to sense its 
movement relative to the Earth’s gravitational and magnetic fields (Consortium on Cognitive 
Science Instruction, 2017). 
Robots (particularly in industrial applications) require an end-effector or an end of arm 
tooling (EOAT) attachment to hold and manipulate either the tool performing the process or 
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the piece upon which the process is being performed (MHI, 2017). The most common end-
effectors are general-purpose grippers, the most common of these being finger grippers with 
two opposing fingers or three fingers in a lathe-chuck position; the grippers’ strength is 
augmented by pneumatics and hydraulics and through the inclusion of additional sensors may 
be equipped with sensory capabilities (BARA, 2017a; Consortium on Cognitive Science 
Instruction, 2017; USLegal, 2017).While these components are coordinated by the robot’s 
controller, end-effectors require to be operated and powered independently and need 
changing should the system have to be refitted for another task (US Patent and Trademark 
Office, 2017).  
The robot’s actions are directed by a combination of programming software and controls, 
which give the system automated functionality allowing for continuous operation (MHI, 
2017). Available robot control systems range from simple pre-programmed robots, which 
perform the simplest operations, to more complex robots that are able to respond 
appropriately in increasingly complicated environments (Consortium on Cognitive Science 
Instruction, 2017). Industry observers predict that innovation in software and AI will be 
fundamental to the development of next-generation robots (Keisner, Raffo, & Wunsch-
Vincent, 2015). Industry stakeholders believe that the continuing reductions in sensor prices 
and the increasing availability of open-source robot software will drive the technological 
possibilities of robots (Anandan, 2015). 
 
3.2.1 Robotics classifications  
Robots can be classified in various ways - according to their mechanical structures and 
mechanisms. Some of the most common approaches involve using the robot's’ mobility, work 
envelope shape (robot’s area of operations, determined by its coordinate system, joints 
arrangements, and manipulator length), and kinematic mechanisms (the movement allowed 
by the joints between robot parts) (Zhang, et al., 2006; Asada, 2005; Lau, 2005; Ross, Fardo, 
et al., 2010) as the bases for differentiation. 
The IFR and industry more generally favour two industry classifications of robots 
according to their purpose : Industrial Robots (IR) and Service Robots (SR)14.  
An IR is an automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator, 
programmable along three or more axes, which can be fixed or mobile for use in industrial 
automation applications (ISO 8373, 2012). Table 3.3 provide a list of the available IRs 
ranked their mechanical structure and industrial application.  
  
                                                 
14 For a classification of Service Robots, see Table III.1 and III.2 in Appendix 
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Table 3.3 Industrial robots (IRs) classification by mechanical structure and application.  
Category Description Industrial application 
Linear robots (Cartesian and 
gantry robots) 
Cartesian robot whose arm has 
three prismatic joints and whose 
axes are coincident with a 
Cartesian coordinate system 
Handling for plastic moulding 
Sealing 
Laser welding 
Pressing 
SCARA robots 
A robot, which has two parallel 
rotary joints to provide 
compliance in a plane 
Assembly 
Packaging 
Articulated robots 
A robot whose arm has at least 
three rotary joints, great payload 
capacity and flexible mounting 
possibilities for optimizing 
working range; 
might be combined with 
SCARA elements 
Handling for metal casting 
Welding 
Painting 
Packaging 
Palletizing 
Handling for forging 
Parallel robots (delta) 
 
A robot whose arms have 
concurrent prismatic or rotary 
joints 
Picking and placing 
Assembly 
Handling 
Cylindrical robots A robot whose axes form a cylindrical coordinate system 
Medical robots (DNA screening, 
forensic science, drug 
development and toxicology) 
Others 
  
Robots in Hazardous 
Environments 
Operations under water 
Operations in atmospheres 
containing combustible gases 
Operations  in space 
Not classified   
Automated guided vehicles 
(AGVs) 
Source: Strujik, 2011, International Federation of Robotics, 2015 
 
Interactive robots (often called social robots) are an emerging sub-set of robotics that 
envisage the next-generation robotic systems. These robots are expected to be viable in 
human environments involving various forms of interactions with human agents, and are 
intuitive, easy-to-use and responsive to user needs (Christensen, Batzinger, et al., 2016). 
Because their commercialization is in its infancy, the IFR classifies interactive robots as 
either IRs or SRs, which latter include the sub-set of social robots that exhibit social 
characteristics (KPMG, 2016). 
While the realization of such systems is extremely complex and restricted (ABB Group, 
2016; Christensen, Batzinger, et al., 2016), a cooperative environment involving human 
agents and automated systems are an attractive proposition because of their distinct 
advantages relative to other configurations: they would combine the flexibility and 
adaptability of the former in complex tasks, with the consistency and high productivity in 
simple tasks of the latter (Michalos, Makris, et al., 2010).  
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Contemporary human-machine configurations in the workplace vary based on the form of 
support that the robot can provide to the agent – often depending on the degree of assistance 
that the combination of sensors, actuators and data processing within the system can provide. 
Generally, robot systems and human agents perform their tasks either jointly or separately. 
The level of interaction is strongly influenced and limited by the ability of the entire 
environment to avoid collisions with human agents. Interactive robots promise to deliver 
cooperation that goes beyond collision avoidance (Krüger, Lien, & Verl, 2009).  
Current IRs fall into several different categories: 1) robot assistant, 2) collaborative robots 
(co-bots) and 3) humanoid or anthropomorphic robots. Robot assistants are interactive and 
flexible robotic systems that provide sensor-based, actuator-based and data processing 
assistance (Helms et al., 2002). First designed by the German non-profit Fraunhofer Institute 
for Manufacturing Engineering and Automation (Fraunhofer Institute IPA), current-
generation robot assistants are complex mechatronics systems that consist of mobile 
platforms with differential gear drives and energy supply for autonomous workflow (Krüger, 
Lien, & Verl, 2009). These are often multifunctional, adaptable to varying requirements of 
automation, and provide interactive guidance to the user (Pew Research Centre, 2014).  
Collaborative robots or co-bots are human-scale, articulated robots that directly work with 
human agents. Invented by Northwestern University McCormick School of Engineering 
professor Edward Colgate (alongside Michael Peshkin), these are mechanical devices that 
provide guidance through the use of servomotors while a human operator provides motive 
power (Krüger, Lien, & Verl, 2009; Morris, 2016). In practice, the co-bots’ distinct feature is 
their ability to directly provide power support to the human agent in strenuous tasks, while 
maintaining a high degree of mobility (Lau, 2009). While co-bots tend to be employed in 
manufacturing tasks,15 they are also used in non-traditional applications such as surgery 
(Delnondedieu & Troccaz, 1995) (see Table 3.4 for a list of popular collaborative robot 
types).  
Humanoid or anthropomorphic robots act autonomously and safely, without human 
control or supervision. They are not designed as solutions to specific robotic needs (unlike 
robots on assembly lines), but built to work in real-world environments, interact with people 
and adapt to their needs (Coradeschi & Ishiguro, 2006; PwC, 2017). The human-inspired 
design of humanoid robots is combined with a safe, lightweight structure (Krüger, Lien, & 
Verl, 2009). Generally, these robots are designed for applications that IRs do not cover 
(World Technology Evaluation Centre, 2012): assembly processes where position estimation 
and accuracy of the robot are significantly below assembly tolerance, tasks where the robot 
works closely with (and may interact directly with) human agents, and processes where the 
robot target’s dimensions are relatively uncertain (Albu-Schaffer, Haddadin, et al., 2007).  
  
                                                 
15 The employment of co-bots in industrial applications, particularly in the automotive sector, will be 
explored in the later sections. 
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Table 3.4 Prominent types of collaborative robots.  
Type Summary Applications 
Power and Force 
Limiting 
Incidental contact initiated by 
the robot is limited in energy 
to not cause operator harm. 
Small and highly variable applications 
Conditions requiring frequent operator presence 
Machine tending 
Loading and unloading 
Hand Guiding The operator leads the robot 
movement through direct 
interface 
Robotic lift assist 
Highly variable applications 
Limited or small-batch productions 
Speed and Separation 
Monitoring 
Robot speed reduces when an 
obstruction is detected Simultaneous tasks 
Direct operator interface 
Safety-rated 
Monitored Stop 
Co-bot responds promptly 
(stopping or moving) in the 
presence of its operator 
Direct part loading or unloading 
Work-in-process inspections 
Speed and separation monitoring (stand-still 
function) 
Source: Robotic Industries Association, 2014 
 
3.3 Global competition and markets in the robotic industry 16 
The robotics industry has experienced rapid growth in recent years. A comparison based 
on robotics expert, Frank Tobe’s industry-dedicated database, the Robot Report’s snapshots 
of firms and research institutions in 2012 and 2015, is indicative of the sector’s rapid growth. 
The institutions’ geographical data suggest geographical agglomeration: start-ups and service 
robotics companies are located near prominent universities and research institutions (e.g. 
Carnegie Mellon, MIT, Harvard, UC Berkeley, Stanford) or areas of innovation (e.g. New 
York city), while industrial robot companies are prevalent in traditional industrial regions 
(e.g. Germany and the UK) (Tobe, 2012). The sector’s activity is further highlighted by the 
increasing sources of funding for robotics-related ventures and consolidation among existing 
robotics firms. Tobe’s 2016 data in the Robot Report on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
(Tobe, 2017a) and funding-related activities (Tobe, 2017b) reinforce the industry’s 
activeness. Funding of robotics-related startups reached USD 1.95 billion (50% more than in 
2015) while M&A activity accounted for at least USD 18.867 billion. Overall, the data 
                                                 
16 For a summary of key-findings at country level, see Table III.4 in Appendix 
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suggest some interesting developments: 1) Chinese companies are positioning themselves 
aggressively in the industry (e.g. the USD 5.1 billion acquisition of German robotics KUKA 
AG by Chinese consumer products manufacturer, Midea Group); 2) large blue-chip US firms 
are acquiring robotics start-ups (e.g. Honeywell International Inc.’s acquisition of materials 
handling solutions firm, Intelligrated, for USD 1.5 billion, USD 0.6 billion acquisition of 
start-up Cruise Automation, which is developing auto-pilot systems for existing cars of 
General Motors); and 3) the sustained success of Silicon Valley startups in raising funds (5 of 
the top 10 companies by amount funded in 2016, are in Silicon Valley or in the greater 
California area). 
IFR 2015 unit sales data indicate that China has become the largest robotics market, with 
an installed count of 68,000 industrial robots (a 20% increase on 2014 figures). Both the US 
and Germany remain key robotics markets with peaks of 27,504 units (up 5% in 2014) and 
20,105 units (up from 20,051 units in 2014) respectively. The US is the fourth-largest robots 
market, and Germany the fifth-largest. During the same period, UK sales decreased to 1,645 
units. 
The sustained growth of the industrial robotics market is attributable mostly to the 
automotive sector: robotics sales CAGR from 2010 to 2015 was approximately 20% and the 
2015 sector installed count approximated 97,500 units (or 38% of the total robotics supply at 
the time) (International Federation of Robotics, 2016). Other valuable sectors that the IFR 
analysis (2016) identifies are the electrical and electronics (install count of 64,600 units in 
2015) and metal and machinery (29,450 units); sales to all industries sales (except for 
automotive and electrical and electronics) in 2015 increased by 27% on average. 
Relative to the industrial robots’ market, the service robots market remains a nascent sub-
sector. IFR (2015) unit sales data show that sold units in 2015 reached 41,060 units. Sales of 
service robots for professional use were largest in logistics (19,000 units or 46.27% of the 
total unit supply), defence (11,207 units or 27.29%), field (6,4440 units or 15.68%), and 
medical (1,324 units or 3.22%) (IFR, 2015). The IFR (2015) forecasts that these applications 
will remain key growth segments for service robotics from 2016 to 2019. 
Collaborative robots. While still in its infancy, the collaborative robots (or co-bots) sub-
sector is expected to drive growth in the industry significantly. Despite achieving market 
acceptance and recognition only quite recently (Lawton, 2016; Universal Robots, 2016), it is 
already a multi-million dollar market (approximately USD95 million in 2014) (Tobe, 2015) 
and (alongside the digitization of mechanical systems) is a hot topic among industry 
stakeholders (e.g. collaborative robots as one of the main themes in AUTOMATA 2016, one 
of the sector’s most prominent trade conventions) (Tobe, 2016). Some of the major players in 
the category include Rethink Robotics, a producer of the popular robots Baxter and Sawyer, 
and Universal Robotics, makers of the world’s first co-bot and the current market leader by 
install base (Universal Robotics, 2016a; Universal Robotics, 2016b) (Table 3.5 provide a list 
of selected robotics companies producing co-bots).  
Analysts and stakeholders alike are optimistic that it will become a billion-dollar trade by 
2020, with some more bullish than others (such as Barclays Capital which forecasts a market 
valuation of USD 3 billion by 2020) (ABI Research in Lawton, 2016; Zalenski, 2016; 
Universal Robots in Thor, 2017). Europe is expected to maintain a significant role in the 
market’s development for several reasons including: 1) the strong presence of European 
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robotics manufacturers in the global landscape; 2) the activeness of European companies in 
maintaining their advantage in the emerging co-bot market (e.g. Universal Robotics, ABB 
Group, KUKA); and 3) the strong robotics research base in the region (e.g. Fraunhofer 
Institute) (Bogue, 2015). 
There are various aspects feeding the appetite for co-bots. First, the greater human-robot 
collaboration enabled by co-bots has resulted in greater productivity on the shop floor (Shah, 
2011). Early adopters, particularly established carmakers such as Ford, Mercedes Benz and 
Toyota, have achieved productivity gains from using co-bots alongside additional human 
workers (Nisen, 2014; WEF, 2016; Zalenski, 2016)  
Furthermore, unlike traditional industrial robots that are large in size and require 
significant investments (making them ideal for mass production), co-bots are compact and 
easy-to-use, making them viable solutions for the untapped SME market and low-volume and 
high-mix production (Lawton, 2016; Zhang, 2017). In addition, co-bots are affordable: 
Rethink Robotics’ Baxter and Sawyer, cost around USD 25,000-30,000 (22,880.50 EUR to 
27,456.60 EUR)17, Universal Robotics’ products range in price from USD 23,000 to USD 
45,000 (21,050.06 EUR to 41,184.90) (Tobe, 2015), and co-bot variants are often available 
for 20,000 EUR to 40,000 EUR (Bogue, 2015). Bogue (2015) adds that these robots often 
have short payback periods, generally one year or less. 
Finally, the co-bots’ design features address safety concerns often associated to traditional 
industrial robots. Co-bots are designed with rounded surfaces (to reduce the risk of impact, 
pinching and crushing), and are equipped with integrated sensors to detect human presence 
(and to stop in such conditions) and force-limited joints (to sense forces due to impact) (Tobe, 
2015; Zalenski, 2016; Zhang, 2017). Thus, manufacturers (and even service providers) are 
able to employ co-bots in a variety of ways that are beyond the capabilities of industrial 
robots (Tobe, 2015; Lawton, 2016b; Universal Robotics, 2016). 
 
  
  
                                                 
17 FX rate on December 31, 2015 (date of report publication) was 1 USD = 0.91522 EUR (via exchange-
rates.org). 
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Table 3.5 Collaborative robots of select companies. 
Company Base of 
operation 
Co-bot Feature summary Product 
status 
Base price  
(in USD) 
Rethink 
Robotics 
North America Baxter 2-armed co-bot On sale 25,000.00 
Sawyer 1-armed co-bot On sale 29,000.00 
Universal 
Robotics 
Europe 
(Denmark) 
UR3 robot 3-kg payload capable co-bot On sale 23,000.00 
UR5 robot 5-kg payload capable co-bot On sale 35,000.00 
UR10 robot 10-kg payload capable co-bot On sale 45,000.00 
MRK-Systeme Europe 
(Germany) 
KR5 SI robot Co-bot software for robot 
systems 
NA  NA 
F&P Personal 
Robotics 
Europe 
(Switzerland) 
P-Rob 2 1-armed co-bot On sale  NA 
Robert Bosch 
GmbH 
Europe 
(Germany) 
APAS System 1-armed co-bot In-house 
use 
 NA 
ABB Group Europe 
(Germany) 
YuMi 2-armed co-bot On sale  40,000.00 
MABI Robotic Europe 
(Switzerland) 
Speedy 6 robot 6-kg payload capable, 1-
armed co-bot 
On sale  NA 
  Speedy 12 robot 12-kg payload capable, 1-
armed co-bot 
On sale  NA 
FANUC 
Corporation 
Japan CR-35iA 35-kg payload capable 1-
armed co-bot 
On sale  NA 
KUKA Europe 
(Germany) 
LBR iiwa 13.64-kg payload capable, 1-
armed co-bot 
On sale 100,000.00 
Kawada 
Industries 
Japan HRP humanoid 
robot 
2-armed co-bot On sale 60,000.00 
Source: Adopted from Tobe (2015); Co-bots guide (https://cobotsguide.com); various company websites 
 
Warehouse automation and logistics robots. The continued growth of e-commerce 
is expected to sustain the appetite for warehouse and logistic robotics. Amazon’s USD775 
million purchase in 2012 of market-leading Kiva Systems (now, rebranded Amazon 
Robotics) (Rusli, 2012) has served as proof-of-concept for the logistics industry regarding the 
benefits of warehouse automation. Shifting consumer expectations have increased pressure 
on service providers to automate. Industry estimates suggest that the robotic market’s 
valuation could be around USD20 billion by 2020 (Tractica, 2017). 
While Amazon’s acquisition left the sector with no established leader in 2012, a 
combination of start-ups and acquisitions has filled the gap. Some of the more notable start-
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ups include: 1) Locus Robotics, a spin-off founded by Massachusetts-based Quiet Logistics 
to provide warehouse automation solutions to third-party logistics providers (with DHL 
Supply Chain, as its most notable client); 2) Fetch Robotics, a San Jose, California-based 
producer of the mobile cargo system ‘Freight’ and the mobile manipulator ‘Fetch’ (both of 
which work collaboratively with human agents in the facility); and 3) Aethon, Inc., a 
producer of Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs) that are used also in hospitals (Banker, 
2016; Romeo, 2016; Clark & Bhasin, 2017). Apart from these enterprises, established firms 
are developing (or acquiring) their own logistics automation solutions: e.g. 1) KUKA’s 
acquisition of materials handling and logistics automation provider Swisslog; 2) Toyota 
Industries’ purchase of Netherlands-based Vanderlande Industries, another materials handling 
and logistics automation provider; and 3) Hitachi’s Racrew, its mobile warehouse robotics 
system that is in development (Banker, 2016; Capron, 2017) (Table 3.6 provide a list of 
selected robotics companies producing warehouse and logistic robots). 
Various developments have made warehouse and logistics automation an attractive 
proposition. First, Amazon’s deployment of robotic systems in 2012 demonstrated substantial 
cost reductions and productivity gains in warehouse management – recent research suggests 
that the firm is saving around USD 22 million in each fulfilment centre equipped with 
Amazon robots (Kim, 2016). Moreover, current-generation automation solutions are more 
adaptable, flexible, and intelligent, thereby allowing service providers to maintain zero-defect 
logistics processes and to rapidly expand services and facilities (D’Andrea in ROBO Capron, 
2017; Parsons, 2017). 
Third, shifting consumer expectations (due to the rise of e-commerce) have put 
pressure on service providers to adopt automation technologies. In particular, the introduction 
of same-day deliveries (and the preference for fast delivery among consumers) has resulted in 
various challenges in logistics and warehouse management including: 1) maintenance of 
multiple distribution facilities which often are located in rural areas and face labour-related 
challenges’ 2) exacerbation of the ‘last-mile’ problem, as goods are no longer delivered to 
retail stores, but directly to households. Robotics seemingly offer viable solutions to these 
problems (Clark & Bhasin, 2016; Romeo, 2016; Harnett & Kim, 2017;  Bray, 2017). 
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Table 3.6 Warehouse automation and logistics robots of select companies.  
Company Base of operations Robotic solutions features Product status 
Kiva Systems 
(Amazon Robotics) 
North America Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
In-house use 
Locus Robotics North America Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
On sale 
Fetch Robotics North America Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
On sale 
Vecna Technologies North America Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
On sale 
InVia Robotics North America Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
On sale 
IAM Robotics North America Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
On sale 
6 River Systems North America Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
In development 
Magazino GmbH Europe (Germany) Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
On sale 
Hitachi Solutions Japan Autonomous mobile robot systems for 
orders fulfillment 
In development 
Clearpath Robotics North America Autonomous guided vehicles On sale 
Aethon North America Autonomous guided vehicles On sale 
Grezenbach Maschinenbau 
GmbH 
Europe (Germany) Autonomous guided vehicles On sale 
Knapp AG Europe (Austria) Autonomous guided vehicles On sale 
KUKA Swisslog Europe (Switzerland) Autonomous guided vehicles On sale 
MiR Mobile Industrial 
Robots 
Europe (Denmark) Autonomous guided vehicles On sale 
Starship Technologies Europe (Estonia) Autonomous guided vehicles In development 
Dispatch North America Autonomous guided vehicles In development 
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Company Base of operations Robotic solutions features Product status 
Grey Orange India 
Private Ltd. 
India Autonomous goods-to-person system On sale 
Scallog Europe (France) Autonomous goods-to-person system In development 
RightHand Robotics North America Grasping technology In development 
Google, Inc. North America Unmanned aerial vehicles In development 
Balyo Europe (France) Vision systems for logistics automation In development 
Seegrid Corporation North America Vision systems for logistics automation In development 
Source: Adopted from Banker (2016); Romeo (2016); Tobe (2016); Bray (2017); various company 
websites 
 
3.3.1 US 
Overview. The US is an important robotics player, being the fourth-largest robots market 
by sales in 2015 and home to the most robotics startups (IFR, 2016c; IFR 2016d). Much of 
robotics’ growth in the country comes from American industries’ efforts to maintain 
competitive advantage through production automation (IFR, 2016a). Moreover, US robotics 
is a mature sector: it comprises a number of leading robotics research institutions (Carnegie 
Mellon University, MIT), subsidiaries of foreign companies (ABB Group, KUKA AG, 
FANUC), notable robotics startups (Boston Dynamics) and the largest technology companies 
(Google, Amazon) that are delving into robotics.  
Industry and technical support. Across the US, there are three prominent robotics 
clusters: 1) Boston, Massachusetts; 2) Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and 3) Silicon Valley, 
California. Boston seems the most mature among the three: it is already a thriving robotics 
hub, with 100 companies and 3,000 robotics employees and attracting multi-million 
investments annually (Subbaraman, 2015). It is also home to a number of robotics companies 
with diverse specializations (e.g. Amazon’s Kiva Systems, the largest US household robot 
provider iRobot Corporation, and prominent start-up Boston Dynamics), a number of 
universities with robotics programs (MIT, University of Massachusetts Lowell, and Olin 
College of Engineering) and various industry partnerships (e.g. Google’s Project Wing with 
MIT, Toyota’s commitment with MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory) (Subbaraman, 2015).  
Pittsburgh hosts the CMU (a major actor in the ARM institute),18 one of the leading US 
universities for robotics, and a healthy ecosystem of venture capitalists with robotics 
expertise (e.g. General Electric Ventures, The Robotics Hub) and various university spinoffs 
                                                 
18 To be discussed in the succeeding sections. 
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and startups (e.g. high-tech baby gear producer, 4moms, and bipedal robots’ developer, 
Agility Robotics) (Anandan, 2016).  
While known more as an ICT innovation cluster, Silicon Valley is home also to various 
robotics enterprises and startups, particularly those involved in SRs and AI. Most of the 
Valley’s robotics projects are international in scope and attract interest from both established 
and emerging institutions (e.g. Bosch, Fetch Robotics, SRI International) (Anandan, 2016).  
The Robotic Industries Association, founded in 1974, is the sector-dedicated trade group 
in North America. Member organizations include leading robot manufacturers, users, systems 
integrators, component suppliers, research groups and consulting firms (Robotics Industries 
Association, 2017).  
Institutional support. In 2011, the US Government launched the Advanced 
Manufacturing Partnership (AMP) to drive investments and collaboration between industry, 
academia, and government in emerging technologies related to manufacturing (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011). Through AMP, in the same year, multiple 
federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of Health (NIH), and the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), launched the National Robotics Initiative. With annual 
funding of around USD 40 million to USD 50 million, the programme sought to accelerate 
the development and adoption of next-generation robotics in the US through the development 
of fundamental research (National Science Foundation, 2011). In 2016, the NSF released the 
National Robotics Initiative 2.0: Ubiquitous Collaborative Robots (NRI-2.0) to serve not only 
as a continuation of the original programme but also to promote research on the scalability 
and variety of next-generation robotics (Computing Community Consortium, 2017).  
More recently, the US Department of Defense (DoD) announced the new Advanced 
Robotics Manufacturing (ARM) Innovation Hub award to American Robotics, Inc. in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (US DoD, 2017). The US DoD (2017) stated that the American 
Robotics, Inc., a consortium of stakeholders from both the public and private spheres, had 
contributed USD 173 million (around 162.56 million EUR19); federal government is 
matching it with a budget of USD 80 million (approximately 75.17 million EUR). The ARM 
institute will include 123 industry partners, 40 academic and academically affiliated partners, 
and 64 government and non-profit partners (US DoD, 2017). The ARM programme joins the 
larger Manufacturing USA programme, a federal-sponsored network of industry, academic, 
and federal stakeholders that is investigating identified high-potential technologies in future 
manufacturing (among others, biopharmaceuticals, regenerative manufacturing, AI) to sustain 
the country’s competitiveness (Manufacturing USA, 2014).  
The ARM Institute is spearheaded by Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) and is focused 
on critical growth manufacturing sub-sectors which forecasts high levels of robotics adoption 
(e.g. aerospace, automotive, electronics, textiles, logistics, and composites) (ARM Institute, 
2017b). To expand its reach, the institute is launching eight Regional Robotics Innovation 
Collaborative (RRICs), which are semi-autonomous institutes that will facilitate the 
                                                 
19 FX rate on 13 January, 2017 (date of report publication) was 1 USD = 0.93964 EUR (via exchange-
rates.org). 
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networking of manufacturing and robotics companies and accelerate the adoption of robotics 
within their regions (ARM Institute, 2017a).  
Demand-side trends. Besides the continued demand from American manufacturers for 
production automation, another notable demand-side development is related to the 
aggressiveness of US technology companies in acquiring robotics companies or researching 
related technologies. A prominent case is the online retailer Amazon’s acquisition of 
warehouse automation provider, Kiva Systems, to improve productivity in its facilities 
(Guizzo, 2012). Another is Automatic Test Equipment provider Teradyne’s acquisition of 
Universal Robots (UR) in 2015 in order 1) to maintain its competitive advantage in its core 
offerings, as its customer base clamoured for the automation of the manual processes around 
its testing offerings, and 2) to participate in the emerging co-bot market in which UR holds a 
near 60% market share (Robotics Business Review, 2015). Other examples include 
investments by technology companies, such as Google, of USD20 to 30 billion in AI R&D 
(Columbus, 2017).  
While the US remains an innovation hub and an important robotics market, there are 
concerns that none of the established market sector leaders are US companies (Cuban 2016; 
Statt, 2017). Many important US players are subsidiaries of foreign companies and the 
notable US robotics companies often serve niche or nascent demand. 
  
3.3.2 China  
Overview. China was the largest robotics market by sales in 2015, with an installed count 
of 68,000 industrial robots (a 20% increase on 2014 figures) across its provinces (IFR, 2016). 
IFR (2016) statistics suggest that China will continue to be a net importer, with foreign robot 
suppliers maintaining an approximately 70.12% market share. Increasing labour costs in 
China, brought about by the mass movement of Multi-national Enterprises (MNCs) to China 
during the 1980s and the country’s ageing workforce, have driven manufacturers to adopt 
robotics in their production processes (Bland, 2016). MNC-owned Chinese factories are 
prominent in the robot drive: Ford’s Hangzhou facility features over 650 IRs while similar 
machines are found in General Motors’ Shanghai and Wuhan factories (Bradsher, 2017). 
Apart from its market size, China, through its domestic firms, has remained in the 
headlines because of its continued aggressiveness in acquiring several foreign robotics 
companies. Since 2015, the Chinese have been involved in numerous landmark acquisition 
deals including AGIC Capital’s purchase of Italian end-of-arms tool supplier GIMATIC Srl, 
AGIC and state-funded Guoxin International Investment Corp.’s purchase of German IR 
integrator KraussMaffei Group, and the USD5.2 billion takeover of German KUKA AG by 
the Chinese Midea Group (Tobe, 2015).  
Industry and technical support. Industry support is mainly from the China Robot 
Industry Alliance (CRIA), an association of Chinese manufacturers, robot end-users, research 
institutes, colleges and universities which is supported by various Chinese government 
agencies and the China Machinery Industry Federation (CMIF) (CRIA, 2015). Founded in 
April 2013, it has 152 member organizations (DGI, 2016). 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
70 
CRIA aims to become a platform for various stakeholders to promote the use and 
development of robotics in China, whilst also ensuring that the overall direction follows both 
national industrial policies and market trends (CRIA, 2015b). CRIA was instrumental in 
developing China’s national standards for industrial robots; it is currently working on 
standards for service robotics (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2016).  
Institutional support. Industry observers believe that the Chinese effort in robotics is 
indicative of China’s drive to become market leader in manufacturing and manufacturing 
innovation, as embodied in the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MiC 2025) plan. MiC 2025 is the first 
of three comprehensive plans to upgrade Chinese industry and transform China into a 
manufacturing power by 2049 through the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies 
from abroad and the promotion of domestic brands and R&D capabilities (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2015). Some of the specific targets identified by MiC 2025 for the Chinese robotics 
industry are related to promotion of various robotics-related research for industrial 
applications and investigations in high-potential sub-fields such as SRs and social works 
robotics (MIIT, 2016) (details of MiC 2025’s sector-specific Robot Industry Development 
Plan are provided in Table 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7 Details of China's Robot Industry Development Plan 
Objective Specific targets 
Larger production scale Domestic robot supply > 100k units 
6-axis robots > 50k units 
SRs revenue > 30 billion RMB 
Elevated production 
capabilities 
Reach of international standards on Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
Advancement in key robot technologies 
Breakthrough in core 
components 
CN firms' share in domestic market > 50% 
Capabilities to produce own robot components 
Significant achievement in 
integrated solutions 
Robot density > 150 robot units per 10,000 workers 
Integrated robot solutions > 30 solutions in traditional industries 
Source: Macquarie Research (2016) 
 While details of exact sums and policy strategies expected from the Chinese are scarce 
(Lee, 2015), there is significant activity at the provincial level. For instance, the province of 
Guangdong promised to invest USD 8 billion for automation-related projects in 2015 to 2017 
(Bland, 2016). Knight (2016) has a higher estimate: USD 150 billion to equip Guangdong 
factories with IRs and to establish two new centres for advanced automation (Knight, 2016). 
Lianoning’s provincial capital, Shenyang, has launched a USD7 million fund to support high-
technology industries (Schuman, 2017).  
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Firm-level information. At firm-level, local Chinese companies are launching robotics-
focused enterprises and subsidiaries to challenge established robotics firms in product pricing 
(Bland, 2016). Bland offers an example: Shanghai-listed machine producer for the plastics 
sector, Ningbo Techmation, has launched a subsidiary, E-Deodar, which produces IRs for the 
plastics industry that are 20–30% cheaper than that produced by ABB and KUKA. Another 
case is Chinese technology giant Baidu’s various investments and partnerships in AI and 
machine learning (Bajpai, 2017).  
Contemporary issues. Despite the broad-based efforts in Chinese private and public 
sectors, observers have raised several concerns about the nation’s manufacturing aspirations. 
First, China’s manufacturing sector, relative to the global competition, draws most of its 
competitive advantage from labour-intensive production. Statistics suggest that it remains 
low-technology based (2016 value-added share was only 19% while more developed 
countries, e.g. the US and Germany, achieved around 30%) and its R&D capabilities remain 
weak (most are in developed regions) (Euromonitor International, 2017). Despite being the 
largest robotics market, analysts believe that China remains a laggard in industrial 
automation: only 60% of Chinese companies use industrial automation software (e.g. 
Enterprise Resource Planning) and robot density is only at 49 units per 10,000 employees 
(Lee, 2015; IFR, 2016). Moreover, correspondence with Chinese companies reveals that they 
are focused mainly on production automation rather than holistic integration of value chains 
through data analytics (espoused by programmes such as Industry 4.0) (Meyer, 2016). 
Realizing MiC 2025’s vision requires a broader effort from the Chinese government since 
firm capabilities remain uneven (Wang, 2017).  
Particular to the Chinese robotics landscape, is continued over-investment and population 
instability: observers not the rapid establishment of different small robotics companies and 
lack of established Chinese robotics components (e.g. speed reducers, servo-motors, and 
control panels) manufacturers, which may prevent the sector from achieving scale (Tobe, 
2017). Analysts predict that it could take China between five and ten years to produce firms 
and products on a par with their German and Japanese counterparts (Macquarie Research, 
2016a; Manjoo, 2017).  
Related to debt financing at the local level, observers worry that there is over-capacity in 
local governments’ debt instruments as Chinese municipalities race to participate in the 
robotics sector (Taplin, 2016). Taplin (2016) describes the case of Wuhu city, west of 
Shanghai and situated in Anhui province: to establish its robotics park, it has already incurred 
a debt of USD 332 million and is planning to raise an additional USD 181 million to sustain 
developments.  
Last, a confluence of factors (such as cost pressures and an emphasis on automation) have 
led to some factories across China indiscriminately adopting advanced automation processes 
and robotics. Knight (2016) describes a Shanghai-based Cambridge Industries Group (CIG) 
factory that already is adopting machines to replace Chinese workers and is planning entirely-
automated factories or ‘dark factories’. In another example, Taiwanese consumer electronics 
manufacturer, Foxconn Technology Group, has plans to fully automate its Chinese factories; 
the firm has stated that already it can produce 10,000 units of its Foxbots, IRs that can replace 
human labour (Statt, 2016). Industry observers are worried that such actions could jeopardize 
the country’s still-enormous manufacturing workforce (Knight, 2016). Some believe that as 
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complex manufacturing tasks are automated, most Chinese workers will be forced to move 
into the services sector (Williams-Grut, 2016).  
 
3.3.3 Japan 
Overview. Japan is a powerhouse in the robotics landscape: it was the third-largest robot 
market by sales in 2015 (IFR, 2016). IFR (2016) data indicate that Japan has seen a growing 
trend of 10% on average since 2010 following decreases between 2005 and 2009.  
Japan’s sustained performance in the robotics sector stems from how the Japanese view 
robots more than machines, as social agents that embody Japanese culture. How the Japanese 
regard robots is based mostly on their view of technological progress as a cultural 
phenomenon (Samani, et al., 2013). Often, Japanese scientists and engineers incorporate 
traditional cultural and social narratives and values into their robotics developments 
(Šabanović, 2014). Robotics has become pervasive in Japan beyond traditional applications, 
and enjoys high levels of social acceptance on the island.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that Japan produces most of the world’s robots (EU-Japan Centre 
for Industrial Cooperation, 2015). Japanese firms are increasingly export-oriented: already 
65% of production is for exports, with the remaining third for the domestic market (primarily 
because of shrinking domestic prices and an already saturated market) (EU-Japan Centre for 
Industrial Cooperation, 2015). It is of no surprise that Japan is home to three of the world’s 
top robotics companies by installed base in 2015: FANUC Corporation (with the largest robot 
installed base of 400,000 units), Yaskawa Corporation (with the second-largest installed base 
of around 300,000 units), and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd (with the fourth-largest 
installed base of around 110,000 units) (Montaqim, 2015).  
Japanese companies produce a wide variety of robotics: in manufacturing, there are IRs 
for automotive, E&E, chemicals, machinery and metal processing and logistics applications 
(EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation, 2015). The EU-Japan Centre for Industrial 
Cooperation report (2015) explains that while Japan is engaged in both IR and SR production 
(and adheres to the IFR industrial classification), it has a particular strength in the production 
of high-precision servomotors, cables and many different sensor types and components 
essential for robot construction and maintenance – industry stakeholders have assigned them 
the separate classification ‘RoboTech’. 
The Japanese New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization 
(NEDO) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) forecast that the Japanese 
robotics sector will double in value by 2020 and that growth from 2020 to 2035 will be 
around 10% to 15%. NEDO projects are increasing also in areas where Japan enjoys a 
competitive advantage (e.g. RoboTech production).20 
Industry and technical support. Japanese robotics enjoy strong institutional support; 
robotics-related research is funded by the Japanese government through various government 
agencies including: METI, NEDO, Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute 
International (ATR), Agency for Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, National 
Institute of Environment and Disaster Prevention, Japan Science and Technology Agency, 
                                                 
20 NEDO expects the RoboTech sector to grow 20% annually in the next 5 years. 
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Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Bio-Mimetic Control 
Research Centre, Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport to name a few. A notable 
example is the Japan National Research and Development Institute of Science and 
Technology’s (JST) maintenance of an industry-university cooperation development platform 
to accelerate the promotion of robotics technologies and ventures (Nirmala, 2016).21 
Institutional support. Coinciding with the renewed growth of robotics in Japan is the 
nation’s current bid to reclaim sector leadership. Having been overtaken by China in IR 
supply in recent years, Japan intends to become the world’s largest society supported by 
robots through the promotion of both SRs and IRs (Yamasaki, 2016). In 2015, Japan 
launched its Robot Revolution Initiative, a public-private programme to expand the country’s 
robotics capabilities and global footprint, and increase social acceptance of robots in the 
domestic market (METI, 2015). The private sector is expected to invest the required JPY100 
billion (around USD 838.08 million or 740.71 million EUR22) funding while the public sector 
will be responsible for policy and regulatory reforms (METI, 2015a). In addition, the 
Japanese government is committing around JPY 26 trillion (around USD 229.44 billion or 
EUR 203.38 billion23) to develop related technologies such as AI and Big Data analysis and 
cyber-security systems (JETRO, 2016). 
Demand-side trends. Apart from the needs of its factories, demand for robots and 
increased automation in Japan originates from various demographic challenges, including 
among other things, falling birth rates, ageing population and declining workforce 
productivity. However, Japan’s problems are more severe relative to its peers: its population 
is expected to shrink by 30 million in the next 35 years and its over-65 population is expected 
to rise to a 40% share by 2025 (Kemburi, 2016). Thus, particular emphasis on SR 
developments for medical and nursing care (2015, EU-Japan Centre for Industrial 
Cooperation). On-going projects listed in the Japan Robot Association (JARA) confirm these 
observations as several projects are focused on medical care (e.g. Project to Promote the 
Development and Introduction of Robotic Devices for Nursing Care, Innovative Cybernetic 
System for a ZERO intensive nursing-care society, and Tough Robotics Challenge) (JARA, 
2016).  
 
  
                                                 
21 Selected current Japanese robot projects are listed in Table 3. 
22 FX rate on 10 February, 2015 (publication date) was 1 USD = 119.32 JPY; 1 USD = 0.88382 EUR (via 
exchange-rates.org). 
23 FX rate on 18 February, 2016 (publication date) was 1 USD = 113.32 JPY; 1 USD = 0.88643 EUR (via 
exchange-rates.org).  
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Table 3.8 Select existing Japanese robot projects 
Project Name Project Summary Cost Start End 
Project to Promote the 
Development and 
Introduction of Robotic 
Devices for Nursing 
Care 
Development of assistive robotics for 
nursing care to reduce caregivers' burden 
in providing elderly care. NA JFY 2013 
JFY 
2017 
Innovative Cybernetic 
System for a ZERO 
intensive nursing-care 
society 
Development of cybernetic systems that 
combines the brain-nerve-muscular 
system, robots, and other devices to 
improve/assist humans who would 
otherwise require intensive nursing-care . 
NA NA NA 
Tough Robotics 
Challenge 
Development of the fundamental 
technologies for outdoor robots, thereby 
leading to the development of autonomous 
robots for disaster response. 
NA NA NA 
Source: JARA, 2017 
 
Apart from medical care, Japan, through the Robot Revolution Initiative, has also 
identified four (out of a total of 5) other high-growth robotics sub-sectors: these include 1) 
manufacturing; 2) services; 3) infrastructure and disaster response; and 4) agriculture (METI, 
2015a). By 2020, Japan aims to achieve the following: a 25% increase in the rate of 
utilization of robots in large manufacturing (10% for SMEs), a 30% increase in use of robots 
in services (particularly, in picking, screening and checking purposes), increased societal 
awareness regarding robots for medical care, a 30% increase in adoption of infrastructure 
robots and the introduction of around 20 robot variants for agriculture (METI, 2015b). 
To stimulate interest in robotics, the Japanese government is planning a Robot Olympics 
alongside the 2020 summer Olympic games, which will feature competitions and exhibits 
that involve a variety of machines such as humanoid robots and IRs (Phys.org, 2016).  
Japanese firms. The private sector includes a wide variety of firms that are market 
leaders or specialists in industrial applications. These include: FANUC, Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries, Toyota Motor Corporation, Panasonic Corporation, Honda Motor Co. Ltd., Fuji 
Heavy Industries Ltd., ZMP Inc., Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd. Among others (EU-Japan Centre 
for Industrial Cooperation, 2015). The successful cases are also the top-three Japanese 
robotics firms by installed base.24 
 
3.3.4 Korea 
Overview. South Korea is an important robotics market and the second-largest by sales in 
2015 (IFR, 2016c). IFR (2016c) states that 2015 performance is equivalent to around a 30% 
to 35% increase on 2014 values. South Korea has the highest robot density in general 
                                                 
24 A more comprehensive list of Japanese robotics suppliers is available in Appendix, Table III.3 
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industry, at around 411 robots per 10,000 employees (for IRs alone, the number is higher at 
531 robots per 10,000 employees). However, analysts have noted that South Korea does not 
have any sector-leading firms and it is lagging behind the US, Europe and Japan in 
technological innovation (Jae-Kyoung, 2016; Prakash, 2016; Kyung, 2017).  
Industry and technical support. South Korea has several industry groups and 
associations that provide technical and market support including the Korea Robotics Society, 
the Korea Institute for Robot Industry Advancement, the Korea Association of Robot 
Industry, and the Institute of Control, Robotics, and Systems (Edwards, 2016). Numerous 
Korean research institutes have had successes in robotics throughout the years: Centre of 
Intelligent Robotics at the Korean Institute of Science and Technology’s development of the 
household service robot CIROS, the Korean Institute of Ocean Science and Technology’s 
half-ton maritime robot Crabster (CR200), and the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology’s maritime robotics project on coastal preservation (Edwards, 2014). 
Moreover, the sector enjoys an active academic and research base that is engaged in 
expanding robotics applications. Some examples include the long-standing efforts of Korea 
University’s Intelligent Robotics Laboratory (IRL), Chonnam National University’s 
investigation into robotics technologies for cancer and intravascular treatments, and the 
collaborative work of various Korean universities (e.g. Korea University, Pohang University 
of Science and Technology, Seoul National University, Sogang University, and 
Sungkyukwan University) on AI (Edwards, 2014; Hyun-chae, 2016).  
Institutional support. South Korea has been active in the robotics sector since 2012 
when national government pledged around USD 316 million investment. In 2014, the Korean 
government, through the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), made an 
additional 2.7 billion USD commitment for the development of advanced robotics (MOTIE, 
2014). 
The latest institutional assistance to the sector has come from an additional public 
commitment of around USD 450 million (or approximately EUR 400 million) (Yonhap News 
Agency, 2016). The Yonhap News Agency (2016) stated that both the public and private 
sectors would will spend around 350 billion KRW to localize key fundamental robotics 
technologies, with more than 100 billion KRW to be poured into corporate research centres. 
In addition, the Korean MOTIE is allocating USD 13.5 million (approx. EUR 12 million) for 
humanoid robotics R&D and necessary workforce development until 2020, and around EUR 
18 million to 24 million (USD 20.25 million to 27 million) for the development of grassroots 
research up to 2022 (Hyong, 2017).  
The latest investment stems from the Korean government’s belief that most widely used 
SRs in country’s market are vacuum robots for the household, medical and agricultural 
sectors (Van Boom, 2016; Yonhap News Agency, 2016). The Korean MOTIE aims that 
through the programme, Joint Robot Industry Development Initiative, it will help expand the 
country’s demand robotics base through market creation and system maintenance (Hyong, 
2017). Hyong (2017) states that the agency has identified four high-growth sub-sectors in 
which government intends to launch 90 projects by 2020: medical and rehabilitation use, 
unmanned robotics, social works and security. In the near-term, MOTIE will sponsor the 
introduction of 5-10 robots in National Rehabilitation Centres and 10-15 robots for assistive 
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roles in general hospitals. By 2018, the agency will introduce 10 social robots in local post 
offices and 5 surgical robots in national hospitals (Hyong, 2017).  
Firm-level information. The Korean private sector is similarly active. Korean 
conglomerates are involved in various sponsorships related to robotics research. In 2015, 
Samsung Electronics made a USD100-million investment in an R&D laboratory focused on 
drones, robotics, 3D printing and virtual reality (Robotics Business Review, 2016). Another 
case is Korean conglomerate Hyundai Heavy Industries’ investments in medical SRs, with 
several robot deployments in various medical centres across Korea (Chougule, 2016). Korean 
SMEs, through government sponsorships, are producing several robot products for various 
applications including education, agriculture, medical rehabilitation, national defence, 
culture, manufacturing, environment, home services and parts, and security (Korean Institute 
for Robot Industry Advancement, 2017).  
 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
77 
 
3.3.5 Europe  
Europe has always been interested in pushing the technological frontier and its experience 
with robotics is another case in point. European experience with automated machines dates 
back to the 1970s; since then, the region has developed considerable technical and 
commercial competence across the growing science of robotics (Forge & Blackman, 2010). 
Recent IFR statistics (2016) confirm the continued relevance of Europe in robotics: the 
second-largest regional market posted a 10% increase in sales to 50,100 units in 2015 and it 
continues to have the highest robot density among all macro-regions at 92 units.  
However, a number of factors are threatening European competitiveness: automation 
adoption remains uneven at country level including the emergence of East Asian countries 
(China, Japan, and South Korea) in the global robotics landscape, and the rapid expansion 
and development of the overall sector (IFR, 2016). 
In 2014, the EU included robotics as a key research focus in its Horizon 2020 programme, 
a 7-year 80 billion-EUR initiative that is Europe’s primary mechanism for reinvigorating 
research and innovation in emerging technologies and contemporary societal challenges (The 
EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, 2014). This programme is expected 
to attract participation and financial contribution from universities, research institutions and 
the private sector (The EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, 2016). 
Provision for robotics research is included in the Leadership in Enabling and Industrial 
Technologies (LEIT) priority, which is expected to receive 22% of the total funding (Juretski, 
2014). Apart from the funding amount, Juretski (2014) describes other innovations 
introduced in Horizon 2020 (which will directly affect the dynamics of robotics R&D 
activities within the programme) that include the promotion of pre-commercial procurement 
(PCP) and public procurement of innovation (PPI).  
A prominent Horizon 2020 project is EU SPARC – The Partnership for Robotics in 
Europe, a contractual partnership between the Commission and the euRobotics AISBL 
(Association Internationale Sans But Lucratif), a non-profit association for private and 
academic stakeholders in European robotics (euRobotics, 2017). With EUR 700 million 
funding until 2020, SPARC is the largest civilian robotics programme in the world; it 
includes over 180 member organizations from Europe to strategically position the region in 
the global robotics space (EU SPARC, 2017). 
Another notable robotics-related project is the ‘Factories of the Future’ initiative, another 
public-private partnership between the European Commission and the European Factories of 
the Future Research Association (EFFRA), a non-profit, industry-driven association that 
seeks to promote the development of advanced and sustainable production technologies 
(EFFRA, 2017). The ‘Factories of the Future’ programme is a EUR 1.15 billion partnership 
that intends to realize the EU’s objective of digitizing and advancing the manufacturing 
production process (EFFRA, 2017).  
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3.3.5.1 Germany  
Overview. Germany is a manufacturing powerhouse and a prominent player in the 
robotics industry. The sector is characterized by stable networks between OEMs,25 lead 
suppliers, and notable SMEs (GTAI, 2017). Germany has globally-recognized strengths in 
the development of industrial robots, particularly in machine vision technologies and human-
robot collaboration development (GTAI, 2017). 
Industry and technical support. Germany has several robotics and industrial automation 
clusters including: 1) the Automation Valley Northern Bavaria cluster, 2) it’s OWL – 
Intelligente Technische Systeme OstWestfalenLippe and 3) Silicon Saxony e.V (GTAI, 
2017). The Automation Valley Northern Bavaria cluster is a vast network of companies and 
research institutions from a broad range of industries that include the mechanical engineering 
company Shaeffler-Gruppe, the IT service provider Datev, the sporting goods manufacturer 
Adidas and public research institutions such as the Fraunhofer Institute and the University of 
Bayreuth (Invest in Bavaria, 2015). The OWL cluster is a technology network of 180 
businesses, universities, research institutes and organization whose purpose is advancement 
of mechatronics to intelligent technical systems; it is working currently on 46 applied 
research projects with funding of 100 million EUR (it’s OWL, 2017). Silicon Saxony is a 
300-strong network of semiconductor, electronics, microsystems and software stakeholders 
(Silicon Saxony, 2017). The cluster’s current activities involve investigations in advanced 
sensor applications (e.g. CPS, RFID technologies) and the latest microsystems technologies 
developments (Silicon Saxony, 2017; Silicon Saxony, 2017). 
Germany has a strong base of academic researchers investigating varied robotics sub-
fields. Examples include: 1) the Institute of Robotics and Mechatronics, which investigates 
developments across the entire robot development process, 2) the DFKI Robotics Innovation 
Centre, which focuses on robot technologies for various dangerous environments (e.g. space, 
underwater, etc.), and 3) the Technical University of Munich and its work on CPS and other 
SRs (e.g. medical robots, humanoid robots) (Edwards, 2015).  
Institutional support. Industrie 4.0 is Germany’s main innovation programme in 
advancing manufacturing through the development and convergence of key ICT and robotics 
technologies. Part of Germany’s Action Plan High-tech strategy 2020, Industrie 4.0 started in 
2013  as a collaborative effort among the nation’s leading business associations BITKOM, 
VDMA, and ZVEI (BMWi & METI, 2016). In 2015, the German government committed 
approximately 500 million EUR to the programme (Temperton, 2015). Today, it is an 
institutional commitment (led by the German Ministries of the Economy and Research) and 
involves over 300 stakeholders from over 150 public and private organizations (Smit, et al., 
2016; Banthien, 2017).  
Demand-side trends. The country is the fifth-largest market by sales and in spite of 
already possessing a high robot density of 301 units per 10,000 employees, annual sales 
remain high (IFR, 2016c). The automotive sector is the leading client sector for German 
robotics while the electrical and electronics industry is the second-largest (GTAI, 2017). 
                                                 
25 OEMs are often the original producers of vehicle components.  
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GTAI (2017) details that the metal processing and machinery, plastics and chemicals, and 
food industries in Germany are other major client sectors.  
2016 was another record year for sales for German robotics companies, with sales 
reaching a new high of EUR 12.8 billion. (VDMA, 2017). VDMA statistics (2017) show that 
57% of German robotics are exported, with China being the biggest market (accounting for 
10%) and North America the second biggest (9%). The industry association expects that 2017 
robot sales will accelerate by 7% because of increased foreign demand (Reuters, 2017). 
The German robotics industry falls into three main sectors: Robotics sub-sector, 
Integrated Assembly Solutions (IAS) sub-sector, and Machine Vision Technologies sub-
sector (GTAI, 2017). 2016 robot sales suggest that while all sub-sectors posted increasing 
sales, IAS remains the largest (VDMA, 2017).  
3.3.5.2 France  
Overview. France is considered an important robotics market in Europe, and has 
embraced increased automation in its production process (even though its install base and 
sector performance remain low relative to other developed regions). 2016 IFR statistics 
indicate that France posted an increase in robot sales, with 3,045 units in 2015.  
Industry and technical support. Sector support is available through industry 
associations, such as the SYROBO Group, and industry research organizations and platforms, 
such as the Technical Centre for Mechanical Industry, the French Robotics Research Group, 
and the French National Robotics platform. The SYROBO Group is a robotics industry 
association that represents the interests of private stakeholders in service robotics (SYMOP, 
2017). The Technical Centre for the Mechanical Industry is a private-led institution that 
facilitates interaction between academia and various industries regarding the adoption and 
development of advanced manufacturing technologies (CETIM, 2017). The French Robotics 
Research Group and the French National Robotics platform are networks that foster 
cooperation and collaboration among academics, researchers and engineers (Business France, 
2017; FEMTO-ST, 2017).  
Institutional support. Since 2013, France has shown strong commitment to developing 
emerging technologies (including robotics) through various levels of institutional support, the 
most prominent being the ‘New Face of Industry in France’ programme (Ministère de 
l’economie, 2015). The reported support for the robotics and related technologies was around 
EUR 1.2 billion (Ministère de l’economie, 2015). In 2015, the French reindustrialization plan 
entered its second phase - the ‘Industry of the Future’ programme. The current programme is 
expected to build on the ‘Factory of the Future’ plan through further investments in key 
advanced manufacturing technologies (among others, additive manufacturing and production 
digitization). Particular to robotics, the programme provides an additional EUR 2.1 billion 
financial support until 2017 (Ministère de l’economie, 2015).  Around the same time, a 
collaborative platform, Alliance Industrie du Futur, for firms and academic and technological 
partners was formed to help realize the programme’s goals (Alliance Industrie du Futur, 
2015)  
Firm-level information. France is home to a number of notable robotics companies: 
humanoid robot developer Aldebaran Robotics (Softbank Robotics), French UAV copter 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
80 
 
provider Infotron, and surgical robots firm Medtech (Tobe, 2014; Medtech, 2017; Softbank 
Robotics, 2017). Apart from these, despite perceptions regarding the rigidity of its labour 
regulations, France already has an emerging startups scene that enjoys the healthy optimism 
of its stakeholders (Cellan-Jones, 2017).  
Contemporary issues. Despite the positive developments in the French robotics landscape, 
there are concerns that there is underrepresentation of these systems because of social 
perception and risk aversion (Pape, 2017). Moreover, there were doubts regarding proposals 
from the French socialist government to tax robots. Observers believe that if this persists it 
could disadvantage France because it is likely to be ineffective for arresting the consequent 
technological unemployment among low-skilled laborers through automation and would 
discourage firms from innovating (Bershidsky, 2017).  
3.3.5.3 United Kingdom 
Overview. The UK is a promising robotics market, although there is notable 
underinvestment in the sector relative to the other industrialized nations. 2016 IFR statistics 
suggest that there is a sustained decrease in sector performance in UK: 2015 robot sales 
decreased to 1,645 units.  
Industry and technical support. Institutional support is available mostly through the 
industry associations, such as the British Automation & Robot Association (BARA), and 
special interest networks, such as the UK Robotics & Autonomous Systems (UK-RAS) 
Network. BARA is one of the most prominent robotics association in England and draws 
membership from both robotics and related industries (e.g. system integrators, components 
and ancillary parts) (BARA, 2017). The UK-RAS Network is an academe-led network of 
universities, companies and public research institutions that aims to promote the development 
of UK robotics’ capabilities (UK-RAS Network, 2017a). The UK-RAS Network is 
responsible for the annual UK Robotics Week and for several competitions related to various 
robot applications (e.g. surgery robotics, social care robotics, robots for educational purposes) 
(UK-RAS Network, 2017b). 
Furthermore, there are robotics-dedicated research institutions in British universities. 
Examples include the Centre for Robotics Research (CORE) in King’s College, the Bristol 
Robotics Laboratory (BRL) of the University of Bristol and the University of West England, 
the Robot Vision Group at the Imperial College London, the Robotics Research Group in the 
University of Oxford, the Centre for Automation and Robotics Research at Sheffield Hallam 
University, and the Robotics and Intelligent Systems Lab at Plymouth University (Robotics 
Business Review, 2014). Some facilities investigate various robotics sub-fields, such as in 
CORE and BRL, while others are more specialized, such as in The Robot Vision Group (The 
Robot Vision Group, 2014; BRL, 2017; CORE, 2017).  
Institutional support. Since 2015, the British government has recognized the 
technology’s potential for improving British manufacturing productivity and has committed 
to building the country’s research and industry capabilities (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills, 2015). Institutional support is mostly channelled through the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the 500 million GBP-funded 
UK innovation agency Technology Strategy Board, and the recently-formed Leadership 
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Council in Robotics and Autonomous Systems (DBIS, 2015; Westlake, 2015). 2016 EPSRC-
sponsored investigations in robotics applications in manufacturing amounted to 
approximately GBP 350 million (around EUR 410.66 million26) and involved various 
universities across Britain (among others, University of Cambridge, Imperial College 
London, University of Leeds, University of Manchester) (UK-RAS Network, 2016). 
Furthermore, the UK-RAS Network (2016) identifies seven research centres (‘Catapult 
Centres’) that enable companies to access equipment, expertise and information needed to 
develop and commercialize ideas and innovations. More recently, PM Theresa May’s 
government announced a GBP 4.7 billion Industrial Strategy 2020, in which robotics and 
related technologies are a key focus (HM Government, 2017). 
Nevertheless, observers are cautious about Britain’s renewed enthusiasm towards 
robotics; the country traditionally has been slow to commercialize its research and sustaining 
sector growth requires converting the potential demand base into innovation partners 
(Williams, 2015; Westlake, 2015).  
Demand-side trends. Despite remaining a key global manufacturing nation and despite 
various investments in production automation, the UK does not participate in the design, 
development and manufacturing of key robotics technologies (Cheeseman, 2017). Industry 
observers note that outside of the country’s automotive sector, there is notable risk aversion 
to robot adoption in manufacturing processes (Tovey, 2016). Some attribute this 
conservatism to certain aspects of British manufacturing experience, such as British financial 
institutions’ preference for short-term returns on loans and a technical skills gap related to 
robotics technologies (Hadall & Wilson, 2017). Moreover, contemporary conversations 
surrounding the subject remains centre on robots’ perceived negative consequences for 
employment (Williams, 2016; Faig, 2017)  
Recent reports suggest that the UK is making significant progress towards increased 
automation. Around 58% of general British manufacturing have made automation-related 
investments and reaped clear benefits (Barclays PLC, 2015). Among Scottish manufacturers, 
the figure is higher: 72% have reported investments in production automation (Wilcock, 
2015).  
Firm-level information. Despite the situation in British robotics, there are a number of 
notable UK-based emerging robotics companies (particularly, in medical care applications) 
and startups. Renishaw PLC is a Gloucestershire-based firm with expertise in robotics 
surgery – its neuro-robotic device, called Neuromate, is used for various surgical procedures 
in several countries (e.g. UK, France Germany) (Demaitre, 2016). Another example is 
Cambridge Medical Robotics, whose work is focused on developing next-generation 
universal robotic systems for minimally invasive surgery (Cambridge Medical Robotics, 
2017). Meanwhile, UK-based robotics startups have varied focuses, but most trace their 
beginnings to a university: examples include bio-mechanics developer Animal Dynamics 
(Oxford University), educational bi-pedal robot producer Robotical (University of 
                                                 
26 FX rate on 13 January, 2017 (date of report publication) was 1 GBP = 1.1733 EUR (via 
exchangerates.org.uk). 
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Edinburgh), and companion and assistive robotic systems developer Consequential Robotics 
(University of Sheffield) (Macaulay, 2017).  
3.3.5.4 Italy  
Italy is a key robotics market, the second-largest in Europe after Germany and the 
seventh-largest in the world (IFR, 2016c). In the context of European production of robots 
applied to automotive manufacturing, and due to the specific contribution of Piemonte, Italy 
is the top ranked manufacturer. The latest IFR (2016) statistics show that Italy continued its 
increasing robot intake, with a 7% increase in 2015 sales and +1.1% increase in revenues. 
Moreover, IFR statistics from the Italian Trade Agency (2016) suggest that the country has 
the second-highest robot density in Europe. After a period of crisis between 2011 and 2013, 
the sector started to grow again reaching a dominant position in the global supply of robots. 
In 2015, in Europe, there was a 10% growth in total production with 20,000 robots produced 
in Germany, 6,700 in Italy and 3,800 in Spain. This represents significant growth, but small 
compared to China which produces 70,000 robots annually (IFR, 2016c). 
The results for the Italian robotics sector are confirmed if we split break down by the 
supply chain. According to data on Italian robotics for 2016 provided by UCIMU – the 
research and corporate culture centre, there have been stable increases in both exports and 
internal sales. Consumption of robots in Italy registered a 1.7% increase, accounting for EUR 
676 million (UCIMU, 2017). 
  
Table 3.9 Italian robotics sector (EUR million)  
  2015 2016 % of increase 
Revenue 528 534 1,1 
Export 188 190 1,1 
Local market 340 344 1,2 
Import 325 332 2,2 
Trade balance 137 142 / 
Source: Ucimu (2017) 
 
Italy’s heavy adoption of and strong interest in robotics comes as no surprise when set 
against its manufacturing capabilities and history of technological competence. Italy has a 
strong industrial machinery and related products sector – 2016 statistics demonstrate the 
country’s continued relevance in the global industrial landscape and its industry’s export-
based orientation (UCIMU, 2017). However, there are only a few large industrial and ICT 
firms in the sector; Italian manufacturing is founded deeply on small and medium enterprises 
(Italian Ministry of Economic Development, 2017). 
Industry support and representation are available through industry trade associations, such 
as the UCIMU-Sistemi per Produrre. UCIMU is the official interest group for the domestic 
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machine tool, robots, automation systems and ancillary products manufacturers (UCIMU, 
2017). Current membership statistics suggest that the association represents over 200 
companies accounting for over 70% of the selected industries (UCIMU, 2017).  
UCIMU splits Italian firms working in robotics into three macro-categories according to 
revenue: large firms with revenues higher than EUR 5 million; medium sized firms with 
revenues of between EUR 2.5 million and 5 million; and small sized firms with less than 
EUR 2.5 million revenue. In general terms, large firms are prominent and account for 75% of 
Italian robotics production. 
  
Table 3.10 Italian firms in robotics by class of revenue.  
Revenue (bln of 
Euro) 2013 2014 2015 2016 
<2,5 16% 13,4% 6,7% 8,3% 
2,5-5.0 11,1% 13,3% 20,0% 16,7% 
>5.0 72,2% 73,3% 73,3% 75,0% 
Tot. 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source:  Ucimu (2017) 
 
Analysing the whole Italian production in robotics, in 2016 there were 114,873 robots 
operating, with an annual increment on 2015 of 6,823 units (UCIMU). 75,078 units (65% of 
total robots production) are engaged in the manipulation activities, followed by welding with 
33,503 units (19.6%), followed by assembly robots with 7,466 units (6.5%), cute robots with 
3,481 units (3.0%), and other robots (5.5%). 
  
Table 3.11 Type, units and % of robots in Italian supply chain, 2016  
Type Unit % 
Handling 75.078 65,4 
Welding 33.503 19,6 
Assembly 7.466 6,5 
Cute 3.481 3,0 
Other 6.345 5,5 
Tot. 114.873 100,0 
Source: Ucimu (2017) 
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Table 3.12 Main firms competing in robotics in Italy, their location and the kind of robots they 
produce (excluding Piemonte) 
Name Region Robot production 
ABB Lombardia Assembly Robot, Welding Robot, Robot 
for didactic, Others 
AMADA ITALIA s.r.l Emilia 
Romagna 
Welding Robots, Others 
AUOTOMATOR 
INTERNATIONAL s.r.l 
Lombardia Press automation  
BUCCI AUTOMATION s.p.a Emilia 
Romagna 
Cartesian coordinate Robot 
CB FERRARI A SOCIO UNICO 
s.r.l 
Lombardia Cartesian coordinate Robot 
CESMA INTERNATIONAL s.r.l Lombardia Welding Robot 
COSBERG s.p.a Lombardia Assembly Robot 
FARINA PRESSE s.r.l CON SOCIO Lombardia Cartesian coordinate Robot 
FICEP s.p.a Lombardia Cartesian coordinate Robot 
HIWIN s.r.l Lombardia Measurement Robot 
INTER.CAR s.n.c DI GAITO Campania Cartesian coordinate Robot 
NUOVA C.M.M s.r.l Veneto Welding Robot, Others 
OPPENT Lombardia Others 
ROLLON s.p.a Lombardia Cartesian coordinate Robot 
SIR. s.p.a Emilia 
Romagna 
Cartesian, Cylindrical and polar 
coordinate Robot, Welding Robot, 
Mounting Robot, Robot for didactic 
SPERONI s.p.a Lombardia Measurement Robot 
STAR s.r.l Lazio Welding Robot, Assembly Robot, 
Cartesian coordinate Robot 
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Name Region Robot production 
TIESSE ROBOT s.p.a Lombardia Assembly Robot, Welding Robot, Robot 
for didactic, Cartesian coordinate Robot, 
Others 
ZUCCHETTI CENTRO SISTEMI Emilia 
Romagna 
Others 
Source: UCIMU 
 
 
Technical and research support is available within the high-skilled workforce located 
across Italy’s main cities of Milan, Turin, Rome, Pisa and Genoa among others (Italian Trade 
Agency, 2016). For instance, the IIT (Italian Institute of Technology) in Genoa is working 
with the precision-motion company, Moog, Inc., towards the development of next-generation 
actuation and control technologies for autonomous robots (Heney, 2016). 
Italy’s institutional support for robotics is in the form of its National Plan, ‘Industria 4.0.’ 
Industria 4.0 is an 18-billion EUR comprehensive public-private partnership that offers the 
domestic industry a wide array of complementary measures (e.g. tax credits, favourable loan 
terms for adopters, and preferential services to SMEs) to spur investment in advanced 
manufacturing technologies and provide streams of financing to domestic enterprises (Italian 
Ministry of Economic Development, 2016a; Italian Ministry of Economic Development, 
2016b). Among Industria 4.0’s instruments, the most important are ‘hyper-depreciation’ and 
‘super-depreciation’ – where the Italian government allows a 250% tax benefit on purchases 
of Industry Industria 4.0-related tangible assets, and a 140% tax benefit on the cost of 
Industria 4.0-related investments (PwC, 2017). 
In addition, there is a notable public-led programme which is the Italian Trade Agency’s 
‘Machines Italia’ Campaign. This project, which provides an innovation platform for Italy’s 
machinery manufacturers, aims to demonstrate the country’s strengths in manufacturing, 
machinery, robotics and related areas (MIT Technology Review, 2017; Machines Italia, 
2017). 
 
3.3.5.5 Piemonte – Turin 
Italian robotics companies are concentrated in the North of Italy. Lombardia and 
Piemonte account for respectively 33.4% and 25% of firms operating in robotics, Piemonte 
shows a higher concentration of revenues (62.8%) and employees (60%).   
The industry area related to robotics present in Piemonte and, mostly, Torino, is 
innovative and typically is characterized by large firms. Firms such as COMAU, Olivetti, 
DEA, Prima and others entered the market in the 1970s and have reached a predominant role. 
In 2011, Istat registered 3,900 firms in mechatronics/robotics in Piemonte (1,900 in Torino), 
with 62,000 employees (27,000 in Torino). In the robotics sector alone (excluding 
mechatronics) there are 250 firms with 12,000 employees, who represent 44% of the national 
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share. According to Istat, in 2013, Piemonte’s share was around 11% of national exports in 
the industry, worth EUR 2.5 billion in value, including EUR 1.3 billion generated in Torino. 
 
Table 3.13 Robotic/Mechatronic industry in Piemonte. 2011  
Robotic/Mechatronic Firms Employees Export (bn  Euro) 
Piemonte 3,900 62,000 2.500 (11% of italian export) 
Turin 1,900 27,800 1.308 (5,8% of Italian export) 
Source: ISTAT 2011 
 
Table.3.14 Main robotic firms in Piemonte region.  
Name Robot production 
COPROGET s.r.l Cartesian coordinate Robot 
HEXAGON METROLOGY s.p.a Measurement Robot 
KUKA ROBOTER ITALY s.p.a Assembly Robot, Welding Robot, Robot for didactic, 
Measurement Robot 
PRIMA INDUSTRIE s.p.a Robot for cutting, Welding and microboring 
COMAU Welding Robot, Assembly Robot, Others 
EIKAS Welding Robot 
Source: UCIMU 
 
Piemonte regional firms have been able to create a district specialized in technologies that 
are related to automotive. Piemonte has developed an eco-system, including regional 
institutions, manufacturing industry, craft and agriculture, research centres and universities. 
Since 2009, Piemonte has supported an active industrial policy to foster technological 
innovation. With POR FESR plans 2007-2013, the Regional Operative Programmes financed 
by the European Fund for Regional Development, Piemonte gave birth to innovation poles 
(Poli di Innovazione), which are clusters of independent firms (large, medium and small 
sized) together with research centres working on specific sectors and coordinated by a 
managing authority.   
These poles group together the actors involved in the innovative process stimulating 
interactions, sharing of installations, knowledge and experience, contributing to the 
widespread of information and technologies across firms. Moreover, poles need to interpret 
the technological needs of firms in order to guide the region in its decisions related to 
research and innovation. For five years the regional programme has financed research and 
innovation projects, feasibility studies and services. 
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The MESAP pole was conceived specifically for robotics and mechatronics for advanced 
production systems. Its implementation was cross-sectoral involving shaping/plant and 
design/robotics, automotive, aerospace, electrical appliance, railroad, textile, print, 
energetic/environmental, agro-industrial, construction industry/housing sector. Three fields of 
research and innovation have been financed:  
 smart products: mechatronic applications to consumer and industrial products; 
 flex processes: mechatronics and advanced production system applications for 
flexibility of productive processes; 
 green processes: mechatronics and advanced production system applications for 
energy efficiency and eco compatibility of productive processes. 
Projects cover a variety of production: sensors to enlarge mechatronics applications; 
reduction of energetic and environmental impact of manufacturing; automated 
microprocessor systems; mechatronic systems for vibration control; mechatronic systems for 
accumulation and power management; open-source integrated environments for mechatronic 
applications product-process; flexible automation systems; flexible mechatronic systems for 
distributed printing; monitoring and control of industrial processes; MEMS 
(Microelectromechanical Systems) adaptive testing; automotive and mechatronic systems; 
and components product development and manufacturing. 
In the pole, 36 projects have been financed, totalling EUR 41.53 million in investments 
and a contribution of EUR 21.45 million. MESAP has 170 members, 2 universities, 9 
research centres, 129 PMI, 30 large firms and 14 industrial sectors; the management is 
entrusted to Centro Servizi Industrie Srl, a service company of the industrial union of Turin. 
POR FESR 2014/2020 has further boosted Piemonte’s investments in mechatronics and 
robotics, giving innovation poles continuity. In the new funding programme, the Piemonte 
region shows a unity of purpose with local private actors offering support to enforce the 
smart specialization of manufacturing and, particularly, of robotics and advanced production 
systems. Measures published for those sectors refers to fundamental actions to achieve the 
following objectives:  
 building a technologic platform on advanced production systems which can compete 
at global level; 
 strengthening the role of innovation poles making them regional agencies for 
innovation 
 facilitating the update of productive machines and plants 
 increasing the presence on markets of firms belonging to the most relevant supply 
chains of Piemonte. 
 
3.4 Additive manufacturing (AM) 
AM is the official industry standard term (ASTM F2792) concerning the process of 
joining materials to make objects from 3D model data (Wohlers Associates, 2010). 3D 
printing is the most popular term. 
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According to EY (2016) a growing number of global industrial firms have acquired 
experience on AM and consider it strategic for their growth, but most companies still have no 
experience with 3DP. The major obstacle to adoption is the high degree of uncertainty on 
how this technology can be applied. 
Depending on the degree of confidence in the possibilities of 3DP for the productive 
process, manufacturing companies consider 3DP simply as: i) an additional approach to 
fabrication; ii) a hybrid technology integrating the existing processes; iii) a technology that 
will replace actual manufacturing systems in most of the industries. 
AM includes seven main subtechnologies (Conner et al., 2014): material extrusion, vat 
photopolymerization, binder jetting, powder bed fusion, directed energy deposition, material 
jetting, sheet lamination. The materials adopted are mainly metals and polymers, but ceramic 
is expanding. Among companies already using metal 3DP, aerospace and automotive 
companies are at the top of the list. 
AM is based on the concept of rapid prototyping in areas of production characterized by 
low volume, low complexity and low levels of product customization. Printed prototypes are 
more cost effective and can be produced more quickly and used for design and marketing 
purposes, in particular. 
Beyond prototyping, operational efficiency can be achieved also through direct 
manufacturing of particular types of items. In particular, as suggested by Conner et al. (2014), 
AM can be effective for complex products production and customized manufacturing in 
both mass and artisanal production. For example, serial 3DP is applied to lightweight parts 
and functionally integrated components, bringing value to aerospace companies and 
automotives (sports cars). 
Typical limitations to adoption are cost, technology and business organization. AM is still 
expensive because of the price of systems, materials and related services, thus some 
companies are not unwilling to invest without a clear strategic vision of the actual 
applications. Technological limitations are related to building envelope and product sizes, 
constraints in the use of materials and multi-materials and careful control over product 
quality. AM sets demanding business challenges related to lack of in-house expertise, 
management of IP issues and integration with the status-quo in the productive chain. 
According to Wohlers (2017), 97 manufacturers produced and sold industrial AM systems 
in 2016. This is up from 62 companies in 2015 and 49 in 2014. Growth in 3D printer sales 
slowed in 2016, due to a slowdown at 3D Systems and Stratasys, the two industry leaders by 
revenue. Together, they represent $1.31 billion (21.7%) of the $6.063 billion AM industry. 
The 3DP market is expected to grow by about 25% annually until 2020 (EY, 2016) – 
resulting in a total market value in that year of US$12.1 billion. Market volumes have 
increased from $1.5 billion in 2011 to $4.2 billion in 2015. In worldwide revenues in 2016 
the AM industry grew by only 17.4%, down from 25.9% the previous year.  
Companies interested in entering 3DP production have two main options. The can 
purchase from systems manufacturers and build an in-house system, or rely on service 
providers for the supply of 3D printed items.  
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System manufacturers are the masters in the 3DP value chain (Figure 3.1) since they can 
supply final clients directly or establish business to business relationships with manufacturing 
companies and service providers. They account for about 55% of the total 3DP market, while 
service providers represent around 25%. The most important systems manufacturers are 
Stratasys, 3D Systems, EOS, Concept Laser, SLM Solutions, ExOne and Ultimaker. 
Material Suppliers provide the different materials used in the production of items. The 
most complex and expensive segment is metals related. 
Software Developers typically belong to traditional software houses or international 
technological groups which use this channel to explore the 3DP market. 
3D Scanning companies are a small group of players who design existing products for 
testing or performance purposes. 
As already mentioned, the second relevant segment of players is service providers, which 
print objects professionally with endless customization. Both are clients of the previously 
mentioned suppliers and also supply industrial companies and other clients (Fig.3.1) 
 
Figure 3.1 Value chain in the 3dp market. 
 
Source: EY (2015) 
3DP systems are divided into two major segments: personal/desktop printers and 
professional/industrial printers. The former is a quite competitive and relatively contestable 
market (Table 3.15). In the latter, Stratasys, 3D Systems and EOS accounted for about 70% 
of market share in 2015. In 2016, this side of the market was marked by decreased sales from 
the industry leaders, Stratasys and 3D Systems (USA), which reached a peak in 2014, while 
EOS (Germany) increased its share thanks to its growing metals business (Table 3.16). Both 
American companies were weakened by the market entry of two major multinational 
businesses. GE has embarked on a strategy of acquisition and established the GE Additive. 
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HP entered into the market in 2016 with the shipment of their first Multi Jet Fusion printers. 
In 2015, more than 76% of industrial investors were already in the 3DP business, reflecting 
the strong consolidation pressure in the market. This consolidation trend will continue as 
large systems manufactures adopt new technologies by acquiring smaller, specialized players. 
 
Table 3.15 Top 5 Vendor 3D Printer Market Share by Unit Volumes and Printer Revenues, 
Global Personal/Desktop Printers 2016 https://www.contextworld.com/3d-printing-research-
update-12-apr-2017 
2016 
Rank 
by 
Units 
Company 2016 Revenue 
2016 
Share 
by Unit 
Revenue 
1 Ultimaker $44.0M 13% 
2 XYZprinting $39.7M 12% 
3 Stratasys/makerbot $38.9M 12% 
4 Formlabs $30.3M 9% 
5 Aleph Objects $17.7M 6% 
 
Table 3.16 Top 5 Vendor 3D Printer Market by Revenue from Industrial/Professional Machines 
shipped 2016 
2016 Rank  
 Company 
Revenues from 
Machines Sold 
2016 Global Revenue 
Share Y/Y Change 
1 Stratasys $ 427M 34% ‐5% 
2 EOS $ 210M 17% 15% 
3 3D Systems $ 144M 11% ‐19% 
4 SLM Solutions $ 76M 6% 21% 
5 Concept Laser $ 66M 5% 41% 
 
  
2016 
Rank 
by 
Units 
Company 2016 Units 
2016 
Share 
by Units 
1 XYZprinting 80.902 25% 
2 Monoprice 27.944 9% 
3 Ultimaker 24.058 8% 
4 M3D 21.656 7% 
5 FlashForge 17.321 5% 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
91 
 
The market for service providers is led by two players: Materialise96 and ProtoLabs (for 
which 3DP accounts for around 10% of their revenue). Nevertheless, the service provider 
market is characterized by a large number of small service providers and start-ups. 
It not possible to say whether companies prefer in-house systems or service providers. 
Given the high cost of investment, on-demand production seems to be a growing trend. 
Extreme customization pushes companies to select locations near end-use markets, and to 
open new opportunities to return manufacturing to Western countries (re-shoring). 
 
3.4.1 Italy and Piemonte 
AM is one of the sectors set to grow the most in the near future in Italy. Excluding public 
administration, healthcare and research centres, the market value of 3D printing in the 
industry sector stands at EUR 245 million (about 3.5% of the world market). Of this, EUR 
140 million  are from hardware and materials and EUR 105 million are from software and 
services. Forecasts between 2016 and 2018 saw an increase to EUR 390 million in 2018. 
(Netconsulting cube & Cherry Consulting; 2017) 
 
Table 3.17 AM value in Italy.  Excluding PA, healthcare e research centre 
 
Source: Netconsulting cube e Cherry consulting, 2017  
 
The technologies linked to 3D printing offer a multitude of solutions in various fields and, 
particularly, in areas of Italian excellence such as automotive, spacecraft, biomedical and 
packaging. 3D printers have the ability to create highly complex projects and structures, 
greatly reducing costs and time-out in different business segments. 
For example, AM technologies can reduce the time needed to enter the market because of 
their ability to implement R&D projects faster than traditional technologies. 
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Nonetheless, 3D printing is able to produce significant benefits in the various production 
steps, such as greater agility in design, reduced production times, increased production 
efficiency and, especially, a major reduction in production chain errors. 
The advantages of add-in manufacturing technologies can be summarized as: 
 possibility of a wider range of alloys than traditional technologies 
 possibility of using materials that are difficult to use in traditional casting processes 
 production of components and objects of any shape 
 reduction in production costs 
 reduction in time spent on production processes 
 weight reduction through topological optimization (simulation of software 
production), which also means less material consumption 
 reduction in the number of moulds expected 
 integration of multiple components into one part 
 mechanical properties superior to fusion 
 significant reduction in percentage of waste compared to traditional merger. 
 
One of the significant aspects related to Italian excellence is the possibility to create 
highly complex structures in one mould thanks to additive technologies. So far these 
structures have been produced as separate parts and assembled at a later stage. This feature is 
particularly valued by the automotive and aerospace sectors, where complex components can 
be realized by reducing the weight of the structures. Also, in the field of design, it is possible 
to obtain more sophisticated bends otherwise unattainable using traditional technologies. 
The entire Made in Italy sector of excellence is able to renew and innovate in different 
fields to face the challenges posed by new technologies, in a country where adoption of AM 
focuses mainly on the prototyping and production of components with important handicraft 
and customization features. Table 3.18 presents estimates of the main areas of application of 
additive manufacturing in the Italian sector in 2014. 
 
Table 3.18 Estimates of main application area of AM in Italy 
Industry 2014 (%) 2014 (Revenue in mln of Euro) 
Aerospace 17.7 23.1 
Industrial 17.7 23.1 
Healthcare 15.5 20.1 
Automotive 11.1 14.4 
Jewellery 11.1 14.4 
Energy 4.4 5.7 
Others 22.5 29.2 
Total 130 
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Source: Cherry consulting 
In addition to the production phase, the benefits of AM can be found in the design, 
prototyping, logistics and post-sales assistance phases. In other words, additive technology is 
able to generate both product and process innovations, redefining the entire industry supply 
chain. Due to the relevant role of 3D printing technologies in automotives and in the field of 
space technology, production time is reduced dramatically. For example, in automotive 
production, traditional technology requires some 36-40 months while AM times can be as 
little as 18 months (Confindustria Centre).  
Piemonte is a leading region for the number of companies using 3D printing technology. 
AM in Piemonte represents a technological excellence, thanks mostly to Avio Aero (GE 
Aviation Group), a leader firm with plants in Rivalta di Torino and in Cameri (Novara). Avio 
Aero is linked to an important chain of companies specialized in the production of hi-tech 
components for aerospace, energy and racing. Its headquarters was established in Cameri in 
2013, representing, with its 60 3D printing machines, one of the world's most highly-
accredited manufacturing plants. The goal of the pole is to become a leader firm in 
aeronautical industrial production for specific segments such as lighter structures to reduce 
fuel consumption, emissions and production times.  
However, 3D printing features confirm Piemonte’s as the leading actor also in design, 
which is one of the areas where, historically, it has played an important role; now 3D printing 
is enabling direct transfer of CAD graphics to prototypes and original productions, cutting out 
numerous assembly phases. 
Table 3.19 lists the major companies in Piemonte involved either in manufacturing or in 
segments which are close or complementary to AM technology.  
 
Table 3.19 Main competitors in AM in Piemonte region 
Firms Location Activities/sector 
Plyform composites srl. Novara Areonautic 
3D System Italia Srl Torino Prototyping 
Aerosoft Spa Torino Aeronautic 
Altair Engineering Srl Torino Filtration and air purification 
Apr Srl Torino Precision mechanics  
Axist Srl Torino Dimensional testing, Coordinate Measuring 
machines (CMM) 
Ec International France Sas Torino Prototyping 
Esi Italia Torino Design and construction 
Itacae Srl Torino CAD design 
Microla Optoelecrtonics Srl Torino Laser marking machines 
Reinshaw Spa Torino Metal additive manufacturing 
Ridix Spa Torino Prototyping 
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Firms Location Activities/sector 
Spring Srl Torino Prototyping 
Avio Aero Novara/Torino Additive Manufacturing for Aeronautic 
Prima Industrie Torino Laser system for industrial application, Sheet 
metal machinery 
Ellena Torino Precision mechanics 
Comau Torino Industrial automation 
Prima Electro Torino Machine industry 
3.5 Automotive Industry 
The automotive in 2013 is still one of the major manufacturing industries although its 
pivotal role in the world economy is heterogeneous across countries. Its contribution to value 
added and employment in the OECD countries is relatively small, but strongly correlated to 
the business cycles and private consumption of most advanced economies. 
Worldwide sales reached a record 88 million autos in 2016 (PwC, 2017) with record sales 
in the US (17.5m vehicles in 2015), while in EU 12.6 million new cars were registered well 
below the 18 million in 2007 (PwC, 2016). On the demand side, the Middle East and African 
markets are growing and emerging markets are stagnating.  
Performance indicators are not encouraging: total shareholder return is 5.5% on average 
vs 14.8% S&P500 and 10.1% DJI; ROI is around 4% vs about 8% of the industry cost of 
capital (PwC, 2017). 
Therefore, automotives are showing high levels of innovation related to connected, 
intelligent and driverless cars. In the meantime, the industry is exhibiting two major trends: 
increasing concentration and power of large established companies, and a long upstream and 
downstream value chain (Smitka and Warrian, 2017). In addition to consolidation, the rising 
cost of software and digital technology, safety and environmental regulation, are calling for 
solutions such as shared platforms, exploration of distribution channels and outsourcing of 
technological development (PwC, 2017) 
In 2016, more than 94 million cars have been produced in 20 countries around the world, 
around 30% in China, followed by the US (13%), Japan (10%) and Germany (6%) (see Table 
3.20). While China and USA are the biggest markets for sales, Japan and Germany are the 
production leaders. Their respective major carmakers, Toyota and Volkswagen, have been 
competing for rank leader and delivering around 10 million vehicles each. Below, we focus 
on carmakers, and the development of robotics technologies. 
 Production in Italy amounts to just over 1 million cars per year and sales of 2 million. We 
examine the traditional Italian car capital Piemonte. France and especially Italy and UK are 
large markets, but have lost most of their productive capacity. 
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Table 3.20  2016 Country Rankings by Production  
# Country Cars & Trucks Production  % Peak Year 
1 China 28,118,794 30% 2016 
2 USA 12,198,137 13% 1999 
3 Japan 9,204,590 10% 1990 
4 Germany 6,062,562 6% 2007 
5 India 4,488,965 5% 2016 
6 South Korea 4,228,509 4% 2011 
7 Mexico 3,597,462 4% 2016 
8 Spain 2,885,922 3% 2000 
9 Canada 2,370,271 2% 1999 
10 Brazil 2,156,356 2% 2013 
11 France 2,082,000 2% 1989 
12 Thailand 1,944,417 2% 2013 
13 UK 1,816,622 2% 1963 
14 Turkey 1,485,927 2% 2016 
15 Czech 1,349,896 1% 2016 
16 Russia 1,303,989 1% 2012 
17 Indonesia 1,177,389 1% 2014 
18 Iran 1,164,710 1% 2011 
19 Italy 1,103,516 1% 1989 
20 Slovakia 1,040,000 1% 2016 
- World Total 94,976,569 100% 2016 
Source: OICA 
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Table 3.21  Manufacturers Ranking by Production (2015) 
# Manufacturer Cars & Trucks Production   
1 Toyota group 10,083,831 JPN 
2 Volkswagen group 9,872,424 GER 
3 Hyundai-Kia 7,988,479 KOREA 
4 General Motors 7,485,587 USA 
5 Ford 6,396,369 USA 
6 Nissan 5,170,074 JPN 
7 Fiat Chrysler 4,865,233 ITA-USA 
8 Honda 4543838 JPN 
9 Suzuki 3,034,081 JPN 
10 Renault 3,032,652 FRA 
11 PSA Peugeot Citroen 2,982,035 FRA 
12 BMW 2,279,503 GER 
13 SAIC 2,260,579 CHI 
14 Daimler (Mercedes-Benz) 2,134,645 GER 
15 Mazda 1,5405,76 JPN 
16 ChangAn 1,540,133 CHI 
17 Mitsubishi 1,218,853 JPN 
18 Dongfeng 1,209,296 CHI 
19 BAIC 1,169,894 CHI 
20 Tata 1,009,369 IND 
Source: OICA 
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Figure 3.2 Registration or sales of new vehicles (OICA, 2017)  
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Figure 3.3 Production and sales of vehicles by country (2016) 
 Source: OICA 2017 
 
Global automotive manufacturing is a very concentrated industry with large OEMs and 
high entry barriers. On the other hand, manufacturing of parts and accessories is very 
fragmented and competitive. According to Zion Market Research (2017), the global car 
accessories market was valued at USD 360.80 billion in 2016 and is expected to reach 
approximately USD 519.01 billion by 2022, growing at a CAGR of around 6.4% between 
2017 and 2022.  
AM could be a huge opportunity for the whole industry from two perspectives: first, it is a 
major source of innovation thanks to its flexibility; second, it can transform business models 
and renovate the actual supply chain. According to Deloitte (2014), AM allows for a 
reduction in capital to achieve both economies of scope in the design of products and scale in 
the possible variety of customized items. The trade-off in performance between capital vs 
scope and capital vs scale is visualized in four paths of value in the adoption of AM in the 
automotive industry (Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4 Framework for understanding AM paths and value 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Mark Cotteleer and Jim Joyce, “3D opportunity: Additive manufacturing paths to 
performance, innovation, and growth,” Deloitte Review 14, January 2014 
 
 
Most OEMs and suppliers are still on path I, exploring technologies to improve current 
production, but without substantial changes to products and supply chains. AM allows: i) 
improved flexibility, speed and quality in the prototyping phase; ii) reduced dependence and 
costs related to tooling and casting in the design phase and enhanced customization. 
According to BMW, customized tools helped to save 58% in overall costs and have reduced 
project times by 92%.27 For a single component, such as an engine manifold, developing and 
creating the prototype usually costs about USD 500,000 and takes around four months. Using 
AM, Ford can develop multiple iterations of a component in just four days at a cost of USD 
3,000.28 
Tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers should investigate exploiting AM capabilities along path II 
producing components on demand and at locations closer to end users. Competition in the 
after-sales market will be based on servicification: shorter delivery times and full availability 
of components but a reduced inventory. For OEMs, the achievement enabled by new business 
models associated to path IV go through product evolution (path III). In the near term, it will 
be possible to develop lighter weight components aimed at fuel savings, which would satisfy 
both environmental regulation and consumers. Another form of cost savings is represented by 
reductions in the number of components required, simplifying the assembly process and 
                                                 
27 Troy Jensen, 3D printing: A model of the future, PiperJaffray, March 2013. 
28 Ford Media Centre, “Ford’s 3D-printed auto parts save millions, boost quality,” in Deloitte (2014). 
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eventually improving quality. Full customization is already possible in the extreme luxury 
segment: path IV will be characterized by smaller supply chains and mass customization. 
 
3.5.1 Robotics and Japanese automotives 
Japan is home to some of the world’s largest automotive OEMs. The  Japanese 
automotive sector currently is characterized by a strong base of OEMs combined with lead 
suppliers, whose inter-locking business relationships emphasize efficiency, prices and quality 
(Putra et al., 2016). Production is global; Japanese OEMs are maintaining a presence in cost-
competitive and growing locations abroad (Putra et al., 2016). Japanese carmakers are 
retaining a global share of approximately 30% (Putra et al., 2016). 
Japanese carmakers’ competitive advantages derive from production efficiency, strategic 
partnerships and mass production. The sector first emerged when, during the second world 
war, Japan selected industry champions (in Nissan and Toyota) to meet the country’s 
transport needs. With sector liberalization in the post-ward period, car companies raced for 
market leadership – most formed strategic alliances with suppliers for critical parts, which led 
to production modularization and an emphasis on cost efficiency (Schaede, 2010). 
Automotive OEMs and lead suppliers maintain close relationships that allow the sharing of 
information on technologies and product design, and critical responsibilities (Kobayashi, 
2006; Schaede, 2010). Certain Japanese approaches, such as kaizen (the culture of continuous 
improvement), keiretsu (enterprises with inter-locking business interests), and just-in-time 
(JIT) production (demand-driven supply chains), make the Japanese car making experience 
distinctive (Putra et al., 2016)29. 
As a result, Japanese car manufacturers are able to enjoy greater quality, cost and product 
reliability advantages relative to other firms. However, this has some drawbacks: such factors 
indicate that these carmakers are limited in terms of the innovations they can introduce on the 
shop floor because any miscalculation could erode the already small profit margins (Putra et 
al., 2016).  
3.5.1.1 Japanese automotive: OEMs and lead suppliers 
The degree to which auto manufacturers rely on outsourcing is difficult to pinpoint since 
it can differ across product categories, product complexity, firm size and the prevailing 
subcontracting system used within a sub-industry. For instance, Toyota outsources a wide 
range of its component needs to Denso, from electronic fuel injection systems to air 
conditioning (Ahmadjian & Lincoln, 2001; Schaede, 2010). Generally, Japanese car 
manufacturers tend to keep only the production of main parts in-house while they outsource 
other modular pieces to a small set of closely affiliated firms (Schaede, 2010). 
Toyota. Toyota obtains many of its automobile parts from local suppliers, mostly through 
long-term contract agreements which ensure steady supply and efficient delivery of 
components. The company is more likely to work with suppliers whose facilities are located 
                                                 
29 These sensibilities were incorporated into a production system called the Toyota Production System, 
which was adopted by most Japanese carmakers.  
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within a 56-mile radius of its plants. Toyota currently maintains a large number of suppliers, 
varying according to the region of production. Some examples include Fuel Total Systems 
Corp., TAIHO Manufacturing, OTICS USA, Tesla Motors, Samsung Electronics, 
Bridgestone Americas Cypress Semiconductor, Magnuson Products, IPT Performance 
Transmission, Nippon Denso Co., Aisin Seiki Co., etc. (North America) and Aisin. 
Honda. Honda also maintains business relationships through long-term contracting across 
its assembly plants in Europe, North and South America, and Asia. For instance, in North 
America, from which almost half of 2015 total sales come, some of the main suppliers 
include American Mitsuba, AGC Automotive, Takata, Nippon Seiki, Nasco, ThyssenKrupp 
and Automatic Spring Products.  
 
Table 3.22 R&D Facilities of select Japanese automotive companies in Europe.  
Manufacturer Company Headquarters / Division 
Office  
Current functions 
United Kingdom 
Honda 
Honda R&D 
Europe (U.K) Ltd.  Swindon, UK  
technical support for procurement of parts 
for local production, evaluation of parts, 
evaluation of vehicles, parts design, 
vehicle design, prototype production 
Honda Racing 
Development Ltd.  Bracknell, UK  development of F1 racing cars 
Honda GP Ltd. Brackley, UK  development of F1 racing cars 
Nissan Nissan Design Europe Ltd.  London, UK 
styling and general design, parts design, 
vehicle design, prototype production 
Toyota 
Toyota Motor 
Sports Germany 
GmbH 
Cologne, 
Germany development of F1 racing cars 
Subaru  
Subaru Test & 
Development 
Centre (STCE)  
Ingelheim am 
Rhein, Germany evaluation of parts, evaluation of vehicles 
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Manufacturer Company Headquarters / Division 
Office  
Current functions 
Germany 
Honda 
Honda R&D 
Europe 
(Deutschland) 
GmbH  
Offenbach, 
Germany  
evaluation of vehicles , styling and 
general design,  
vehicle design, prototype production, 
marketing research 
Isuzu Isuzu Motor Germany GmbH 
Gustavsburg, 
Germany 
technical support for procurement of parts 
for local production, evaluation of parts, 
parts design 
Mazda Mazda Motor Europe GmbH 
Leverkusen, 
Germany 
evaluation of vehicles ,styling and general 
design,  
vehicle design, prototype production, 
marketing research 
Mitsubishi 
Mitsubishi 
Motors R&D 
Europe GmbH 
Trebur, 
Germany 
technical support for procurement of parts 
for local production, evaluation of parts, 
evaluation of vehicles, styling and general 
design, parts design, vehicle design 
France 
Toyota 
Toyota Europe 
Design 
Development 
S.A.R.L. 
Nice, France 
styling and general design, parts design, 
vehicle design, prototype production, 
marketing research 
United Kingdom / Belgium  
Toyota Toyota Motor Europe N.V./S.A.. 
Zaventem, 
Belgium 
Bernaston, UK 
technical support for procurement of parts 
for local production, evaluation of parts, 
evaluation of vehicles, parts design 
United Kingdom / Spain/ Belgium/ Germany 
Nissan 
Nissan Technical 
Centre Europe 
Ltd. 
Cranfield, UK 
Barcelona/Madri
d, Spain 
Brussels, 
Belgium, 
Bruhl, Germany 
technical support for procurement of parts 
for local production, evaluation of parts, 
evaluation of vehicles, parts design, 
vehicle design, prototype production 
Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (JAMA, 2017) 
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3.5.2 Robotics and German automotive 
Germany boasts one of the most prominent and valuable automotive manufacturing 
sectors in the world. Across Europe, 2015 data indicate that Germany is both the largest total 
vehicle producer and the biggest market by total vehicles registered (see Figure 3.5) 
(European Automobile Manufacturers Association, 2016). At the national level, the sector is 
the largest industry by sales (404 billion EUR in 2016) and accounts for a substantial share 
(around 35%) of the entire German R&D expenditure (21.7 billion EUR in 2016) (Germany 
Trade & Invest, 2017).  
 
Figure 3.5 EU total motor vehicles production and registration 2015, in millions 
 Source: European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA, 2016) 
 
Germany hosts several automotive OEMs and key Tier 1 automotive components 
suppliers,30 such as the BMW Group (BMW) Daimler AG (Mercedes-Benz), The Ford Motor 
Company (Ford), Adam Opel GmbH (Opel), Volkswagen AG (Audi, MAN Group, Porsche, 
Volkswagen), Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch), and Continental AG (Continental) (see Table 
3.23). 
  
                                                 
30 Tier 1 companies are often regarded as the largest or the most technically-capable companies in the 
OEM’s supply chain. They often develop close working and business relationships with OEMs (via 
Investopedia.com and chron.com). 
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Table 3.23 List of automotive OEMs (and their marketed brands) and select automotive 
components suppliers located in Germany 
OEM Parent 
company Brands* Automotive components suppliers° 
Adam Opel GmbH Opel Bosch Draexlmaier 
BMW Group BMW Continental Eberspaecher Holding 
Daimler AG Mercedes-Benz ZF Friedrichshafen Getrag 
The Ford Motor 
Company Ford Thyssen Krupp Leoni 
Volkswagen AG 
Audi BASF SE KSPG 
MAN Group Mahle Freudenberg 
Porsche Schaeffler Webasto SE 
Volkswagen Bentheler Automobiltechnik Infineon 
  Hella KGaA Leopold Kostal 
  Broze Fahrzeugtechnik Trelleborg Vibracoustic 
   Kautex Textron  
* Listed brands are those that have significant operations in Germany 
° Automotive components suppliers with German headquarters 
Source: Author’s classification, adopted from GTAI (2016).  
 
Considering the sector’s breadth and scope of activities, it is unsurprising that German 
carmakers were one of the earliest adopters of advanced technologies and investigators of the 
Industry 4.0 environment.  
The next section examines the advanced technologies and robotics that the major German 
OEMs (and related brands when applicable) have adopted in their production processes. 
Similar case studies are presented for the two largest automotive components suppliers in 
Germany: Robert Bosch GmbH and Continental AG. A brief but comparable discussion is 
constructed for the automotive supplier SME SEW-Eurodrive to demonstrate that the current 
technological transformation across the German automotive industry is sector-wide.  
3.5.2.1 German automotive: OEMs 
BMW Group. Within the automotive space, the BMW Group (BMW) has been one of 
the pioneers in adopting the most recent technologies in its manufacturing process. Currently, 
several of the manufacturer’s plants in Germany and in the US have been retrofitted with 
various autonomous robots that enable greater human-robot collaboration (hereafter referred 
to as collaborative robots or co-bots when applicable) than allowed by traditional machines. 
BMW’s first lightweight robot came online in its Spartanburg, SC plant (BMW Group, 
2017a) and allowed the carmaker, together with MIT, to identify that a collaborative human-
robot environments results in an 85% drop in workers’ idle time and that this combination is 
more effective than teams of either humans or robots alone (Knight, 2014).  
Since then, BMW has capitalized on its knowledge by commissioning more of these 
robots in its other plants. Today, BMW uses co-bots to undertake tasks such as the lifting of 
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bevel gears during axle transmission assembly (BMW Group Dingolfing plant) and the 
application of viscous adhesive to front window installations (BMW Group Leipzig plant) 
(BMW Group, 2017a). Similar collaborative and autonomous robots have been introduced in 
the company’s transport and logistics management: Smart Transport Robots (STR) and laser-
guided autonomous tugger trains are employed in the Wackersdorf and Dingolfing plants 
respectively (BMW Group, 2016c).  
The BMW Group also uses other proximate technologies that benefit both humans and 
robots alike: 3-D printing technology in rapid prototyping, manufacturing validation (MIT 
Technology Review, 2014), and additive manufacturing (BMW Group, 2016b), laser-based 
guidance systems (BMW Group Regensburg plant), augmented reality applications and 
intelligent devices, and robotic exoskeletons for strenuous tasks (BMW Group, 2017a). 
Daimler AG. Daimler AG was another early adopter of advanced manufacturing 
technologies exploring the many possibilities of Industry 4.0. Even before the sector-wide 
shift, the then Daimler Chrysler was experimenting with agent-based HMS in its Mercedes 
Benz V6 and V8 engines assembly plant (NVM) in Stuttgart (Bussmann & Sieverding, 
2001). Currently, within the Mercedes-Benz brand, Daimler AG has defined and achieved 
two stages: 1) global component standards, a standardized systems architecture and 
standardized automation, regulation, and control technologies; 2) globally standardized 
technology modules for its robotics and production processes. Furthermore, Mercedes-Benz 
is able to simulate the production process from press plant to final assembly, allowing the car 
manufacturer to examine 4,000 individual processes prior to actual production (Daimler AG, 
2015b). 
Various other related technological shifts have been exploited in selected Mercedes-Benz 
variants: for instance, Mercedes-Benz S Class production recently shifted from its large 
traditional robotic machines to the smaller and lighter co-bots in the Sindelfingen plant in 
what the carmaker refers to as “robot farming”; the human workers are expected to provide 
the required adaptability and the flexibility to achieve mass customization (Gibbs, 2016). For 
its latest E Class (213 series), the carmaker is implementing a networked and digital-based 
production approach: 87 body-in-white production systems are equipped with 252 
programmable logic controllers, 2,400 robots, and 42 technologies and are linked to 
approximately 50,000 intelligent network participants (IP addresses), thereby allowing 
continuous monitoring without human intervention (Daimler AG, 2015a). Unmanned 
production tracking is enabled by combinations of antennae and Wi-Fi networks. Again, 
workers become valuable because of the flexibility that they provide in the shop floor 
(Daimler AG, 2015a).      
Beyond its premium vehicle segment, Daimler AG maintains key facilities in its 
Sindelfingen location that enable it to advance its production processes. An example is the 
TecFactory, which is a test factory where the company tests new production concepts and 
ideas, particularly in man-robot cooperation and innovative logistical solutions (i.e. driverless 
transport systems or DTS) (Daimler AG, 2015b). Another facility is the Virtual Reality 
Centre which is used for prototype design and virtual prototype simulation, such as the case 
of the Mercedes-Benz Class E (213 series) (Daimler AG, 2015a). 
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Daimler is actively involved also in inter-firm collaborative research to advance the 
current technologies. The carmaker, together with the University of Stuttgart, Fraunhofer 
IPA, and Bosch, founded the project Active Research Environment for the Next Generation 
of Automobiles (ARENA2036). ARENA2036 is a public-private platform that investigates 
agile and flexible production systems and human-robot cooperation (International Federation 
of Robotics, 2016).   
The Ford Motor Company. As part of its efforts to participate in Industry 4.0, the 
American car manufacturer Ford Motor Company (Ford), has installed co-bots in its Cologne 
factory. In Ford’s approach, the co-bots are relied on to assist the workers in fitting shock 
absorbers into the wheel arches of its Ford Fiestas: the machines are used to handle the lifting 
and positioning tasks, while the human workers supervise the installation (Zaleski, 2016). 
Regarding worker safety, Ford relies on intelligent machines that stop immediately they 
detect a human presence (even just a finger) in their path (Ford Motor Company, 2016). 
Adam Opel GmbH. Adam Opel GmbH (Opel) is still in the early phases of advanced 
technologies adoption and Industry 4.0 investigations. Rüsselsheim am Main-based Opel’s 
ITEZ – Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMT) team, together with its supply chain 
and manufacturing IT personnel, is actively researching intelligent systems and self-
organizing production (Scherer, 2017). Another ITEZ division, called the Structural 
Development Laboratory (SDL), applies laser-based and simulation technologies to 
prototyping and testing of brake systems (Scherer, 2016). These internal efforts are 
supplemented by work done by graduate interns, such as investigations into intelligent self-
organizing production (Opel Post, 2016). However, Opel is beginning to adopt smart 
technologies and intelligent robotics on its shop floor. For instance, it relies on Fanuc R-
2000iB, a heavy-duty robot, to work with its human counterparts in door installations for the 
company’s Insignia models in its Rüsselsheim plant (Wollny, 2016). Smart technologies, 
such as augmented reality devices and wearables, are used for supply chain management in 
Opel’s ADAM vehicles (Opel Eisenach plant) and components assembly (Opel Kaiserlautern 
plant) (Scherer, 2017). 
Volkswagen AG. Production processes in Volkswagen AG (Volkswagen) facilities have 
been highlighted in the literature because of their innovativeness, such as the employment of 
RFID technologies during post-production logistics management (Huang, et al., 2009). In the 
Industry 4.0 landscape, Volkswagen is involved in several initiatives that drive and 
investigate company-wide implementation of advanced and smart technologies: 1) Data:Lab 
in Munich, which handles ideas related to big data, advanced analytics, machine learning, and 
AI; 2) Berlin-based Digital:Lab, which handles ideas related to end-customer engagement 
(e.g. mobility services); and 3) Smart.Production:Lab in Wolfsburg, which develops both 
software and hardware pilots and prototypes that are implementable in Volkswagen’s smart 
factories (Volkswagen AG, 2015). The group-wide level of IT standardization for production 
management was 88% in 2016 (Volkswagen AG, 2016). 
In particular, through its Smart.Production:Lab, the carmaker, together with the German 
Research Centre for AI (DFKI), is carrying out research for the development of greater 
cooperative human-robot capabilities within the same production space (Simpson, 2016). 
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Propriety systems will be able to process human waves, gestures and motion, which will 
allow for greater responsiveness and interaction capabilities in robots (Volkswagen Group 
Italia S.P.A., 2016). 
Simultaneous with the general measures being undertaken at the parent-company level, 
Volkswagen brands have also adopted market-available solutions. For instance, Audi’s 
Neckarsulm facility was one of the early adopters of co-bots for handling coolant expansion 
tanks (Euromonitor International, 2016). Another instance is Audi’s Ingolstadt facility which 
combines a high level of automation with a multitude of other advanced technologies, such as 
optics-driven, low-power laser systems and regenerative braking in lift and conveyor 
systems. In its Audi A3 body shop, Audi employs robots that roughly equal the number of its  
employees (800); these machines do most of the more strenuous tasks (Juskalian, 2014). 
There are several intelligent systems employed in the Audi Ingolstadt facility:  body-
assembly is jointly produced by an autonomous group framer and several robotic arms that 
spot weld the components in place (Juskalian, 2014). Juskalian (2014) refers to the Ingolstadt 
automatisierter Anbau (INTA) – a fully automated door-assembly process that uses an array 
of sensors, robotic arms and lifts in which the unique combination of technologies allows for 
efficient handling of A3 body variants and installation of corresponding doors. Audi, together 
with research institutions, is also using the Ingolstadt facility as a site to investigate the 
viability of nascent intelligent technologies, such as smart mobile assistants, in industrial 
applications (Angerer, et al., 2012).  
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Table 3.24 Advanced technologies of German OEMs in Germany 
Parent 
Firm Facility name Plant city Plant state 
Adopted 
Technology 
Targeted production 
process 
BMW 
Group    
3-D printing 
technology 
rapid prototyping; 
manufacturing 
validation; additive 
manufacturing  
    augmented reality technology 
early-phase concept 
validations, initial 
sampling inspections 
    intelligent devices  supply chain management 
    robotic exoskeletons 
supply chain 
management 
 BMW Group Dingolfing plant Dingolfing Bavaria 
collaborative 
robots  
assembly - axle 
transmission 
    autonomous transport systems 
transport and logistics 
management 
 BMW Group Leipzig plant Leipzig Saxony 
collaborative 
robots  installation – windows 
 
BMW Group 
Regensburg 
plant 
Regensburg Bavaria laser-based guidance systems 
transport and logistics 
management 
 
BMW Group 
Wackersdorf 
plant 
Wackersdorf Bavaria smart transport robots (STR) 
transport and logistics 
management 
Daimler 
AG    
standardized 
systems 
architecture and 
automation 
 
    
standardized 
technology 
modules for 
robotics and 
production 
 
    simulation technology  
 TecFactory Sindelfingen Baden-Württemberg  
Investigations in man-
robot cooperations and 
logistic solutions 
 Virtual Reality Centre Sindelfingen 
Baden-
Württemberg  
prototype design and 
virtual simulation 
 Mercedes Benz   
autonomous 
production 
systems 
 
    sensor technology  
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Parent 
Firm Facility name Plant city Plant state 
Adopted 
Technology 
Targeted production 
process 
Daimler 
AG 
Mercedes Benz 
Sindelfingen 
plant 
Sindelfingen Baden-Württemberg 
collaborative 
robots  
production - Mercedes 
Benz S Class  
 
Mercedes Benz 
Sindelfingen 
plant 
Sindelfingen Baden-Württemberg 
collaborative 
robots  
production - Mercedes 
Benz E Class (213 
series) 
The Ford 
Motor 
Company 
Ford Cologne 
plant Cologne  
collaborative 
robots  
installation - shock 
absorbers  
Adam 
Opel 
GmbH 
ITEZ - AMT Rüsselsheim am Main Hesse  
Investigations on 
intelligent systems and 
self-organizing 
production 
 ITEZ - SDL Rüsselsheim am Main Hesse 
laser-based sensor 
technology 
prototype design and 
virtual simulation 
    simulation technology  
 
Opel 
Rüsselsheim 
plant 
Rüsselsheim 
am Main Hesse 
collaborative 
robots  installation - doors 
 Opel Eisenach plant Eisenach Thuringia intelligent devices  
supply chain 
management 
 
Opel 
Kaiserslautern 
plant 
Kaiserslautern Rhineland-Palatinate intelligent devices  
assembly - automotive 
components 
Volkswagen 
AG    
standardized 
systems 
architecture and 
automation 
 
    sensor technology  
 Data:Lab Munich Bavaria  
Investigations on big 
data, advanced 
analytics, ML, and AI 
 Digital:Lab Berlin Berlin  Investigations on CRM 
 Smart.Production:Lab Wolfsburg 
Lower 
Saxony  
Investigations on smart 
production 
 Audi Ingolstadt plant Ingolstadt  Bavaria 
laser-based sensor 
technology 
transport and logistics 
management 
 Audi Neckarsulm Neckarsulm 
Baden-
Württemberg 
collaborative 
robots 
supply chain 
management 
    collaborative robots  
supply chain 
management 
     assembly - body 
     installation - doors 
Source: author’s analysis 
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3.5.2.2 German automotive: automotive components lead suppliers 
Continental AG. Continental AG (Continental) has implemented several Industry 4.0 
technologies in its Regensburg facility: networking co-workers, co-bots, and driverless 
transportation systems (ROI Management Consultants, 2015).  
In its other lines of businesses, particularly tyre manufacture, Continental has established 
its High Performance Technology Centre (HPTC) in Continental Corporation’s Korbach 
location. HPTC machine and equipment are equipped with sensors and software, allowing for 
the emergence of a complete network. The system allows for continuous display and 
complete documentation of all the processes and materials involved (Continental 
Corporation, 2016b) using data to run simulations and investigations of tyre variants, thereby 
reducing development time (Continental Corporation, 2016a). 
Robert Bosch GmbH. Bosch’s automotive plant near Immenstadt im Allgäu, Germany, 
is a testbed for intelligent manufacturing processes that the company might implement across 
its facilities. The plant is equipped with various advanced technologies: sensor (RFID) 
technologies and digital twins are made available in all machinery and tools, allowing plant 
managers to obtain real-time information om plant efficiency and health (Juskalian, 2016). 
Moreover, Juskalian (2016) explains that the facility is connected to a main data centre in 
Stuttgart, where granular data from 11 Bosch facilities are consolidated and analysed.  
Bosch is also one of the founding members of ARENA2036 (see Daimler AG).  
SEW-Eurodrive. SEW-Eurodrive’s factory in Baden-Württemberg features several 
robotic technologies that aid its human workers: 1) a robotic workbench that assembles near-
complete drive systems; and 2) robotic arms that assist workers in load handling (Hollinger, 
2016).  
 
Table 3.25 Advanced technologies of German automotive suppliers in Germany 
Parent Firm Facility name Plant city Plant state 
Adopted 
Technology 
Targeted production 
process 
Continental 
AG HPTC Korbach Hesse sensor technology 
machine health and 
prognostics management 
     processes and materials behaviour documentation 
     prototype simulation 
  Regensburg Bavaria collaborative robots  
    autonomous transport systems  
Robert Bosch 
GmbH  Stuttgart 
Baden-
Württemberg big data analytics 
machine health and 
prognostics management 
  Immenstadt im Allgäu Bavaria sensor technology 
machine health and 
prognostics management 
SEW 
\Eurodrive   
Baden-
Württemberg  collaborative robots  
Source: author’s analysis 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
111 
 
3.5.2.3 German automotive: German cars 
Current-generation driver assistance systems. German OEMs have at least kept pace 
with other leading carmakers across the world in use of the latest technologies in driver 
assistance systems such as autonomous self-parking, lane-keeping and cruise-control, and 
traffic jam assistants.  
For instance, the BMW i3 model is the first car to offer a fully automatic parking option 
(BMW Blog, 2014). Other BMW variants, Mercedes-Benz offer hands-off and feet-on 
technologies while Audi and Volkswagen offer experimental vehicle-to-infrastructure (V21) 
communication alongside other features (IEEE Spectrum, 2014d).  
The Volkswagen Touareg has one of the more advanced lane keeping systems on the 
market and can track lanes at night-time (IEEE Spectrum, 2014c). Volkswagen has advanced 
the technology in its other models by allowing the system to continuously counter-steer to 
maintain the vehicle in its lane (Passat CC) (Volkswagen, 2017). BMW currently offers lane 
departure warning systems while Mercedes-Benz have lane keeping technologies. All 
German OEMs have cruise-control technologies, although BMW variants are notable in 
providing low-speed steering capabilities (IEEE Spectrum, 2014a).  
Among the most recent German vehicles available in the market, the Mercedes Benz E 
Class (213 series) is among the most advanced: the car is equipped with ultrasonic sensors 
and a 360° camera for traffic analysis and accident prevention (Daimler AG, 2015a). Daimler 
AG (2015a) states also that the E Class (213 series) has the firm’s latest car-to-X 
communication technology, remote parking pilot via smartphone applications, and a digital 
vehicle key through near field communication (NFC) technology.  
Next-generation automotive systems. Several initiatives among German OEMs and 
German Tier 1 automotive suppliers are being carried out to investigate next-generation 
vehicles systems. While some firms conduct their investigations internally, most are carried 
out in collaborative inter-firm (and sometimes including a research institution) environments.  
Bosch currently is working on an advanced braking system which allows the car to take 
over control from the driver in situations where it identifies potential accidents (IEEE 
Spectrum, 2014b). IEEE Spectrum (2014b) explains how the car processes information 
through sensory data acquired by means of a chip installed in the windscreen; it returns 
control to the driver when it concludes that the danger has passed.  
Continental is working with the University of Oxford and the Technical Universities in 
Darmstadt and Munich on investigating the application of neural networks in the cameras of 
its advanced driver assistance systems (Continental Corporation, 2017). In 2015, Continental, 
Deutsche Telekom, Fraunhofer ESK and Nokia Networks h demonstrated the viability of 
real-time communication between vehicles via the LTE network; the research has the 
potential for latency reduction of car-to-car communication and viability of existing networks 
for connected motorways (Continental Corporation, 2015). 
Among German OEMs, BMW, together with the Israeli firm vehicle safety systems 
provider, Mobileye, and chip maker Intel, will begin testing vehicles that rely on a 
reinforcement learning approach in second half of 2017 (Knight, 2017; Etherington, 2017; 
BMW Group, 2017b). The carmaker is concentrating its development resources in 
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Unterschleissheim, near Munich, and intends to release self-driving, electric, and fully 
connected vehicles by 2021 (BMW Group, 2016a). 
Another BMW endeavour is the generation of real-time data through camera-based 
Advanced Driver Assist System (ADAS): the car manufacturer is working with Mobileye to 
equip its 2018 vehicles with Mobileye’s Road Experience Management (REM™) data 
generation technology. The collaboration will allow BMW vehicles to access and contribute 
to Mobileye’s Global RoadBook (GLRB™), a crowd-sourced collection of HD maps with 
highly accurate localization capabilities. The agreement allows both parties to further 
promote automated driving (BMW Group, 2017c). 
Daimler AG and the UK-based Delphi are currently experimenting with the installation in 
its vehicles of up to four Light Detection and Ranging sensors (LiDARs), devices that map 
the environment in 3-D with lasers (Simonite, 2016).  Simonite (2016) notes that Daimler has 
invested in the technology company, Quanergy, for the development of next-generation 
LiDARs. 
Recently, Volkswagen AG presented a concept for an autonomous self-driving car called 
Sedric. It is a level-5 autonomous driving concept car which was designed and constructed by 
the Potsdam-based Future Centre Europe and the Wolfsburg-based Volkswagen Group 
Research (Volkswagen AG, 2017). The car is envisaged as a battery-powered electric vehicle 
with no conventional controls and operated through remote control (Noakes, 2017). 
Volkswagen AG also is actively investing in ride-sharing technologies, such as Israeli-based 
ride-hailing service Gett (Kokalitcheva, 2016).  
Like its parent firm, Audi has been active in researching future technologies. Recently, 
the car brand created a new subsidiary, Autonomous Intelligent Driving, which will work for 
the entire Volkswagen Group to research self-driving technology (Korosec, 2017). Across its 
vehicles, Audi is working with the technology firm, NVIDIA, to develop the Audi Q7. 
NVIDIA’s DRIVE PX 2 in-car computer is the foundation for the local neural net in the Audi 
Q7; primarily, it studies driver behaviour and uses the data to infer behaviour (Etherington, 
2017). A consortium of Audi, Ericsson, Qualcomm Technologies, SWARCO and the 
University of Kaiserslautern, is to carry out demonstration trials for vehicle-to-everything 
communications through 4G/5G LTE-based vehicle-to-network (V2N) technology (IEEE 
Connected Vehicles, 2017).  
Environment for next-generation automotive systems. Regarding the overall 
environment for the development of networked driving, the German Federal Ministry of 
Transport and Digital Infrastructure on the following areas of action: Infrastructure law, 
innovation, networking, and IT security and data protection (VDA, 2016).  
Existing German regulation, particularly the Road Transport Law and the Road Traffic 
Act, allow the use of automated systems, but make no exact provisions in the case of 
accidents that involve self-driving cars (VDA, 2016). However, in October 2015, Germany 
adopted the Vienna Convention on road transport, which permits automated driving in traffic, 
provided that these technologies can be overridden by the driver any time (UNECE, 2016).  
Various initiatives are investigating the proper standards for the vehicle-to-X 
communications network infrastructure (see Next generation automotive systems). The 
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German automotive association, the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) 
has worked with the federal and state government data protection authorities to develop a 
standard on data protection aspects of use of networked and non-networked vehicles (VDA, 
2016) 
 
3.5.3 Piemonte and Torino 
Piemonte represents the most developed region within the Italian automotive sector. The 
past and recent history was characterized by the important presence of the FCA group (FIAT 
SPA until 2014). FIAT allowed massive development of companies linked to the local 
automotive eco-system, which, over the decades, have been specializing throughout the 
automotive supply chain (product development, components, design, output, after sales).  
 According to the latest data provided by the Italian automotive components Observatory 
2016, Piemonte significantly increased its automotive productivity and revenue in 2015. 
Within the region there are 712 companies, which represent more than 36% of total Italian 
suppliers. There are more than 77,000 employees in the supply chain, 55,500 in the 
automotive industry.  
In 2016, FCA production in Italy was 721,126 cars (+8.2% on 2015 and +84% on 2013). 
Most of the production is concentrated in the South (Melfi, Pomigliano and Cassino), but 
Mirafiori-Torino and Grugliasco are still relevant for bodywork production of Alfa Romeo 
and Maserati. Italian factories employ almost 34.000 workers. 
 
Table 3.26 Data on the Piemonte automotive industry. 
Automotive Industry Italy Piemonte 
Firms 1.956 712 
Revenue 38.8 billions 15.2 billions 
Employers 136.000 55.400 
Export 75% 81% 
Export revenue + 4,2% + 3,3% 
% of export revenue 40% 45% 
Dependence on FCA 79% 87% 
R&D 72% 74% 
Source: Moretti A., Zirpoli F., (2016), “Osservatorio sulla componentistica automotive 2016”, Ricerche 
per l’innovazione nell’industria automotive, Edizioni Cà Foscari. 
  
The FCA group is not only the main group in the automotive sector in Piemonte but is 
also a starting point for satellite activities in the region. Over 85% of the companies 
interviewed for the Observatory report said that part of their revenue came directly or 
indirectly from FCA, while the national figure stands at 79.9%. 
Considering the entire automotive industry, Piemonte is able to generate a total revenue of 
EUR 19.9 billion, a 6.5% increase with respect to 2014. That accounts for 39% of Italian 
sales in automotive. 
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Table 3.27 Firms, Employees and Revenue of the automotive Supply Chain – Piemonte Region 
2015 Firms Revenue 
Automotive 
Supply Chain 
(Bn of Euro) 
Revenue 
Automotive 
Industry (Bn 
of Euro) 
Employees 
Automotive 
Supply Chain 
Employees 
Automotive 
Industry 
Sub-providers 351 2.499 1.442 13.369 7.366 
Specialist 242 10.568 7.630 39.716 24.942 
Engineering & 
Design 
86 749 652 4.905 4.287 
Systems 
Engineers 
33 6.090 5.487 19.455 18.832 
Tot. 712 19.906 15.211 77.445 55.428 
Source: Moretti A., Zirpoli F., (2016), “Osservatorio sulla componentistica automotive 2016”, Ricerche 
per l’innovazione nell’industria automotive, Edizioni Cà Foscari. 
 
What appears to be an interesting updating about the increased production in Italy and 
Piemonte, is the change in the production mix. In fact, the production of higher unit volume 
segments, such as Monovolume and Suv, has increased considerably, while lower band 
production (A, B, C) was reduced. 
Table 3.27 shows the most developed and productive sectors in the Piemonte automotive 
supply chain, where the specialist segment plays a crucial role. 
Piemonte is the main actor in Italy for development of research and innovation. The  
Piemonte region invests EUR 2.4 billion of in-house resources in innovation, equal to 17% of 
total spending on R&D by Italian companies. 
The entrepreneurial sector invests 78% of its regional expenditure on innovation (the 
average for Italy is 54%). Innovation is realized mainly in the specialized ICT segment and 
advanced specialist services. Those firms that are more innovative are characterized by 
smaller employment (less than 50 employees), less than five years of activity, and average 
investment of 4% of their turnover in R&D activities. 
This strong inclination for product innovations in the field of advanced ICT and advanced 
services is generating positive effects in many segments of the regional automotive supply 
chain, as well as influencing the component sector. Data show that in 2015, 74% of 
component companies were involved in innovation activities (8% more than in 2014). 
Two crucial segments in the field of R&D investment are subcontractors, and engineering 
and development. While the first appears to be the less innovative within the supply chain 
due to the production of essentially standard components, engineering and development  
activities are highly innovative. 
In Piemonte, the engineering and development  segment accounts for 16% of the entire 
chain (against an Italian average of 12%). This is evidence of significant regional 
performance in the field of innovation and development of state-of-the-art engineering 
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solutions. Combined with a great propensity to innovate in the field of specialized services 
and ICT, this allows Piemonte region to act as the national innovation leader in the 
automotive sector. As already mentioned, the Piemonte automotive sector is characterized by 
the presence of the FCA Group which, together with CNH Industrial, represents the two main 
manufacturers in the automotive sector in the region. 
Around these big groups, one can find both important firms along the supply chain, as 
shown by the industry overview, and important companies that represent the region's 
excellence in research, components and, most importantly, design. 
 
Table 3.28 Main competitors – Piemonte Region 
Group Firm Employees Location Activities 
FCA       
  
  
  
Fiat 5.001-10.000 Torino, TO Manufacturing 
Maserati 501-1000 Grugliasco, TO Luxury Production 
Magneti Marelli 2.001-5.000 Venaria, TO Manufacturing 
CNH Industrial Over 10.000     
  
  
Iveco 1.001-1.500 Torino, TO Manufacturing 
New Holland 251-500 San Mauro 
Torinese, TO 
Manufacturing 
General Motors       
  Global 
Propulsion 
System 
501-1.000 Torino, TO Engineering 
Research Centre 
Valeo 1.001-1.500 Pianezza, TO Components 
Pininfarina 501-1.000 Cambiano, TO Design 
ItalDesign – Giugiaro SPA 501-1.000 Moncalieri, TO Design 
Jac Italy Design Centre 51-200 Pianezza, TO Design 
Source: Moretti A., Zirpoli F., (2016), “Osservatorio sulla componentistica automotive 2016”, Ricerche 
per l’innovazione nell’industria automotive, Edizioni Cà Foscari. 
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As already mentioned, FCA has a significant impact on local suppliers. The reopening of 
many of the group’s manufacturing facilities and the recovery of the automotive industry 
globally and locally, have contributed to the multinational’s re-emergence as a customer for 
many component suppliers in the region. 
Despite progressive diversification in local suppliers' customers in the last few years, 
since 2014 the trend has changed. Analysis of the distribution of Piemonte's turnover 
generated by supplying FCA, shows the impact of the group has grown compared to the 
recent past. This is true more especially for the regional cluster than for the rest of Italy. More 
than 86% of companies stated that part of their revenue for 2015 came from direct or indirect 
relationships with FCA. That value decreases to 79% when we consider the Italian level. The 
detailed percentages show that almost 34% of Piemonte companies earn more than 75% of 
their revenue from the Italian-American group, against 29% earned by other Italian 
companies. 
In 2014, the average percentage of (direct or indirect) supply to FCA decreased (32%), 
but in 2015 the share rose again to 49%. This growth was experienced not only by the 
domestic market (33% vs 26% in 2014), but also by the average percentage of sales for 
foreign production (16% vs 6%). 
There are some interesting aspects to the degree of openness to the foreign market based 
on prospect data. Subalpine businesses historically have been characterized by a high degree 
of openness to foreign markets. This propensity allowed the chain in Piemonte to overcome 
the recent global economic crisis, which severely affected the car market, and to maintain 
high levels of competitiveness and entrepreneurial specialization. 
After 2014, when component sales abroad had halted, Piemonte exports continued to 
grow and reached nearly EUR 4.5 billions (about 37% of Italian car exports) in 2015. This 
represents an increase of 3.1% compared to the previous year. 
In 2015, for the first time in ten years, the value of sub-alpine car sales exceeded those of 
parts and components, increasing by 33% compared to 2014 (EUR 5.8 billions). This was due 
to the expertise and experience in the Piemontese entrepreneurial system, acquired over the 
years, particularly in the Turin area where FCA produces some Maserati and Alfa Romeo 
brands. Today, Piemonte automotive exports account for almost 30% of domestic car sales 
abroad, a share that has increased progressively in recent years (21% in 2008). This confirms 
the importance of the Subalpine territory in an international context. 
The opening of Piemonte companies to foreign markets is confirmed by the responses to 
the Observatory survey: in the last edition of the Observatory, 81% of Piemonte suppliers 
(79% in 2014)  declared being exporters, against 75% of suppliers nationwide. The greater 
propensity to export is supported by the degree of intensity with which companies rely on it: 
for one quarter of the sample surveyed, export accounts for more than 75% of the turnover.  
  
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
117 
 
4 Policy actions  
We are keen to avoid rehearsing the lists of general policy recommndations proposed by 
numerous reports written during the last 18 months on the development of the digital 
manufacturing. Here, we offer a concise set of actions that could be implemented in the next 
18 months, focusing particularly on Torino and Piemonte, but as part of the larger macro 
region of North Italy.   
Torino and Piemonte can rely on extensive and state-of-the-art knowledge on machinery 
and robotics, which are embedded in a production system that suffered greatly in the last 
economic crisis, but which has managed to survive thanks to significant investment in 
innovation. Indeed, a growing share of R&D in GDP is evidence of an innovation-oriented 
business environment in Piemonte; this share is the highest among the Italian regions, about 
2.2% in 2014 (see Table 1.6). Innovative companies have managed to substitute lack of 
internal demand for export-led growth, which is a reconfirmation of their competitiveness. 
Significant economic growth in 2017 combined with investment and an increase in internal 
demand for manufacturing goods (see forecast return to 2 million cars sold in Italy) should be 
a good predictor also of increased demand for the automotive supply chain, which still plays 
a very important role in Piemonte. We believe that this trend should enable increased local 
growth in line with the higher rates experienced over the last 18 months in Lombardia, Emilia 
Romagna and Triveneto. However, this positive scenario should be seen against the relative 
lack of digital industry skills. The generation and diffusion of new Cyber-Physical Systems 
(CPS) characterizing digital manufacturing are requiring the integration of high-level 
technological and organizational skills, which currently are lacking in these areas.  
However, a catch-up in AI (AI) and Computing Technologies is possible, for several 
reasons: 
1. In the past, Torino has proven able to shift its specialization pattern. 
2. Piemonte has been home to Olivetti’s computer developments and production and 
established Telecom Italia’s operator lab (CSELT, now Tlab). Arduino, an open-
source platform that is known worldwide, can be considered as an example of a 
spillover from a technological ecosystem, which never disappeared. 
3. Torino hosts some important AI and computing science organizations – both 
academic and non-academic - which can act as the first pivots of future further 
developments. 
4. Other regions with a specialization in machineries and robotics, such as Bayern, seem 
to have had the ability to make rapid transitions and become leaders in CPS. 
Torino and Piemonte are players within a larger geographical area that includes, at least, 
Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna and Triveneto, which, were they more integrated, generate a 
critical mass of human capital, industry and financial advantages in order to compete 
globally. With a population comparable to that of the BENELUX countries and similar 
education, technological and industrial performance, this macro-region could emerge from 
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the most recent and long recession to achieve GDP growth rates not seen for a long time. 
However, the window of opportunity is narrow and within the next few years the list of 
global players in the field will close. 
The end of the 19th century and the early 20th century, the dawn of the second industrial 
revolution, saw Torino (Piemonte), Milano (Lombardia) and Genova (Liguria) achieving 
crucial industrial catch-up, which laid the foundations for the post war Italian ‘miracolo 
industriale’.  
The larger quadrilateral roughly connecting Torino, Venezia, Bologna and Genova (with 
Milano in th centre of the Torino-Venezia link) could become the core of an immediate future 
wave of industrial and technological developments, building also on geographical proximity 
to Europe’s power house, that is, Germany and the growing Eastern European economies.  
The following suggestions focus on policies with a clear emphasis on supporting the 
generation of the human capital required to develop the capabilities that will become 
integrated with existing skills in machinery and robotics. These policy actions concentrate on 
the creation of regional shared public goods (club goods) based on industrial commons. 
Actions to a) elevate technological trajectory, b) de-risking innovative investment, c) 
accelerating the pace of change and d) building the cognitive capacities will enable SMEs 
firms to compete in Global Supply Chains. These policies should be aimed at driving 
activities and all could be delivered in full in the next 18 months with relative low investment 
efforts. 
 
Masters and PhD Courses in apprenticeship 
According to Italy’s National Engineering Council (Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri), 
there are around 18,000 engineers in Piemonte (10,000 in Torino), 40,000 in Lombardia, and 
about 24,000 in Emilia Romagna. Engineers with degrees in either automation or computing 
technology represent less than a third of these numbers. A plausible target among this 
population of engineers for training policies in AI and computer science integrated in robotics 
and automation would be in the range 800-1000 bearing in mind the age limits for the 
programmes described below. This engineering workforce has little training in computer 
technology or AI; however, it has the required absorptive capabilities and skills.  
Masters and PhD in apprenticeships are public programmes that create incentives to 
combine formal degrees at either the Politecnico of Torino or the University of Torino, with 
on-the-job training. Students enrolled on these programmes are hired by firms, which benefit 
from around a 30% reduction in labour taxes compared to what the firm would have to pay 
for an employee of a similar seniority. There are currently few apprenticeship schemes 
available in hard science and social sciences. We call for wider use of these important 
schemes, focused on AI and its integration with digital automation. Masters level students 
receive 400 hundred hours of teaching over two years. Doctoral level students are given less 
teaching time, but develop an applied research project within the relevant company. 
Estimated training costs are EUR 4,000 per trained individual per two years at master’s level, 
and EUR 12,000 per trained individual per three years at doctoral level; these estimates 
exclude grants or scholarships because the students enjoy financial advantages from being 
Digital Disruption and the Transformation of Italian Manufacturing 
 
119 
 
employed by a company. We obtained these estimates based on the present standard costs 
paid by Regione Piemonte.31 Excluding fiscal advantages, a reasonable investment would be 
around EUR 5 million over three years for 900 master’s positions and 100 doctoral positions.  
 
ITS courses to train human capital 
Supporting the transition from traditional manufacturing to digital manufacturing requires 
a supply of trained personnel - and as soon as possible. Production processes require not only 
graduates but also specialized technicians, who can receive tertiary education training in 
technical schools in two years. Compared to Germany and France, Italy has lagged behind in 
developing this type of higher education, which can be seen in the lower share of graduates in 
the Italian population. More than 15 years after the introduction of the 3+2 Bologna system, 
most Italian students still tend to participate in the full five-year university programme (Alma 
Laurea). The first (not very successful) attempts to develop a ‘Lauree Brevi’ (2-3 year HE 
degrees) were made between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. In 2011, the Istituti Tecnici 
Superiori (ITS – Higher Technical Institutes) were introduced in Italy; Piemonte is already 
reaping the rewards. 
ITS in Piemonte32 are organized in seven schools and cover various areas, such as 
innovation, mobility, tourism, culture and fashion, energy and biotechnology, which have a 
large socio-economic impact. The strengths of this form of education, in which the Region 
Piemonte has invested EUR 15 million for the period up to 2020, include co-design of 
profiles and skills, support and advice on job placement, rapid adaption of profiles to business 
needs, transfer of innovations, focus on work objectives and practice, high-level 
apprenticeships and internships. So far, ITS in Piemonte are achieving employment rates of 
over 80% within six months of graduating and the dispersion rate is stable and below 20%. 
The number of students enrolled is increasing, from 80 students in years 2011/2012 to 400 in 
years 2017/2018 (only 75 places available to study aerospace and mechatronic). The most 
recent two years’ courses include both classroom hours and internships. We call for more 
efficient use of this tool together with an expansion in the range of activities to include 
computer programming and data science. The sum of EUR 4 million over 2 years would 
cover the cost of training an additional 800 students. 
 
  
                                                 
31 Information on Higher Education and Research regulation in Piemonte is available at the Regione 
Piemonte website http://www.regione.piemonte.it/apprendistato/duale_ricerca.htm 
32 More details can be found at www.itspiemonte.it/ 
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Continuous learning on the job and an open knowledge repository 
The two year ITS higher education programme could be complemented by a system of 
online training that would allow workers to continue to update their skills. Such an online 
system, premised on the ITS courses, would benefit from the alumni network and support 
infrastructure. In any year, ITS students would have to chance to follow the online courses 
and to spend a small number of days in the classroom. Older workers who had not benefited 
from the ITS training could be enrolled in the online courses based on access tests and 
completion of preparatory courses (online and in the classroom), which would award them 
with the necessary credits for entry to the ITS. This hybrid system would benefit from an 
esprit de corps engendered by participation in a similar course (an example is ITS Torino 
2018 Digital manufacturing, which creates incentives for workers to continue learning and 
sharing their knowledge). To facilitate knowledge sharing at the local level (creation of a club 
good), the physical infrastructure of the ITS could become the locus for the creation of an 
online repository of software, best practice, data, etc, which could be accessed by all 
accredited ITS students. A fix cost of about 0.5 million a year would be more than sufficient 
for the development and maintenance of such a system. 
 
Attracting Human Capital: brain circulation and attraction of talent  
Italy has suffered from a longstanding brain-drain problem, which has not been balanced 
by brain-gain from other countries. Young and educated pupils tend to emigrate and not 
return, whilst, also, Italy, has not held any attraction for young professionals, despite the 
financial incentives that have been introduced for 2017. 
Italian law grants a tax exemption over three years, on 90% of the salaries of both Italian 
and foreign researchers willing to relocate to Italy. However, the outcome of this policy has 
not been entirely satisfactory, and only about 4,000 researchers profited from this opportunity 
in 2016 (note that this number could include individuals who would have come to Italy in any 
case, so may be an over-estimate of the impact of this policy). Moreover, few foreign 
professionals emigrate to Italy, although the policy specifically includes foreigners in 
potential candidates. The reasons for this poor results are related to labour demand and 
supply. On the demand side, companies in Piemonte and Italy, more generally, are not 
necessarily open to foreign employees due to cultural and language barriers33. On the supply 
side, foreign professional are put off by the bureaucratic procedures involved in the relocation 
process. Since it is not possible, in the short term, to reduce the cultural barrier in many firms, 
a strategy designed to help the rapid assimilation of foreign workers could be introduced 
consisting of an ad hoc service to help to overcome the bureaucratic and language barriers, 
and provision of intensive language classes. Active efforts to be made to identify foreigners 
interested in living and working in Italy (Italy is attractive from a quality of life and value for 
money perspective). Priority could be offered to engineers and scientists with at least five 
years’ work experience in a digital manufacturing employment. We would suggest that the 
city of Torino (Milano, Bologna) should set a target of 2,000 new young digital 
manufacturing field professionals from abroad, and offer them additional benefits to those 
                                                 
33 Positions are often advertised in Italian only and the job description is in Italian. 
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offered by the state (during the first and second industrial revolutions, Piemonte passed laws 
to create incentives for foreign inventors to locate their production activity in Piemonte).   
It should be noted that the relocation choice often is not driven solely by the available job 
opportunities. According to LinkedIn Global Talent Trends 2015, compensation is a top 
priority, along with other aspects and especially in the case of the creative industries (Florida, 
2001). The city environment in which a specific job is located is an important determinant of 
this choice, as are the richness and diversity of the city, its natural and cultural amenities and 
the presence of a university (Florida, 2011)  
Piemonte and Torino do not lack cultural amenities, as clearly testified by the continuous 
increase in tourism after the Winter Olympic 2006 that repositioned the city on the 
international map. Moreover, Torino should take advantage of its comparable to other cities 
low cost of living. However, the city of Torino needs to implement a city branding strategy to 
advertise working conditions and benefits, career opportunities, the knowledge environment 
and the city amenities in the international job market. Milano has been much more active in 
rebranding itself as an international city and Torino might learn from its so far successful 
experience.  
 
Coordinating Organization 
A well-performing innovation system needs specific organizations able to act as devices 
enabling the coordination of efforts among system actors such as the Politecnico di Torino, 
the University di Torino, private and public research institutions and private companies 
towards the development of an applied technology ecosystem. A successful organization 
would become a landmark and help to promote the city of Turin in line with the branding 
strategy suggested above. The current Officine Grandi Riparazioni developments are moving 
in this direction, but more work is needed and competition among different organization 
addressing different potential but overlapping demands (spin-off generation versus support 
for SMEs) is welcome. 
The Politecnico hosts several research groups dealing with both smart automation and AI; 
similarly at the University, many Departments led by the Department of Computer Science 
are active in computing sciences and AI and recently have built the high-performing-
computer Occam, which is becoming a sand box for researchers in the field. The role of 
Higher Education Institutions should not be considered as confined only to formal education; 
they should also be imparters of knowledge that will contribute to the development of the 
economic environment. They can profit from interaction with firms, which would allow them 
to focus research on specific issues. However, not all the knowledge created in academia is 
integrated in the system. Combined with the proprietary nature of the knowledge created in 
the private sphere, competition can generate duplications of research efforts and lose 
profitable exchanges, hindering joint research activities and, ultimately, damaging the 
economic performance of the system as a whole. Since global competition in the sector is 
intense, and the areas positioning in the ranking is not well established, the costs of 
knowledge diffusion can be high. Since neither market forces alone nor the good will of 
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single individuals rarely create effective coordination (creation of a club good in the 
production of knowledge), there is need to coordinate public-private interventions. There are 
several examples of coordination achieved through the creation of ad hoc organizations 
tasked with integrating the knowledge in the ecosystem. One of the most successful of such 
cases is the German Fraunhofer-Gesellshaft. The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft is an organization 
devoted to applied research. It is organized into activities in 69 research units located in 
Germany. Its annual budget is EUR 2.1 billion, 1.9 billions of which come from contracts. 
Clearly, this initiative is on a different scale from a potential knowledge hub in Turin, but it 
shows that such institutions can rely almost exclusively on private financing and competitive 
research grants. Another example is the UK’s Catapult programme, which is a network of 
physical research centres designed to conduct applied research that matches business needs to 
academic knowledge. Each centre receives public funding of EUR 10 million on average, 
with a similar additional amount coming from competitive grants and business contracts. 
Although a similar programme might benefit Italy, initially, we suggest the setting up in 
Torino of one institute similar to a node in the UK Catapult, in the converging areas of AI 
and automation. Such an organization would interact with and benefit from the Italian 
Institute of Technology (IIT) located in Genova and the coming Human Technopole (HT) in 
Rho-Fiera. During the last few years, a large number of new initiatives to support the creation 
of spinoffs have been launched in Torino. The organization that we are recommending would 
have a primary objective of bridging between universities, public research centres, large firms 
and small and medium sized firms to achieve knowledge exchange and knowledge creation. 
This would involve large and small companies that are attempting to make the transition into 
digital manufacturing, and knowledge creators such as the Politecnico, the University, IIT, 
HT etc. Spinoffs might result from, but are not the focus of this activity. The goal is digital 
rejuvenation (through the transformation of production and organization) to enhance 
competitiveness.  
There are many examples in Europe of similar types of institutions, which have all been 
successful in developing new products and processes in different high-tech areas. They have 
managed to find matching funding via business contracts and competitive grants and all 
require some basic funding that should be higher in the year of establishment and then 
gradually decrease. For instance, Innovate UK, a government economic development agency, 
in 2013 invested about GBP 100 million in Catapult centres. This amount of funding has 
reduced drastically over time. We think that the minimum investment required to establish 
such an institution would be EUR 10 million per year for the first three years, followed by an 
exit strategy related to public investment. Private companies and local private foundations 
should be interested in supporting the creation and development of such an organization. 
The location of the suggested institution is of prime importance, since it can become a 
hub for as many related activities as possible, and should increase personal contacts and 
exchanges of tacit knowledge. In the context of the other policies suggested above, the 
institution should support teams scouting for international professionals, branding the city 
and helping foreigners to relocate to Italy. It should have at its disposal temporary housing for 
foreign professionals, while it can be the home of the ITS in Digital Manufacturing. It should 
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become a physical emblem of the emergence of the city of Torino as specialised in advanced 
technology, which would contribute to the city’s branding efforts and help to attract relevant 
talent. Preliminary discussions with the “Agenzia del Demanio”, which manages public 
owned but dismissed areas for the Italian government, suggest that there are several areas in 
the city where such an organization could be located. Using a public dismissed area would 
reduce building costs to almost zero and reduce subsequent rents, which would be payable to 
the public owned investment fund that would finance the restructuring. The cost of 
refurbishing a large area, only partially used by the new bridging organization, might be 
around EUR 100 million and EUR 2-3 million per year an adequate return of investment 
from the public owned investment fund. That means that the property should be rented by 
other commercial activities to cover a significant share of the 2-3 million rents. 
 
This set of policies does not constitute an optimum policy-mix for the industrial 
development of the area but rather the minimal set of feasible actions which can be 
immediately implemented at a reasonable cost. They have the purpose of exploiting the 
narrow window in order not to pass up, once again after the failure of the Olivetti, the 
opportunity of competing as a leader in the digital technologies. The long-standing problem 
of the Italian stagnation and the role of very broad investments in industrial policy is not a 
matter discussed in this report, but it is surely a key issue to be addressed by Italian policy 
makers.  
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APPENDIX I 
Here we report two illustrative cases of reshoring in Italy, extracted from the European 
Reshoring Monitor 
 
FIVE (Fabbrica Italiana Veicoli Elettrici)  
is an Italian innovative start-up incorporated in 2012, leader in the production of electric 
bikes and motorbikes and controlled by the Italian group Termal. The company decided to 
move back its manufacturing activities from Shanghai (China) back to Bologna (Italy). FIVE 
has invested EUR 12 million on 22 May 2017 for a new production plant to be located in 
Bologna (Italy). Fabio Giatti, the company CEO, stated that the main motivation for 
reshoring has been quality. FIVE was never able to achieve the quality needed for Italian 
and European consumers after it established with the plant in China. Secondary reasons have 
been an increase in production costs, the long transportation time, and the made-in effect, 
since the product could not be considered as made-in-Italy after offshoring. The new plant is 
expected to operate at full capacity within the next three years by producing a total of 2,500 
units in 2017, which is about 30% of FIVE’s product portfolio. In this way, FIVE could 
gradually withdraw production activities at two factories in Shanghai (China), where 50 
workers are employed. By 2021, the same number of employees will be active in the new 
Italian plant.  
 
Turolla  
is an Italian producer of motor gear products and fan drive systems. Despite the cost 
advantage coming from lower labor costs (-35%) in Slovakia, the company plans to 
reshore its entire Slovakian production to a new plant in Castel San Pietro, Emilia Romagna, 
in Northern Italy. The Italian plant has been active since June 2017. Its General 
Manager, Riccardo Carra stated the local network of trained engineers, and the presence of 
high quality research centres and universities in proximity to the new Italian plant 
will compensate for the disadvantage of the Italian bureaucracy, which remains however 
the main disadvantage of the operation. The new plant will not hire new employees at the 
beginning, directly on site. There are plans of a large scale recruitment of highly competent 
professionals in the near future, but at the group level, as reported by the Danfoss Group, 
controller of Turolla. 
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APPENDIX II 
Table II.1 Geographic coverage of the Italian sample of firms 
Region N. of firms 
Abruzzo 6,912 
Basilicata 2,484 
Calabria 6,642 
Campania 26,200 
Emilia-Romagna 28,920 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 6,164 
Lazio 45,923 
Liguria 6,900 
Lombardia 69,714 
Marche 9,041 
Molise 1,482 
Piemonte 19,075 
Puglia 17,255 
Sardegna 6,949 
Sicilia 18,505 
Toscana 22,927 
Trentino-Alto Adige 6,562 
Umbria 4,574 
Valle D'Aosta 721 
Veneto 29,864 
Total 336,814 
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TableII.2 Premia on manufacturing vs services, foreign vs domestic firms in value added 
content 
Dependent variable: OLS value added content 
domestic firm -.071*** 
  (.011) 
manufacturing firm -.035** 
  (.012) 
domestic & manufacturing firm .093*** 
  (.014) 
(log of) capital intensity -.016 
  (.014) 
(log of) size -.024*** 
  (.006) 
Constant 1.001*** 
  (.067) 
Adj R squared 0.5506 
N. observations 336,814 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Errors clustered by industry Yes 
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APPENDIX III 
Table III.1 Service robots’ classification for personal and non-commercial use 
Service robots for personal/domestic use 
Robots for domestic tasks  
Robot companions/assistants/humanoids Vacuuming, floor cleaning  
Lawn-mowing  
Pool cleaning /window cleaning  
Entertainment robots  
Toy/hobby robots  
Multimedia/remote presence  
Education and research  
Others  
Elderly and handicap assistance  
Robotized wheelchairs  
Personal aids and assistive devices  
Other assistance functions  
Personal transportation (AGV for persons)  
Home security & surveillance  
Other Personal / domestic robots 
Source: International Federation of Robotics, 2016 
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Table III.2 Service robots’ classification for professional and commercial use 
Service robots for professional use 
Field robotics 
Agriculture / Other field robotics 
Milking robots  
Other robots for livestock farming  
Forestry and silviculture  
Mining robots  
Space robots  
Professional cleaning 
Floor cleaning  
Window and wall cleaning (incl. wall climbing robots)  
Tank, tube and pipe cleaning  
Hull cleaning (aircraft vehicles etc.)  
Other cleaning tasks 
Inspection and maintenance systems 
Facilities, plants  
Tank, tubes, pipes and sewers  
Other inspection and maintenance systems 
Construction and demolishing 
Nuclear demolition & dismantling  
Building construction  
Robots for heavy/civil construction  
Other construction and demolition systems 
Logistics systems 
Automated guided (AGV) vehicles manufacturing environments /non-manufacturing environments 
(indoor)  
Cargo handling, outdoor logistics  
Other logistic systems 
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Service robots for professional use 
Medical robots 
Diagnostic systems  
Robot assisted surgery or therapy  
Rehabilitation systems  
Other medical robots 
Rescue and security applications  
Fire and disaster fighting robots  
Surveillance / security robots  
Other rescue and security robots 
Defence applications 
Demining robots  
Unmanned aerial vehicles  
Unmanned ground based vehicles  
Unmanned underwater vehicles  
Other defense applications 
Underwater systems (civil / general use)  
Powered Human  
Exoskeletons  
Unmanned aerial vehicles (general use)  
Mobile Platforms in general use  
Underwater systems (civil / general use) 
Hotel & restaurant robots  
Mobile guidance, information robots  
Robots in marketing  
Robot joy rides  
Others (i.e. library robots) 
Other professional service robots not specified above 
Source: International Federation of Robotics (2016) 
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Table III.3 Other Japanese robotics suppliers 
Company  
 
Main technology focus Total 
revenue 
in 2016 
Market  
capitalization 
Revenue by sector in 2016 
Daifuku Logistics automation 
systems 
(automated rack systems, 
sorting and picking 
systems), semiconductor 
and LCD fab cleanroom 
automation systems 
(AMHS), airport baggage 
handling systems. 
¥336.1b
n 
 
$2.1 bn 31% of revenues are from the 
electronics sector, 19% are 
from the automotive sector.  
 
Nidec 
Sankyo 
LCD glass handling robots, 
semiconductor wafer 
transport robots, associated 
controllers, RoboTech 
(precision reduction gears 
/reducers), motors, reducers  
¥123.3b
n  
$27.4 bn 20% of the revenues are from 
robot sales to various sectors 
Nachi-
Fujikoshi 
Spot-welding, arc-welding, 
handling robots, palletising 
robots (especially six-axis 
robots capable of heavier 
payloads), cutting tools  
¥20bn 
 $0.9bn 
Robots are the key revenue 
drivers, mainly supplies to 
the automotive industry 
Yamaha 
Motor 
SCARA, Cartesian and 
single-axis robots, pick and 
place machines, unmanned 
aircraft used for crop-
dusting, SMT equipment, 
drones 
¥48bn 
 
$7.0bn 
About ¥20bn from the sales 
of pick-and-place machines, 
¥15-20bn from robots and 
about ¥5bn from unmanned 
helicopters 
Panasonic 
Industrial robots and 
welding and cutting 
systems, inspection 
equipment and screen 
printers, SMT equipment, 
sensors, drivers 
¥1,052b
n 
 
$25.6bn Industrial robot revenues are between ¥10-20bn 
Seiko 
Epson 
SCARA robots, six-axis 
robots, linear robots, robot 
controllers. Supplies mainly 
for automotive and 
electronics 
¥48bn 
 $6.8bn 
Robotics solutions revenue  
is ¥15.4bn  
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Company  
 
Main technology focus Total 
revenue 
in 2016 
Market  
capitalization 
Revenue by sector in 2016 
Mitsubishi 
Electric 
Robots, automation 
controllers (numerical 
controls, programmable 
logic 
controllers/sequencers), 
drives (servomotors and 
inverters), laser cutting 
¥540bn $27.2bn 
Robot revenues are at 
~¥10bn (US$100m) per 
year 
Hirata 
Assembly lines for the 
automotive sector, and 
cleanroom robots and 
loadports for the 
semiconductor production 
equipment and LCD panel 
production equipment 
industries 
¥53bn $0.7bn 
¥20bn from semiconductor 
equipment (likely including 
¥5-10bn from cleanroom 
robots) and ¥20bn from 
automation solutions for the 
automotive industry 
Omron 
Sensing devices, automation 
controllers and safety 
products, robots for light 
assembly and packaging 
applications, including 
SCARA robots, delta robots 
and six-axis robot arms 
¥6bn $7.7 bn 
Omron is integrating the 
robots with its sensor, 
safety components, NX/NJ-
series automation 
controllers and the Sysmac 
automation platform, to 
offer easy-to-implement 
solutions to a range of 
industries – including food 
processing and 
pharmaceuticals 
Nabtesco 
Precision reduction gears 
(reducers) for industrial 
robot joints.  
  
¥55.3bn $3.5bn 
Has 60% of the global 
market share for precision 
reduction gears for 
industrial robot joint. 23% 
of its revenue and 35% of 
its operating profit are from 
its precision reduction gears 
segment; supplies to all the 
key global industrial robot 
manufacturers such as 
Fanuc, Yaskawa, Kuka and 
ABB 
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Company  
 
Main technology focus Total 
revenue 
in 2016 
Market  
capitalization 
Revenue by sector in 2016 
THK linear motion guides and linear motors 
Targets 
to 
¥262bn 
in 2017 
$2.5 bn 
About 50% of the 
worldwide market share in 
linear motion guides  
SMC 
precision pneumatic 
components and systems for 
semiconductor production 
equipment, machine tools 
and other equipment. 
Targets 
to 
¥450bn 
in 2017 
$19.9bn - 
Keyence 
machine vision solutions, 
major supplier of other FA 
components and systems 
(controls, safety devices, 
laser marking equipment 
and barcode readers) 
¥379.3b
n $44.2bn - 
Source: compiled from the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation (2015) 
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Table III.4 Summary of key country level finding34  
Country USA35 GER36 FR37 ITA38 UK39 JPN40 CHI41 KOR42 EU43 
IFR 2016 rank, 
by 2015 robot 
sales (% change 
from 2014) 
4 (5%) 5 (0.2%) NA (3%) 7 (7%) NA 3 (20%) 
1 
(29%) 2 (55%)  
IFR 2016 robot 
density in 
manufacturing 
per 10,000 
employees 
176 301 NA 155 NA 305 49 531  
Primary 
industry 
association 
Robotics 
Industries 
Association 
The 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
Industry 
Association 
SYROBO 
Group 
UCIMU-
Sistemi 
per 
produrre 
The British 
Automation 
& Robot 
Association 
Japan Robot 
Association 
China 
Robot 
Industr
y 
Allianc
e 
Korean 
Association 
of Robot 
Industry  
Key public 
stakeholders 
US 
Department 
of Defense 
German 
Ministry of 
Economy 
and 
Research 
French 
Ministry 
of 
Econom
y 
Italian 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Developmen
t 
Engineering 
and Physical 
Sciences 
Research 
Council 
Ministry 
of 
Economy, 
Trade, and 
Industry 
PRC 
State 
Council 
Korean 
Ministry of 
Trade, 
Industry, 
and Energy 
FP for 
Research 
and 
Innovation 
Primary 
robotics 
programme 
Advanced 
Robotics 
Manufacturing 
(ARM) 
Program 
Industrie 4.0 
Programme 
Industry of 
the Future 
Programm
e 
Industria 
4.0 
State-
sponsored 
research 
Robot 
Revolution 
Initiative 
Made 
in 
China 
2025 
State-
sponsored 
research 
Horizon 
2020 
Programme 
start 2017 2013 2015 2016 2015 2015 2015 2016 2014 
Programme end NA 2020 2017 2020 NA NA 2020 2020 2020 
Programme 
component for 
domestic 
market creation 
Y N N N N Y Y Y  
Focus robotics 
sub-fields  aerospace MFG MFG MFG MFG agriculture  MFG 
medical and 
rehabilitation 
 automotive     
infrastructure 
and disaster 
response 
service  unmanned robotics 
composites manufacturing social works  social works  
logistics medical and rehabilitation security  
textiles service 
* Programme is mostly a combination of financing streams and tax credits for qualified participants. 
                                                 
 
35 Funding data retrieved from the United States Department of Defense (US DoD) Jan. 13, 2017 Press Release 
on ARM Program. 
36 Funding data retrieved from various sources: Temperton (2015), Alpenia (2016), and Thomas (2017). 
37 Funding data retrieved from the French Ministry of Economy’s Press Release on the ‘Industry of the Future 
plan (link). The ‘2.1 billion EUR’ value is the one wherein robotics is explicit mentioned. 
38 Funding data retrieved from the Italian Ministry of Economy presentation on ‘Industria 4.0’. The value is the 
overall public finance burden of the Industria 4.0 plan. 
39 Funding data retrieved from the UK-RAS whitepaper on Industrial Automation.  
40 Funding data retrieved from the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)’s Press Release 
on the Japan Robot Revolution Initiative.  
41 No concrete funding data is available regarding Chinese commitment. 
42 Funding data retrieved from the Yonhap News Agency (2017). 
43 Funding data for the robotics-centred EU SPARC project (under Horizon 2020) is the one used as proxy for 
the program commitment to robotics.. 
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